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ABSTRACT
A CRITIQUE OF ACADEMIC NATIONALISM
FEBRUARY 1997
AMIE A. MACDONALD, B.A., HAMILTON COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Ackermann
The focus of this dissertation is to identify, analyze, and critique
what I take to be a fundamental contradiction between the ideal
mission of the university to serve as the site for the pursuit of truth
and the function of Traditionalist humanities curriculums. I argue
that because nationalist education makes it nearly impossible for
students to engage in the critique of ideology, nationalist education is
antithetical to the university's mission. With anything less than the
ability to engage in this critique of ideology, there is no way that
students can participate meaningfully in the ideal of the university.
In the opening chapter I argue first, that the development and
preservation of national culture stands in a dialectical relation to the
preservation and contestation of national identity; second, that post-
secondary education in the arts and humanities is largely education in
the national culture; and third, that nationalism mediates the
dialectical relation between national culture and national identity.
v
In the second chapter I critique nationalism on the grounds that
underlying every nationalist movement (including curricular
Traditionalism) is a universalist project which denies the reality of
complex personal identity formation.
In the third chapter I show that the Traditionalist position
(articulated by Bloom, D'Souza, and Searle) seeks to support through
curricular control nationalist versions of culture and identity.
In the fourth chapter I critique Marx's and Mannheim's theories
of ideology since they seek to devise methods for evaluating ideology
through epistemic standpoints removed from the site of the
production of ideology. And thus I conclude this chapter by asserting
that in order to be a critic of ideology one must struggle with and
acknowledge multiple and complex social identities.
In the final chapter I defend the claim that nationalist education
undermines the process of teaching students to be critics of ideology
since such an education prevents students from engaging the
complexity of the encounter between the knowing subject and the
object of knowledge. Moreover, I argue that a decidedly non-
nationalist multicultural education offers the possibility of developing
heterogeneous group identity without the deleterious consequences
invariably brought forth by nationalism.
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CHAPTER I
NATIONALISM AND THE ACADEMY
A. Introduction
In this first chapter I am examining what I take to be the general
relationship between formal intellectual activity in the academy 1 and
nationalism. In her most recent book. Teaching to Transgress, bell
hooks claims that "If we examine critically the traditional role of the
university in the pursuit of truth and the sharing of knowledge and
information, it is painfully clear that biases that uphold and maintain
White supremacy, imperialism, sexism, and racism have distorted
education so that it is no longer about the practice of freedom"(29).
Now, while many argue that the university actually serves functions
other than the pursuit of truth and the sharing of knowledge (for
example, that the university is the training ground for the professions,
or that it prepares individuals to be productive members of a capitalist
economy, etc.), and while I am somewhat sympathetic to the
sentiments of these different arguments, I am more concerned in the
dissertation to discuss some of the philosophical aspects of the
relationship between the ideal mission of the university and the real
^y the "academy" or academia I mean to refer to post-secondary level education. I
have restricted my analysis to college and university level curriculum in order to focus
on the specifics of recent disputes over post-secondary humanities curriculum and the
role of nationalism in these disputes. In no way do I mean to suggest by focusing my
inquiry in this fashion that primary and secondary education are not similarly
impacted by the forces of nationalism in the United States.
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consequences of university education. Therefore, the focus of my
dissertation is to identify, analyze, and critique what I take to be a
fundamental contradiction between the ideal of the pursuit of truth
and the function of Traditionalist humanities curriculums in the
modern university. Specifically, I am concerned to launch an
ideological critique of the pedagogical practices of Traditionalism, both
in curriculum and method, that are antithetical to students' pursuit of
truth and knowledge. In this case, I am arguing that because
nationalist education makes it nearly impossible for students to engage
in the critique of ideology, nationalist education is antithetical to the
mission of the university. That is, if we accept the claim that the
university is a place to pursue truth, and we acknowledge that there are
many different accounts of what truth is or might be (not all of which
are true), students must be intellectually equipped not only to
understand the varied accounts of truth presented to them by their
professors and fellow students, but must be able to begin themselves to
evaluate and adjudicate among these different, and often competing,
accounts of truth. With anything less than the ability to engage in this
critique of ideology, there is no way that students can participate
meaningfully in the ideal of the university.
Essential to my understanding of ideology is that it is central to
the perpetuation and maintenance of coercive power structures. Thus,
exposing and analyzing the content of a particular ideology in the
process of ideology critique is a way of contesting those power
structures. My understanding of ideological critique therefore does not
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include the possibility of an unmotivated ideological critique. That is,
my undertaking to expose, in the case of my dissertation, the
fundamental aspects of the ideological underpinnings of what I am
calling academic nationalism, is motivated by my understanding of
academic nationalism as ideological. Ideological critique then is useful
and valuable in that it exposes the tight theoretical and practical
connections between sets of seemingly unconnected (or at best loosely
connected) ideas and practices: between, in this case, the ideas and
pedagogical practices of nationalist education and the failure to teach
students to think critically, to be able to critique ideology, and therefore
to be able to choose and thus act voluntarily.
It is my aim then in this opening chapter to show first, that the
development and preservation of national culture stands in a
dialectical relation to the preservation and contestation of national
identity; second, that post-secondary education in the arts and
humanities is largely (though not exclusively) education in the
national culture; and third, that nationalism mediates the dialectical
relation between national culture and national identity.
I recognize that these terms that I am working with - nation,
nationalism, national culture - are all hopelessly vague. There is a
tremendous amount of scholarship devoted to finding definitions for
these concepts. However, I wish in this chapter to begin with
substantive accounts and instances of nation, nationalism, and
national culture rather than to attempt abstract definitions at the
outset, definitions that might correspond in advance to the conclusions
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I wish to draw. I begin here since it is my belief that clear articulations
of these concepts are in the histories and realities of nations, both
sovereign and colonized.
B. National Identity and National Culture
Frantz Fanon writes in his Wretched of the Earth "For culture is
the first expression of a nation, the expression of its preferences, of its
taboos, and of its patterns"(244). Fanon is working towards a different
end than I in his discussion "On National Culture," however, there are
elements in his analysis pivotal to the point that I am trying to make;
namely, that the development and preservation of a national culture is
a central component of nationalism.
In this section of Wretched of the Earth Fanon is critiquing the
concept of negritude on the grounds that it fails to express the cultural
diversity of distinct African nations. In fact, according to Fanon, the
concept of negritude works to obfuscate the reality of national cultural
diversity in Africa. The result of African intellectuals focusing on
elaborating African cultural icons, such as the concept of negritude and
a canon of Negro literature, has resulted in a failure to create distinct
national cultures. Fanon states: "The native intellectual who has gone
far beyond the domains of Western culture and who has got it into his
head to proclaim the existence of another culture never does so in the
name of Angola or Dahomey. The culture which is affirmed is African
culture"(212).
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While according to Fanon this perception of a lack of distinct
national cultures in the continent of Africa has everything to do with
the colonialist empire that worked to eradicate any sense of distinct
nationality on that continent, African intellectuals contribute to this
situation by organizing their intellectual inquiry and production
around concepts that further reinforce this notion of Africa as
populated by many people who are all essentially the same. Thus the
colonialists in Africa, like their counterpart White slave holders in
America, do not see Africans as citizens of any particular nation; they
are all simply Negroes (sic). He states: 'The whites of America did not
mete out to them any different treatment from that of the whites who
ruled over the Africans. We have seen that the whites were used to
putting all Negroes in the same bag"(215).
Thus Fanon identifies not only the theoretical limitations of
negritude as a concept, but the far-reaching social, political, economic,
and above all national, ramifications of cultivating a non-national
culture. In the case of Algerians (and all other Africans) the absence of
a national culture and the conscious effort on the part of Black
intellectuals to promote a unified (homogenous) Pan-African cultural
sensibility based on skin color further cements the colonialist
occupation of African nations. Moreover, the cultivation of a non-
national culture is tantamount to the suppression of the national
culture, a suppression which works to impede the process of
decolonization by forestalling the realization of the nation. Therefore
Fanon argues that "[t]o fight for national culture means in the first
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place to fight for the liberation of the nation, that material keystone
which makes the building of a culture possible"(233).
Amilcar Cabral in "National Liberation and Culture" argues
similarly that national culture has the ability to nourish any society,
though especially those on the cusp of liberation. Thus, imperialist
domination of societies includes the simultaneous denial and
occlusion of cultural development in the dominated society. Cabral
states that "Whatever may be the ideological or idealistic characteristics
of cultural expression, culture is an essential element of the history of a
people. Culture is, perhaps, the product of this history just as the
flower is the product of a plant"(55). The inability, for whatever
reason, of a society to express and develop its national culture is
therefore equivalent to a denial of that society's history. And for
Cabral, "the foundation for national liberation rests in the inalienable
right of every people to have their own history"(56).
The relationship between nation and (national) culture then is
dialectical: the liberation or birth of the nation makes way for the
growth of culture, as the development of national culture makes it
possible to conceptualize and define the nation. Fanon though is
theorizing the negation of this relationship: Algeria, without a
distinctive national culture, is unable to achieve the liberation of the
nation, and without the liberation of the nation is unable to cultivate a
distinctive national culture. Thus the call to native intellectuals to
formulate national cultural expressions that are neither reproductions
of the structures of colonial domination nor ossified declarations of
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Pan-Africanism. Similarly, Cabral engages with the relationship
between national culture and nation from the perspective of
challenging and dismantling colonialist dominion over South
American nations.
For Fanon though, nationalism, per se, is not part of this
complex. At the conclusion of his discussion on national culture he
names and responds to the so-called "pharisees" of national claims.
Namely, that the era of the nation is over and that resorting to national
claims is a backward form of cultural, economic, and political
isolationism. To these objections Fanon replies that philosophic
thought teaches us to be self-aware in order to gain knowledge
( Wretched 247) and in so doing, Fanon gives definition to what he calls
national consciousness, a concept to be distinguished from
nationalism. For Fanon, national consciousness (suspiciously similar
to what most understand as nationalism) is the positive expression of a
distinctively national culture, a sure sign of the definition of the
nation, and a necessary component of national liberation. However,
national consciousness Fanon emphasizes, is not nationalism. For it is
national consciousness and national liberation that lead "the nation to
play its part on the stage of history" since it is at the "heart of national
consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows (247-
48). Fanon is very clearly opposing national consciousness, as a
positive and productive international force, to nationalism.
So if we take stock of Fanon' s distinction between these two
concepts, we see that national consciousness is characterized by a
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distinct sense of the nation imbued with a predisposition to a kind of
worldly awareness. Nationalism, however, is sinister in its ability to
support national solipsism. It is on the existence of this distinction
however that my view diverges from Fanon's. While he does not state
it explicitly, to make sense of his position on the connections among
national culture, the nation, and national consciousness, it would
seem that national consciousness is the mediating concept between
national culture and the formation or existence of the nation. It is this
description of nation forming and national existence that I will refer to
from here on in as national identity. But while Fanon makes a clear
definitional distinction between nationalism and national
consciousness, he gives no real grounds for asserting that national
consciousness is capable of engendering sentiments of nationally self-
aware worldly humanism expressed in national culture that do not
have to devolve into the territorial and ideological solipsism of
nationalism.
Fanon's account here of national consciousness is more
representative of a hope or a vision than any actual reality. Of course it
isn't altogether fair to hold Fanon's theory up against historical events
that have occurred since the publication of Wretched of the Earth.
However I think it important to my argument to recognize that
restrictions on national culture in Algeria today are characterized by
anything but a self-aware but worldly humanism. Algerian women
violating any aspect of Muslim dress code are subject to public
humiliation, torture, rape, and murder. Secular and religious Algerian
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journalists, writers, artists, teachers, lawyers, and politicians have been
kidnapped, tortured and murdered for failing, in their cultural
expressions, to adhere to Fundamentalist imaginings of the national
community and national identity. While Fanon's notion of national
consciousness is certainly what many individual citizens of all nations
hope for, I assert instead that at the dialectical crossroads between
national identity and national culture is the phenomenon of
nationalism. Nationalism is the sentiment that permits movement
between national identity and the definition of national culture;
nationalism constructs national culture according to the current
conception of the national identity and nationalism fortifies and
refines the borders of the nation, and so defines national identity, with
the cultivation of a particular national culture.
This assertion is borne out in examples from radically different
national communities. In the United States, for example, the English
Only Movement2 gains momentum on a daily basis. The political
organization U.S. English, at its inception headed ironically by a
Japanese-American immigrant, and then by Linda Chavez (a Latina
and former Staff Director of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission) works
autonomously and in conjunction with other conservative
2The movement to establish English as the official language in the United States is
currently spearheaded by two major organizations, U.S. English and English First. In
addition, there are many minor - and often more reactionary - organizations promoting
the establishment of English as the official national language. The general term I use
however to describe all of the political organizations and structures aiming at
establishing English as the official language of the United States is the English Only
Movement. Thus, in reference to the activities of a specific organization, such as U.S.
English, I will use the title of the organization. In reference to the political movement
in general I will use 'English Only Movement.'
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organizations to prevent the United States from becoming
multilingual. Among the goals of U.S. English and other English Only
Movement supporters are: to make it illegal to print election ballots
and voting instructions in any language other than English or to
provide at the State's expense courtroom translators; to outlaw
bilingual public education; to criminalize the act of speaking any
language other than English in the workplace. This is an unabashed
attempt to shape national culture in response to a particular conception
of the United States' national identity.
Nationalism in this case, as a sentiment, mediates between the
Movement's concept of the nation's identity and the Movement's
attempts to restructure national culture. I say the concept of national
identity since the English Only Movement is geared towards actively
retooling the composition of the nation, though it simultaneously
asserts that it is merely preserving the nation as it has always been.
That is, the English Only Movement makes it seem as though the
United States is an English speaking country, has always been an
English speaking country, and thus should continue to be an English
speaking country. The English Only Movement thus asserts that to
secure English as the official language of the United States is to
maintain a fundamental aspect of American national culture and thus
of American national identity. English Only Movement supporters
take their theoretical lead from the claim that the United States was
initially colonized and established as a nation by English speakers.
Proponents of this initiative towards official monolingualism will
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grant that the United States is a nation of immigrants - many of them
originating from non-English speaking countries, but claim that the
immigrant experience has always been (and thus should continue to
be) one of assimilation to American culture, especially with regard to
language. Thus, the different players in the English Only Movement
attempt to make their legislative goals appear innocuous when actually
they are undertaking to alter significantly the national culture (from
multilingual to monolingual) according to a particular national
conception of the United States as fundamentally English speaking.
That the territory governed by the United States of America has
always been multilingual is confirmed by a cursory examination of U.S.
history. For example, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 annexed
by military and economic force enormous tracts of land (extending as
far north as to what is today called the state of Colorado) from Mexico
to the United States. This land was populated nearly exclusively by
Spanish speakers. In fact, the Treaty insured Spanish speakers the right
to keep their language. In this respect, it is valid to claim that Spanish
is a native language of the United States. In 1898 the final annexation
of Hawai'i was achieved by congressional resolution, effectively
annexing to the United States a population of Hawaiian and Japanese
speakers3 (Trask 4-28). Between 1940 and 1960 the United States
government orchestrated a campaign of economic "incentives,” forced
3 In 1896 the U.S. government banned the use of the Hawaiian language in Hawaii.
After Hawai'i officially became a territory in 1900, all education and government was
conducted in English; this despite the fact that natives and non-natives alike all spoke
Hawaiian. See Haunani Kay-Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and
Sovereignty in Hawai'i.
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sterilization, and misinformation, effectively resulting in a massive
outmigration of Spanish speakers from the island of Puerto Rico to
New York City . 4 These are only three of many examples one could cite
to support the contention that the United States has a distinctively
national history of multilingualism. Nationalist desires for purity and
homogeneity in language and thus in citizenry, for resistance to foreign
intervention (let alone foreign domination), and for an identifiable
collective identity, inform the English Only Movement's nationalist
legislative initiatives. National consciousness of a national history and
contemporary reality of English linguistic purity have little to do with
the English Only Movement's attempts to establish official
monolingualism.
These qualities of the English Only Movement characterize that
movement as inherently nationalist. Nationalism decisively
presupposes the homogeneity of national history, and thereby
prefigures national culture and identity as pure and fixed. In the case
of the English Only Movement, assertions of homogeneous identity
over time in national culture and identity are focused on language.
The claim to past national linguistic purity is false though nationalism
constructs it as true. This false nationalist claim mediates between
culture and identity to produce the desired nationalist homogeneity in
current national culture and identity.
There is a similar linguistic purity initiative in the Province of
Quebec that shares many of the features of the English Only Movement
4See the film La Operation for documentation of this mass exodus of Puerto Ricans to
New York City.
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in the United States. In Quebec the French Only language laws were
instituted in 1983. Enforcement of these laws focused for a time on
shops and restaurants who are barred from printing any bilingual
menus, signs, etc. Restaurants may furnish English speakers with a
menu written in English at the request of the customer. The occasional
absurdity of enforcement, for example an early morning raid on a
Donut shop in Montreal that yielded a citation and seizure of several
cases of napkins bearing the greeting 'Good Morning!', has not
diminished the Quebec nationalists' attempts to achieve linguistic
purity. Again, in this case, Quebec nationalism mediates between a
particular concept of Quebec's national identity as uniformly French
(and thereby distinct from other provinces in Canada) and the
construction of national culture by curtailing the use and appearance of
any language other than French.
Now, while the national status of both the United States and the
Province of Quebec is fundamentally different from that of Algeria and
other colonized or post-colonial Third World nations, the complex of
national identity-nationalism-national culture is similar in relevant
respects. What is the relationship between national identity and
national culture in these cases? On what grounds can it be said that it
is nationalism, and not national consciousness, that informs
social/political thought and action on national culture and national
identity? Nationalists in both Quebec and the United States recognize
the value of culture in defining and preserving national identity (as do
Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria). That Quebec has achieved many
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of its linguistic purity initiatives and that the English Only Movement
has achieved national notoriety is reflected in the fact that both
nationalist movements have had significant impact on the topography
of their respective national cultures. In the October 1995 vote on
Quebec independence, residents of Quebec narrowly rejected the
referendum. Over 92 percent of Quebec's five million eligible voters
cast ballots - a record turnout for any vote in the province's history.
The referendum was defeated by an exceptionally narrow margin (50.6
percent against and 49.4 percent for); this even though only in March of
1995 "recent polls have indicated that a majority of Quebecers are
opposed to totally severing ties with Canada" ("Quebecer Offers Case
for His Cause" 2). In the United States, U.S. English has claimed
responsibility for the declaration of English as the official state language
in thirteen states, including California (May 1).
What makes these movements nationalist is the intention to
produce a collective and homogeneous national identity grounded in
national cultural purity; in the case of the English Only Movement and
the Quebec nationalists, linguistic purity. Now Fanon claims that the
cultivation of a distinctively national culture is, or perhaps can be,
emblematic of national consciousness and not nationalism. Thus
Fanon seems to be arguing that while nationalism is destructive in that
it imagines and thus produces cultural purity where there was none,
national consciousness is instead the exploration and cultivation of
existing aspects of national culture. But these movements to shape
national culture through monolingualism cannot be understood as
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expressions of national consciousness according to Fanon's conception
of national consciousness. The English Only Movement is about
anything but national self-knowledge. As I have argued above, the
English Only Movement actually serves to conceal and erase
fundamental realities of our national linguistic (and thus ethnic and
racial) history and composition. Fanon claims that "[t]he consciousness
of self is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic
thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee"(247).
While if the English Only Movement ever achieved their major
objectives, this would surely impact the ability of the United States to
"play its part on the stage of history"(Fanon 247), this turn of events
would in no way be a sign of the international consciousness Fanon
claims arises from national consciousness. To seek linguistic (and
thereby racial and ethnic) national purity is a clear manifestation of
nationalism since underlying these goals is a vision of collective
national identity, achievable only through purification and
homogenization of the nation's ultimately diverse citizenry.
What makes these movements interesting to me is that they
provide concrete evidence for the claim that there is a conclusive
relationship between national culture and nationalism. Nationalist
movements seek to control national culture because nationalists
recognize the power of culture to protect an existing nation from
challenges to national sovereignty. Matthew Arnold noted this in his
Culture and Anarchy. In reference to his new conception of culture, a
culture that would in place of religion sustain England as a major
15
European imperial power, he states clearly that "[t]hrough culture
seems to lie our way, not only to perfection, but even to safety"(West
22). Likewise, the intellectual leadership of colonized or occupied
nations often recognizes the impact of culture on the fortification of a
fledgling nation's liberation struggle. Writing about the revival of
Hawaiian culture and language since 1970, Haunani Kay-Trask
concludes that "the cultural revitalization that Hawaiians are now
experiencing and transmitting to their children is as much a
repudiation of colonization by so-called Western civilization as it is a
reclamation of our own past and our own ways of life. This is why
cultural revitalization is often resisted and disparaged by
anthropologists and others: they see very clearly that its political effect
is de-colonization of the mind"(188). National culture provides an
arena for the contestation, preservation, and construction of national
identity; this is one reason why nationalist movements are often
focused on shaping national culture.
Gottlieb Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation give further
evidence to this claim. In the Addresses
,
Fichte argues that education
is the basis of national security and self-determination. He states in the
introduction: "In a word, it is a total change of the existing system of
education that I propose as the sole means of preserving the existence
of the German nation"(13). He goes on to outline a program for
national education based in the assertion of linguistic unity and purity
among Germans. At any rate, his program for education is
pedagogically interesting in that it is not based in reading specific texts
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or reciting national literature, poems, songs, or the like. Fichte's "new
education" is instead designed to mold the will of all Germans so that
ambivalence in the face of moral decision making will be impossible.
Essentially, Fichte is claiming that with a nation of Germans who all
speak German (an uncorrupted language), and who have been
educated according to this new program, it will be impossible for
anyone to challenge the strength of the German nation. In fact, Fichte
even goes so far as to claim in his Patriotism and its Opposite that "a
state which adopted his educational policy could dispense with an
army, for then it 'would have a nation to put in arms, which simply
could not be defeated by any mortal power'"(Kedourie 84).
In other words, Fichte argues that his program for national
education (which did in fact have significant impact on the
development of education in Germany5 ) is not only an important
component in the process of national fortification of Germany; Fichte
claims that it is only through institution of a national education that
the nation's sovereignty can be maintained. The implementation of
Fichte's plan would make it possible to exert unparalleled control over
the definition and construction of national identity precisely by
controlling the development of national culture. All German children
would be taught that the German language is superior to other
Teutonic languages, that the German language provides the basis for
national cultural (and intellectual unity), and most importantly, that
5See the translators' introduction to Addresses to the German Nation where they assert
that Fichte's educational philosophy had significant influence on Wilhelm von
Humboldt, "whose ideas and plans for German education were carried into effect in 1809
and 1810 . . . Humboldt's work laid the real foundations of modem education. . "(xxi).
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all Germans share, in a fundamental sense, a national identity
grounded in linguistic purity. By virtue of cultural unification,
Germany can secure its national borders against any foreign invasion
or intervention.
But this is precisely why the difficulty arises in forming a
distinctively national culture (regardless of the nation in question) that
is emblematic of Fanon's notion of worldly national consciousness
rather than of nationalism. Fanon's attempt to theorize national
culture based on national consciousness (as opposed to nationalism) is
laudable in the visionary sense. Recognizing the importance of
cultural production to national liberation and responding to the
urgency created by French colonialist violence against Algerians as
citizens and Muslims as a religious order, Fanon reaches for a non-
nationalistic but still distinctively national conception of culture.
Interestingly, Fanon's call for the development of national
culture is decisively in response to colonialist assertions of the cultural
homogeneity of Africans. This is intriguing to me since while Fanon
aims to denounce the ideological assertion that all Africans are the
same by asserting the legitimacy of distinct national cultures, the
attempt to develop a distinct national culture results in a falsely
unified and homogeneous conception of national identity and culture.
This seems to be an expression of an internal contradiction
fundamental to nationalism: Fanon turns to the development of
national culture and identity in order to combat colonialist denial of
difference among Africans and this same denial of difference among
18
Algerians is the result of cultivating national identity and culture. In
other words, nationalism is often seen as the most viable route for
resistance to and liberation from dominating foreign powers (for viable
nations, nationalism is seen as a program for maintaining
independence) who often achieve hegemony by falsely homogenizing
the identity of the colonized. Nationalism however is untenable
without a firm conception of national identity, one that requires false
unification and homogenization of the national citizenry.
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to develop a national culture
that is not informed by nationalism since the notion of a national
culture is itself untenable without a clear and definable conception of
national identity. Any attempt to define national identity is bound to
result in some fundamental falsification of the realities of national
identity (understood simply as the actual identities of all citizens of the
nation) since the project of defining national identity necessarily
involves attempting to articulate an ultimately diverse reality in a
unified conception. Therein nationalism recreates the very political
conditions it sets out to transform.
To summarize, I have tried to develop two central points in this
section. First, that control over the definition and development of
national identity, and thus of the conception of the nation, is
inextricably bound up with control over the cultural expression of a
nation. And second, that attempts to shape national culture are all too
often grounded in nationalism; the attempt to shape national culture is
based upon a falsely homogeneous conception of national identity.
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C. National Culture and Education
What is national culture? Fanon's discussion of national
culture was originally delivered as a speech at the Second Congress of
Black Artists and Writers, Rome, 1959. His comments are direct
responses to theoretical and creative trends among Black intellectuals
of all nationalities, theoretical and creative trends in literature, the arts,
and social criticism. Amilcar Cabral's definition of national culture is
broad enough so as to include any act of armed resistance to
colonization for the sake of national liberation. The English Only
Movement in the United States and the Quebec nationalist linguistic
purity initiatives are focused ostensibly on the structures of
communication, though the effects of enforced linguistic purity reach
far beyond a simple exchange of linguistic codes. Obviously, the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship would be difficult to exercise in an
unfamiliar language - the right to vote, the right to legal defense
counsel, the obligation to pay taxes, etc. The increasing economic
pressure on bilingual education programs in the United States due to
declining public support for them will make it exceptionally difficult
for the children of non-English speaking immigrants and U.S. citizens
without financial means to procure an education equal to that of their
native English speaking counterparts. Fichte's Addresses also focus on
the power of linguistic purity in defining the nation, though the
program for national education as the sole means to reconstitute a
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powerful and sovereign German nation introduces education as a
significant element of national culture.
Thus it would seem that the concept of culture embraces all
production in the realm of thought of a designated group of people.
National culture then would simply be the conglomeration of all
production in the realm of thought of a given nationally defined
community. In the examples I have cited so far, language, religion,
intellectual work, creative expression (literary, visual, performing, and
musical arts), political/social/economic history and analysis, and
education have all emerged as central locations for nationalist struggle
over the definition of national culture and thus national identity. In
the case of each broad category we can identify specific consequences for
national identity of shaping cultural manifestations in any given way.
The French Only movement in Quebec has had the effect of
significantly increasing separatist sentiment in Quebec by virtue of
highlighting a Quebecois national identity distinct from and, in fact as
far as some are concerned, inconsistent with (English) Canadian
identity. 6 Moreover, Law 101 (the French language law) does much to
ensure that there will be a continual community of French speakers
who will presumably be Quebec identified - in opposition to English
Canada. The provisions of Law 101 ensure this reality by forbidding
Francophone or immigrant parents from sending their children to
English language schools while permitting English Canadians to send
6See Charles Taylor "The Politics of Recognition" in Multiculturalism: A Critical
Reader, 89-95. Taylor outlines here the basic history of Law 101 which forbids
commercial signage in English, and forbids Francophones and immigrants from sending
their children to English-language schools.
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their children to English language schools. Thus by explicit control
over the language in which children are educated, and ensuring
through immigration law that the children of any new citizens of
Quebec who are not Anglo-Canadian will be educated in French, the
Quebec government is able to exert a significant measure of control
over the national identity of Quebec.
The colonization and annexation of Hawai'i led to a dramatic
decrease in the native Hawaiian population in Hawai'i; today only
twenty percent of residents are Native 7 (Trask 22), a fact resulting from
death (due to disease) and immigration of large numbers of Japanese
and American nationals. Hawai'i's national identity has clearly been
radically altered by U.S. colonization of Hawaiian culture; the
imposition of Christianity (to the exclusion of Native religion), the
institution of English as the official language (a process fortified by the
forced closure of all Hawaiian language schools), and the introduction
of U.S. military and tourist industries have all worked to create a
damaging national image of Hawai'i as a land of palm trees, tropical
drinks, and hula hula girls.
The English Only Movement has influenced recent national
trends in politics, trends that have resulted in the introduction of all
manner of legislative initiatives hostile to immigrants (legal and
illegal) and non-English speaking or multilingual U.S. citizens. If these
legislative initiatives are ever enacted, their enforcement will
significantly change the demography, the distribution of education,
7United States Census records indicate that only thirteen percent of resident
Hawaiians are Native.
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capital, and employment among United States citizens, and thus the
national culture and consequently the national identity, of the United
States . 8
The Algerian Armed Islamic Group and similar organizations in
Algeria have, through violence and propaganda, essentially purged all
Westerners from the country and silenced, by murder or kidnapping,
many prominent Algerian thinkers (journalists, intellectuals, teachers,
writers, lawyers) critical of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement in
Algeria. Through violent intimidation, the Islamic fundamentalists
are able to alter and shape the cultural practices in which citizens can
safely engage (dress, religion, politics, education, etc.), and in so doing
8Both the House and Senate have recently passed legislation (July 1996) on
immigration reform that will add 5600 new border patrol and immigration
investigators and streamline the deportation process. This despite the fact that a
recent investigation by the INS of the United States Border Patrol operations in San
Diego has yielded allegations that San Diego supervisors falsified reports to make it
appear as though the recent crackdown measure that included a significant buildup of
San Diego Border Patrol, known as Operation Gatekeeper, was successful in reducing
illegal border crossings from Mexico. See "Union Alleges Border Patrol Faked Results in
Crackdown" in the New York Times 14 July 1996: A21. See also Kenneth Noble's article
in the New York Times 3 April 1996: A10, for a story describing how "a videotape of
two white deputies clubbing Mexicans has jarred the Los Angelas area and revived
charges that law enforcement officials have failed to confront a pattern of
brutality"(Noble 10).
Moreover, California voters narrowly defeated Proposition 187, a state
initiative that would have withheld basic health, education, and food benefits from
the U.S. citizen children of illegal immigrants (Ayres "California Immigration Law is
Ruled to be Partly Illegal"). However, federal legislation currently under
consideration includes provisions to withhold education from the U.S. citizen children
of illegal immigrants. Bilingual education has become the target of anti-immigration
groups and others eager to have English declared as the nation's official language
(Celis "Bilingual Questions: The Answer is 'Si' or 'No Way'"). This despite the fact
that a "study finds many foreign bom residents in the southern part of California are
rapidly acclimating to life there, generally learning English and escaping poverty at a
quick pace . . . this study comes against the backdrop of California's immigration
debate, with many Californians calling for stricter immigration laws and measures
that would require use of English in state business"("California Immigrants Make Fast
Economic Gains, Study Finds" 40).
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can effectively modify Algeria's national culture and thereby Algerian
national identity. With or without the will of its people, Algeria is
undergoing a transformation from a post-colonial nation state into a
Fundamentalist Islamic nation.
Thus in each of these examples, changes in different
manifestations of national culture, whether these changes are the will
of the majority or not, lead to changes in national identity. Definition
of national culture - national language, religion, ideology, history,
political philosophy, artistic form, economy, education, etc. - is reflected
in national identity. I want to focus here on just one of these broad
categories: education. Education stands out as a central mechanism for
constructing, altering, and especially maintaining national identity. Let
me suggest then that this is the reason for the current storm over
educational policy. Education is, above all, intellectual training in
language, religion, ideology, politics, economics, the arts and
humanities, history, etc. The goal of education is (in general) to teach to
students both historical and current achievements in these different
manifestations of culture with the hope that they will make their own
contributions to culture or, at the least, learn to appreciate and
understand it. Thus while the other categories of human intellectual
and artistic production are central to the topography of any given
culture, education is unique in its capacity to shape national culture
since education is instruction in all the varied manifestations of
culture; that is, education is instruction in language, religion, ideology,
history, political economy, etc.
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Education in communities that understand themselves in
national terms is thereby training not merely in culture, but in the
national culture; in this way, education becomes a likely arena for
nationalist battles. But I am getting ahead of the story here; below I will
turn to the question of what exactly makes these contests over the
definition of national culture specifically nationalist. For now, I want
to continue with this line of reasoning: having argued that national
culture exists in a dialectical relation with national identity and is
therefore a significant determinant of national identity, I now want to
assert that education is a special case for the analysis of national
culture. As I have suggested above, education occupies a unique
position in its impact on the formation of national culture. Formal
education, as Fichte realized, has the potential to determine
significantly the course of national culture. While Fichte was
concerned with all levels of national education, I am restricting my
analysis to post-secondary education in the humanities. While the
academy is certainly not solely responsible for all manifestations of
national culture, major contributions to and contestations of national
culture are determined by what happens in the academic world. The
colleges and universities in the United States are the location of
intellectual training for the vast majority of writers, artists, politicians,
scientists, doctors, teachers, judges, etc . 9 Moreover, nearly every
9This is not to say at all that the colleges and universities are the only institutions
where intellectual training takes place. Obviously, many other institutions and
industries participate in this process. A partial listing would include museums,
primary and secondary schools, television broadcasting, major motion pictures, popular
music, print journalism, etc.
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individual occupying a position of economic, social, or political power
in the United States has undertaken formal education in a college or
university in the United States. 10 The impact of this training on the
topography of national culture is thereby significant.
There are strong arguments however against this position that
there can be such a conclusive relationship between the form and
content of education on the one hand and national identity or national
culture on the other. In her essay "Why Do We Read?" Katha Pollit
clearly articulates the objections to this position. After a brief treatise
on the inappropriateness of teaching popular literature in college
courses, Pollit concludes that the curriculum debate between liberals
(or Multiculturalists) and conservatives (or Traditionalists) is not based
on a dispute over what we read, but rather grows out of a fundamental
confusion regarding the purpose of reading. According to Pollit, we
should read for aesthetic pleasures of language, form and image (208)
and not for what she calls medicinal purposes. The participants in the
controversy over multiculturalism, Pollit argues, have made a
fundamental error regarding the relationship between books and
behavior. She states: "The culture debaters turn out to share a secret
suspicion of culture itself, as well as the anti-pornographer's belief that
there is a simple, one-to-one correlation between books and behavior.
Read the conservatives' list and produce a nation of sexists and racists-
or a nation of philosopher kings. Read the liberals' list and produce a
10
It would be interesting to consider the impact on nationalism in other countries, and on
relations between nations, of the fact that significant numbers of politicians, scientists,
intellectuals, and artists from all over the world are educated in the United States
academy.
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nation of spineless relativists-or a nation of open-minded world
citizens. Read the radicals' list, and produce a nation of psychobabblers
and ancestor worshippers-or a nation of proud-to-be-me pluralists.
Books do not shape character in any simple way. . . Books cannot mold
a common national purpose when, in fact, people are honestly divided
about what kind of country they want. . ."(210).
Pollit makes an excellent point here. She claims that reading
certain books cannot have a universalizing effect on national identity
in terms of molding a common national purpose. The citizens of this
nation have always disagreed (for good reason) about exactly what kind
of country it is that they want to live in, and submitting the national
citizenry to a required reading list is not going to change the fact of
fundamental disagreement in the population over national identity.
So, to extend her argument, the point is that even before the
movement towards multiculturalism began in the 1960's with the
advent of Black Studies programs, there was radical and widespread
disagreement among the nation's people about what exactly American
national identity or American national culture was, or should be. That
is, before any dramatic curricular changes were even considered by
institutions, much less introduced, in the American academy, there
existed dramatic disagreement among the nation's citizens as to what
American national purpose or identity was. The standard college
curriculum that existed without controversy into the early 1960's did
nothing to curtail dissension among the nation's citizens regarding the
shape of American national identity. Therefore, it is foolish for
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Traditionalists to think that returning to (or maintaining) a traditional
curriculum would successfully obliterate all such national controversy.
Likewise, it is foolish of the Multiculturalists to contend that a
diversification of the curriculum will lead to a common pluralist
national purpose.
While I agree fully with the point that Pollit makes here, her
focus on the more simple-minded arguments of the Traditionalists and
the Multiculturalists effectively truncates her analysis. While the
arguments in, for example, Roger Kimball's Tenured Radicals
,
suggest
his adherence to such a view of a one-to-one correlation between books
and behavior, certainly there are much more sophisticated arguments
on all sides of this question that do not fall prey to such criticism.
I wish to make two related points here. First, it is no trivial
matter that a fundamental part of the debate over multiculturalism
grows out of a concern for molding what Pollit calls national purpose,
and what I would call national identity and national culture. I believe
that exposing this kind of nationalist motivation behind the debate
over curriculum is productive in that critiquing the ideological
foundations of the debate, rather than the superficial assumptions of
the respective participants, permits consideration of the logic behind
teaching this particular curriculum. Moreover, to a large degree, it
does not matter whether books do actually influence behavior, or make
it possible to mold a particular national purpose. What does matter is
that Traditionalists and some Multiculturalists believe that this is so;
they perceive a relationship between books and behavior and thereby
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work tirelessly to institute a curricular program that corresponds to
their own vision of national identity and culture. While Pollit may
contend that such a belief is fundamentally flawed, individuals from
all camps - liberal, conservative, radical, and anarchic - speak, write,
and act as if the opposite were true. And they are getting results. Diane
Ravitch, the former Assistant United States Secretary of Education, is a
major contributor to the national conversation regarding curricular
reform. Her presence and impact as a representative of the Federal
government suggests the import of the relationship between education
and national culture. The University of California, San Diego 1989
proposal for a Department of Ethnic Studies was approved in 1990
(Gutierrez 164) and many other major research institutions are
reconstructing their programs in Area Studies, as well as
interdisciplinary programs, into full fledged academic departments 11 .
Clearly many individuals participating in the national debate
over curricular reform believe that there is a substantive relation
between curriculum and national purpose. Thus, even if it were the
case that books had no significant impact on human behavior, the
perception that books do impact behavior is significant enough to
warrant our attention and analysis. It is this belief that leads them to
work vociferously for their particular preferred outcome. And it is this
vociferating that I am most interested in, since it is from this
perspective that I can argue against the Traditionalist position - not
11 For a concise account of the history of Ethnic Studies in U.S. colleges and universities
see Ramon A. Gutierrez "Ethnic Studies: Its Evolution in American Colleges and
Universities."
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because I have a different national plan than they do, but because
attempting to construct curriculum and pedagogy according to
nationalist understandings of culture and identity ultimately impairs
the university's ability to achieve its stated mission of teaching
students to think critically.
Second, the impact of books, of intellectual activity, of thought,
on human behavior is not insignificant. It simply is not the case that
there is no relationship between books and behavior, as Pollit asserts.
It is true though that the relationship is complex. Pollit reacts to a
glaring absence of argument in the assertion that there is some central
relationship between books and behavior and she is right to focus on
this. Moreover, Pollit identifies the simple-minded assumption in the
likes of former Secretary of Education William F. Bennett and the
multitudes of politically correct curricular reformers who seek to
change merely the required reading lists simply for the sake of
representativeness. For example, those who claim that if only X
reading list would be instituted as the standard college and university
humanities curriculum, then radical disagreement about what it
means to be an American would simply evaporate.
However, Pollit is not right to conclude from these observations
that there is no relationship between books and behavior. As I have
argued above, while I certainly would agree with her that a nation-
wide program of the Great Books curriculum would not produce a
nation of philosopher kings, I do think it would have significant
impact on intellectual culture, and thereby on national culture, if such
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a curriculum were instituted. The recent outpouring of scholarship
and inquiry in Area Studies, Women's Studies, Queer Theory, and
other so-called insurgent academic disciplines is certainly the result of
fundamental changes in the courses and academic majors available to
students today as compared even to what was available fifteen years
ago.
Pollit's reduction of the arguments over the curriculum to the
critique that they all rest on a simple-minded assertion regarding the
relationship between books and behavior has the effect of obscuring
what is fundamentally at issue in these debates: struggles over national
identity. Surely, anyone who claims that reading the Great Books will
automatically produce a nation of Philosopher Kings, or alternatively a
nation of sexists and racists, is flat out incorrect. Alternatively, the
position that any particular curriculum has no particular effect on the
composition of the nation is equally incorrect . 12 So we need to look
more closely then at what these different constituencies are claiming as
the result of their particular curricular programs.
I want to be careful here though to point out that it is not my
aim to show that we need yet another list of books, another
curriculum, in order to achieve the ideal national community. To
argue at this point for any one list of books over any other list of books
would be to fall right into the trap laid by Pollit, and to miss entirely
the ideological underpinnings of the current battles over curriculum.
12
It is of no small significance that this argument stretches back at least as far as
Plato's Rqjublic. For Plato, the rulers of the state can be properly and completely
trained only through a detailed and comprehensive program of education, including
intellectual, ethical, and physical training.
31
It is not my intention to argue for any one list of books over any other
list of books; instead, my aim is to understand why different
constituencies are working tirelessly to implement their respective
curricular programs and to consider the impact of these programs on
the overall mission of the university.
As a matter of fact, I do believe that there are national
consequences of, for example, training students to believe in objectivity
or in the indeterminacy of interpretation, or to believe that insurgent
disciplines (like Women's Studies or Area Studies) are merely political
and represent alternative, not integral, methods of inquiry. Thus, I do
believe that there is a relationship between books and behavior. That
relationship is not a simple one-to-one correlation, as Pollit would
have us believe is the only option for the relation between books and
behavior. Pollit has made a logical error in assuming that because any
one curricular program cannot generate a determinate and guaranteed
outcome, that therefore no curricular program has any bearing on the
intellectual development, and thus the behavior, of people.
I would suggest instead that while many exaggerate the impact of
books on intellectual and thus political development, there is an
integral connection between intellectual and political development.
For example, the fact that there are very few colleges and universities
(let alone high schools) who offer courses in Gay and Lesbian History
(that there are very few books read in courses discussing and analyzing
the history of Gays and Lesbians in the United States) has a direct
impact on the general public's mystification about Gay and Lesbian
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lives in the United States. This mystification is apparent in many
spheres of public and national life. The House of Representatives
voted overwhelmingly (342-67) in July 1996 to ban federal recognition
of same-sex marriages and to permit states to disregard gay marriages
performed in states which sanction them. While the White House
spokesman has criticized the legislation. President Clinton intends to
sign the measure if it is approved in the Senate. The effect of such
legislation is to recreate an aspect of national culture in conformity
with notions of family and domesticity central to national identity.
This attempt however is, once again, normative. While legislators and
political figures argue that legislation outlawing gay marriage simply
confirms what has always been the case, inquiry into
Gay/Lesbian/Transgender history in the United States corroborates the
fact that many individuals have found home and family in long-term
same-sex domestic relationships.
Another example is found in the current national debate over
whether Gay and Lesbian people should be permitted to serve in the
Armed Forces. One of the presuppositions of this argument is of
course that, in general. Gays and Lesbians have never served in the
Armed Forces. It is this kind of mystification regarding the realities of
Gay and Lesbian lives in the U.S. Armed Forces that permits the
continued imagining of the Armed Forces as free from homosexuality.
Now certainly, the absence of documentation and education in Gay and
Lesbian history is not entirely responsible for the image of the Armed
Forces as aggressively heterosexual. However, the perpetuation of this
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mythology by a failure to educate to the contrary contributes to this
imagining of the U.S. Armed Forces. Moreover, this construction of
national defense, as a component of national culture, informs our
every day notions of national identity.
There are equally compelling examples drawn from
“alternative" U.S. historical scholarship. In her essay “The Myth of
Black Matriarchy" bell hooks argues that the assertion of the existence
of a Black matriarchy is fundamentally racist and sexist. Hooks claims
that the myth of Black matriarchy originated during slavery since
“black women posed so great a threat to the existing patriarchy that
white men perpetuated the notion that black women possessed
unusual masculine-like characteristics not common to the female
species“(“Myth“ 369). According to hooks, this myth continues to be
perpetuated by today's scholars (Black and White) who argue that “the
black woman's performance of an active role in family life both as
mothers and providers had deprived black men of their patriarchal
status in the home“(372). hooks points out that the existence of a
matriarchy suggests that it is women who are economically secure, the
owners of property, and the central decision makers in both public and
private social spheres. However, hooks argues, very few Black women
who are heads of households in the United States own property, have
economic security, or occupy leadership positions in government,
business, or industry. The myth of the Black matriarchy permits the
continued existence of a complex and vicious mythology concerning
the lives of Black women in the United States. In general, Black
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women are often held accountable for the high rate of unemployment
among Black men and youth, the incidence of teen-age pregnancy and
single motherhood among young Black women, gang violence and
criminalization of young Black men, and, best of all, the existence of
rampant welfare fraud. These mythologies are perpetuated at all levels
of public life: radio talk shows, television sit-coms, newspapers,
academic anthropological and sociological studies, state and federal
legislative initiatives. Moreover, these mythologies constitute a
fundamental aspect of American national identity: racist misogynist
bootstrap capitalism. That is, the argument goes, if Black women
would work for a living and behave like good (White, submissive)
women, then none of the social pathologies plaguing many Black
families in this nation would exist. The social and economic status of
many Black Americans is then employed to reinforce the idea that
America is the land of opportunity, that those who do not succeed fail
to do so by their own choosing. Moreover, Black women are
dehumanized by the racist and sexist presumption that many Black
men are "unable" to provide economic security for their families
because of the domineering, castrating order of Black matriarchs.
This is a fundamental aspect of American national identity, an
ideal that is reinforced in a multitude of ways by particular
constructions of national culture. The failure to teach complex
race/class/gender analyses of, in this case, Ante-bellum relations
among African slave men, women and their White slave masters and
their wives, and among Black and White men and women post
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Reconstruction, is partially responsible for the perpetuation of specific
myths about Black women and for the maintenance of a particular
aspect of American national identity. Again, it would be simple-
minded to conclude that if bell hooks' historical scholarship was
installed on the mythical required reading list that the myth of the
Black matriarchy and the different notions of bootstrap capitalism
would predictably fall from American national identity. However, it is
the case that the hegemony of the standard historical account of
slavery, reconstruction, and current race relations in the United States
(of course there are exceptions to this standard account) has much to do
with reinforcing central components of American national identity.
Moreover, it is arguably the case that the failure to assign books like
hooks' on a wide scale, and the protection of the canonical accounts
and explanations of these periods in American history, are
manipulations of national culture that function to maintain central
aspects of American national identity.
To summarize then, I have argued that national culture
includes all production in the realm of thought of a given nationally
defined community. I have outlined four examples where
modifications in national culture have led to dramatic and decisive
changes in national identity. I have asserted that education is a special
case since education, especially undergraduate education in the United
States, is instruction in the history and progress of national culture. In
this way, I have attempted to defend my conclusion that education
plays a central role in the development, maintenance, and contestation
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of national identity. I have considered and responded to the objection
that books cannot in any simple way determine behavior, or mold a
national identity, and concluded that there are substantive relations
between primary aspects of American national identity and canonical
accounts of, for example, American history.
EL
—
Nationalist Control Over Culture and Identity
None of this however, has been for the sake of preparing the
ground for yet another argument for a required reading list. It is my
aim instead to show that the driving force behind most of the very
different attempts to preserve the traditional curriculum in the
humanities is actually based in nationalism. I intend to show that this
kind of nationalist sentiment in the educational arena makes it
extremely difficult for the university to reach its stated mission to serve
as a site for the pursuit of truth and the sharing of knowledge. In this
third section, I will further develop my position regarding the role of
nationalism in the relation between national identity and national
culture, specifically as concerns post-secondary education.
I have outlined above four examples where definition and
delineation of different aspects of national culture have made for a
significant change in national identity. The question now though is:
what makes these modifications of national culture specifically
nationalist? Isn't it possible that these modifications are emblematic of
national consciousness instead? Where and how does nationalism
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enter the dialectical relation between national identity and national
culture?
Where Fanon, Cabral, and others would argue that the
cultivation of a distinctively national culture is indicative of national
consciousness and not nationalism, I would argue instead that in each
of these cases the cultivation of a national culture suggests the
existence of nationalism. As I have claimed in the first section of this
chapter, the sentiment that mediates between national identity and
national culture is, more often than not, nationalism. In each of the
examples I have outlined, the development of a distinctively national
culture, while it may not originate from national separatist desires,
results in the very kind of separatism and national solipsism Fanon so
negatively characterizes as nationalism. National consciousness, as
Fanon describes it, is a distinct sense of the nation imbued with a
predisposition to a worldly awareness. A deeper examination of the
cases I have raised will indicate that it is nationalism, rather than
national consciousness, that is the framework behind specific attempts
to control and construct national culture.
I return to the French Only movement in Quebec. As I have
discussed above. Law 101 has played an enormous role in forming the
national identity of Quebec. While Quebec has no official national
status yet, Quebec is a nationally defined community. The leaders of
Quebec's secessionist movement and average Quebec citizens
consistently describe Quebec as a nation, a people with a unique
cultural, historic, and linguistic tradition. The fact that Quebecers
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voted to retain their provincial status within Canada by only a one
percent voter margin suggests that Quebec is well on its way to an
inevitable separation from Canada.
The effect of Law 101 (and different aspects of the Quebec
secessionist movement) has been to highlight and protect the image of
Quebec as a distinct society under Canadian rule. Law 101 requires that
businesses with more than fifty employees be conducted in French, that
children of Francophones and immigrants must attend French
language schools, and that commercial signage must be solely in
French or in French and another language (it bans unilingual signage
in any other language than French). Law 101 constructs specific aspects
of national culture (language, education, business, public signage) in a
way that focuses on the qualities that distinguish Quebec from other
provinces of Canada. The signage regulations, while they seem
particularly Orwellian, are actually quite effective at creating the image
of Quebec as a distinct land within the bounds of Canada. Traveling
from any of the Anglo Canadian provinces into Quebec, one is struck
by the near universal presence of French language signs on the streets.
This seemingly insignificant change in physical reality is exceedingly
effective at highlighting through difference the existence of a distinct
national culture. Moreover, Law 101 ensures the continued existence
and development of this particular national culture by requiring all
immigrants to educate their children in French language schools. In so
doing. Law 101 produces a unique national identity through
manipulation of national culture.
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National identity and national culture in this case inform one
another in a dialectical manner. The presence of all commercial
signage in French (and the absence of any unilingual English
commercial signage), the impact of all corporation sized business being
conducted in French, and the growing enrollments at French language
schools all serve to demonstrate the distinct character, and thus
national identity, of Quebec. In turn, the sense of burgeoning
Quebecois national identity impacts public opinion, both inside and
outside of Quebec, regarding the construction of national identity.
While the Supreme Court of Canada did strike down as
unconstitutional the commercial signage provisions of Law 101, the
high court agreed that it was reasonable for Quebec to outlaw
unilingual English signs; nevertheless, the original signage provisions
of Law 101 remain in effect by virtue of a legislative override of the
Supreme Court's judgment (Taylor 105, note 30). Thus while the
English Canadian law deems Law 101 unconstitutional, within Quebec
there is sufficient support to reject outright the decision of the national
Supreme Court.
It is indisputable that Quebec has been engaged over the last
fifteen years in cultivating a distinctively national culture. The
question remains whether this cultivation is emblematic of national
consciousness, nationalism, or something else entirely. I maintain that
the cumulative effect of this cultivation has been to construct the
image of an increasingly homogeneous citizenry built around French
and things Francophone, and to diminish in reality tolerance for and
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existence of alternative cultural manifestations 13
. Pierre-Etienne
Laporte, the president of Quebec's French Language Commission,
reported that "Quebec's government needs to face and rectify the
perception among the English-speaking minority that they encounter
discrimination in the workplace and particularly in hiring, where an
Anglo accent or name is suspected of being a liability"(Trueheart 20).
Moreover, Charles Trueheart of the Washington Post reports: "With
or without any referendum on independence, however, Quebec is
destined to become an increasingly French-speaking place"(Trueheart
20). This is so since many bilingual Anglophones see that their
Anglofied French is a liability to them in Quebec but a clear asset in
English speaking places. So, they retreat to Toronto, Ottawa, Seattle,
Vancouver, etc. It is this tendency towards and demand for compliance
with homogeneity that makes the manipulation of national culture
nationalist. Finally, Jacques Parizeau 14
,
Quebec's Premier, blamed the
most recent failure (October 1995) to pass the referendum for secession
on the "ethnic vote" and on the population of Montreal, suggesting
again the presence of a deep seated xenophobia informing the Quebec
separatist agenda. Parizeau's claim demonstrates his nationalist
understanding of Quebec national identity; for Parizeau, it is not
possible that any French Quebecer could have voted against the
13The 1980's saw a sudden rise in violence against Vietnamese students in Quebec public
high schools. Vietnamese students fluent in French but speaking Vietnamese between
classes or at lunch were beaten by Quebecois students.
14Lucien Bouchard, a popular political leader, expressed similar sentiments following
the election.
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referendum since all French Quebecers are possessed of the same
homogenized national identity.
The introduction of Law 101 and other legislative measures thus
makes it appear as though Quebec is a national community of
Francophones, when actually this is not the case. While outside of
Montreal French is spoken in 94% of Quebec homes, in Montreal the
figure is 69%; 19% of Montrealers are Anglophone and 12%, mostly
recent immigrants, speak other languages (Trueheart 20). So
nationalist control over culture has the consequence of creating
homogeneity in the population by positing the existence of a non-
existent homogeneity. Ironically, the non-existent homogeneity is
eventually made real by the policies of the allegedly real homogeneity.
The mass exodus of Anglophones from Quebec in the late 1970's is now
being repeated by the bilingual children of Anglophones who
remained in Quebec after the French majority took control of the
provincial government. Interestingly, while leading Quebec
nationalists come off sounding very much like Fanon in their
estimation of the potential of independence to permit Quebec to play
its role as a nation upon the world stage, a nationalist subtext remains
central to the secessionist movement. Bernard Landry, Deputy Premier
of Quebec and active member of the Parti Quebecois claims that 'The
Quebec adventure is not based on ethnicity - it is a nation building
process. [Canada] cannot be reformed to take our needs, our social
aspirations and our economic, cultural, and social potential into
account . . . Sovereignty will allow us to become full citizens of the
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world, without intermediaries, without lame compromise, without
arumosity "("Quebecer Offers Case for His Cause" 2). Landry here
appears to be theorizing the very kind of national consciousness
defined by Fanon, carefully attempting to distinguish Quebec
secessionism from any kind of ethnic separatism. However, in the
same public address at Harvard University's Center for International
Studies, in reference to Quebec's French heritage Landry stated: "By
any standards, Quebec is a nation"("Quebecer Offers Case for His
Cause" 2).
The same kind of attempt to create homogeneity from the
supposition of a non-existent homogeneity is exemplified by the
English Only Movement in the United States. As I have argued above,
U.S. English (and related organizations) make it appear as though the
United States has always been English speaking and that in order to
save the nation, we must ensure that the United States continues to be
universally English speaking. Modifications to and justifications of
national culture are made in accordance with particular notions of
American national identity. National culture and national identity
thus exist in a dialectical relationship; while neither is fixed, composed
incarnations of national identity fortify the English Only position that
English is the universal language, and therefore should be the official
language, of the United States. Likewise, increasing manipulation of
national culture gives credence to the English Only Movement's
assertion that fundamental to U.S. national identity is the process of
assimilation to American (read: English/ Anglo) ways.
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I contend again that the sentiment mediating between national
culture and national identity in this case is not anything like what
Fanon calls national consciousness. U.S. English, and other groups and
organizations working for the same ends, are attempting to develop a
distinctively national culture. I choose the word develop consciously,
to highlight the fact that many in the English Only Movement would
claim they are not developing a national identity, but instead are
preserving a national identity. This particular feature of the English
Only Movement however is partially what defines its attempts to
designate English as the official language of the United States as
decisively nationalist, and not as a consequence of national
consciousness. This control over and construction of a distinctively
national culture is not informed by national consciousness, by a
worldly self-awareness. Self-awareness in regards to national language
would generate a recognition of the polylinguistic origins of the United
States, and of the diversity of language currently in use here. On the
contrary, U.S. English stands defiantly against bilingual education,
even in the face of educational research demonstrating that children of
non-English speaking immigrants learn English and all other academic
subjects more successfully when educated in bilingual classrooms. If
language is a central component of culture and if immigrant children
are prevented from learning even their native language (let alone
studying literature, history, etc. in their native language), then non-
English speaking immigrant children and U.S. citizens are deprived of
knowledge of their culture. Moreover, the institution of English
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linguistic homogeneity deprives all U.S. citizens of knowledge of our
national culture. When bilingual English citizens are afraid to speak
Spanish to their children in their own homes for fear of losing custody
of them 15
,
when speaking any language other than English in the
workplace is just cause for termination16
,
when bilingual education is
increasingly difficult to secure in the public schools, the cultivation of
this particularly national culture of English monolingualism is not
preparing U.S. citizens to take their place on the world stage among
other nations.
Again, in this case, U.S. English's attempts to control national
culture are nationalist and not the result of national consciousness
since they are aimed towards (and succeed at) creating a false, yet
parasitic, national image of the United States as unified and
linguistically /culturally homogeneous. Moreover, on a practical level
(as is the case with the provisions of Law 101 in Quebec as well as the
immigration laws Parti Quebecois has managed to implement), the
fantasy of a homogeneous national population becomes increasingly
15See "Mother Scolded by Judge for Speaking in Spanish." New York Times 30 August
1995: A12. Texas State District Judge Samuel C. Kiser stated in a custody hearing to the
custodial parent: "Now get this straight. You start speaking English to this child
because if she doesn't do good in school, then I can remove her [from the mother's
custody] because it is not in her interest to be ignorant. The child will only hear
English."
16See Donald J. Petersen's "English Only Rules: Valid Business Policy or
Discrimination?" in the Labor Law Journal June 1994. Petersen documents here the fact
that the Ninth and Fifth Circuit U.S. District Courts have ratified English-only rules.
He concludes "The courts have rejected the EEOC Guidelines that have held that
English-only rules are automatically coercive, intimidating, or demeaning. . . The
courts have held, contrary to the EEOC's position, that English-only rules are not, per
se, discriminatory. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has properly placed the burden on the
plaintiff to show discriminatory intent underlying such rules on the employer's
part"(373).
45
more real and less fantasy as the formal and informal initiatives
designed to promote cultural homogeneity succeed at drumming out
any evidence of cultural diversity.
The analysis of control over national culture in Hawai'i and in
Algeria is necessarily more complex since these are national
communities under siege from powerful, wealthy, and established
nations. Both Hawai i and Algeria experienced cultural genocide at the
hands of the Americans and the French, respectively. I want to focus
here though on the logic behind the annihilation of Hawaiian national
culture and behind the reconstruction of Algerian national culture. It
is my aim in doing so to highlight the features of nationalist control
over national culture.
The United States has controlled national culture in Hawai'i
since forced annexation in 1893. The history of U.S. colonization in
Hawai'i provides an instructive example of the steady movement from
nationalist fantasy of a unified and homogeneous national citizenry, to
nationalist reality of such unification through annihilation of
diversity. From the moment of annexation, the United States made
sure to outlaw indigenous language and religion and to decrease the
overall percentage of Natives by encouraging Japanese and mainland
Americans to become settlers. In the last forty years the United States
has been successful in further dilution of the political and cultural
presence of native Hawaiians by aggressively establishing the tourist-
military complex on the islands of Hawai'i. A prime example of this
calculated effort to marginalize the political and cultural impact of
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Native Hawaiians is the statehood vote taken in 1959 - a time when
settlers outnumbered Hawaiians, effectively making Native Hawaiians
a minority in their own country. Haunani Kay Trask confirms:
"Settlers voted overwhelmingly for statehood, while Hawaiians did
not, a fact conveniently overlooked by statehood promoters"(38 ).
This deliberate control and manipulation of Hawaiian national
culture has resulted in concrete and damaging changes to Hawaiian
national identity. The national image that many Americans are left
with - Hawai'i as a paradisial land occupied by friendly, satisfied, (and
sultry) natives waiting to display the beauty of their land to each of six
and one half million tourists descending upon the islands annually - is
the result of the United States deliberately annihilating the existing
national identity of Hawai'i and replacing it with a homogenized
version of national culture compatible with U.S. interests in economic,
military, and territorial occupation. This homogenization has been
effected by the control over national culture, a control marked by the
calculated desire and effort to annihilate all indications of cultural
diversity and specificity: that is, any cultural expressions that would
indicate the presence of diversity in language, religion, political
perspective, etc. of resident Hawaiians and, any cultural expressions
that would demarcate the cultural specificity of Hawai'i thereby
marking it off as distinct from the United States.
What is more, the hula-hula girl/tropical paradise Hawaiian
identity created by the U.S. government's deliberate attempts to
annihilate indigenous culture masks the lived reality of poverty.
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homelessness, and environmental destruction experienced by native
Hawaiians 17
. Nationalist control of culture in Hawai'i has made it
appear as though Hawai i is populated by docile, pliant natives happy
to be U.S. citizens in the land of plenty when in fact U.S. control over
Hawaiian national culture has decimated indigenous culture,
economics, and public life. The national identity that remains obviates
the two-thousand year history of Hawaiian indigenous self-governance
and cultural expression.
Hawai'i is a special case then in this analysis since U.S.
colonization worked to create a distinctively national culture to
supplant the indigenous national culture on the islands. Nationalist
control over national culture in Hawai'i results not only in the
annihilation of indigenous culture, but also in the creation of an image
of false national unity, an insipid homogeneity that conceals the
violence committed against Native Hawaiian people. It is for these
reasons that I identify the manipulation of Hawaiian culture as
nationalist: the manipulation is designed to produce and promote not
simply cultural homogeneity at the expense of existing cultural
diversity, but a particular version of cultural homogeneity - one that
17See Trask, especially 22 and 182-183. Nearly one-fifth of Hawai’i’s resident
population is classified as near-homeless, resident families spend an average of 52% of
gross income on housing; ground water supplies are dangerously low; air, land, and sea
pollution from hotels, golf courses, commercial and military planes threaten the
health and safety of residents; tourists outnumber residents by a ratio of six to one and
outnumber Native Hawaiians by thirty to one. Native Hawaiians experience "high
unemployment, catastrophic health problems, low educational attainment, . . .
,
occupational ghettoization in poorly paid jobs, and increasing outmigration that
amounts to diaspora"(Trask 22).
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makes it appear as though Hawai'i has no characteristics that could
logically distinguish it from the United States.
Now, certainly Fanon did not intend his views on the
relationship between national culture and national consciousness to
apply to a colonizing power, and it would be intellectually irresponsible
to critique his position on national consciousness by using U.S.
colonization and nationalist destruction of Hawai'i as a simple-minded
counter example. Still, I include this example in my analysis since it
shows the powerful consequences of nationalist manipulation of
national culture, from the perspective of n colonizing nation. This
only brings my assertion regarding the dialectical relation of national
culture to national identity, and the centrality of nationalism in this
relation, further into focus. Fanon, and others, recognize this centrality
and thus focus on it as a means to colonial resistance. What Fanon's
analysis misses though is the realization that any kind of national
control over culture (not to be confused with any expressions of
national culture) invariably becomes nationalist as the controlling body
attempts to delineate the characteristics of national culture, and thus of
national identity. These attempts to articulate an ultimately diverse
reality in a unified conception of national culture are bound to produce
a stultifying homogeneity that doesn't come close to representing the
realities of national cultural production and expression.
The current situation in Algeria elucidates this assertion. Facing
the ravages of colonialism, of decades of violent foreign occupation,
and of a world community increasingly hostile to Islam, prominent
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Algerian politicians, religious leaders, and intellectuals have resorted
to nationalist control over Algerian culture in an attempt to secure the
national future of Algeria. Again, this control is not emblematic of
national consciousness, of attempting to cultivate through national
culture a distinct sense of the nation as a member of the world
community of nations. Algeria's recent expulsion of all tourists and
foreigners, sustained violence against journalists and other cultural
critics, and increasingly restrictive interpretations of Islamic
fundamentalist law have made authentic expressions of Algerian
culture nearly non-existent.
Thus somewhere in the attempt to reconstruct Algerian culture
along national lines as a rejection of colonial occupation, the project
became nationalist - a project aimed to universalize Algerian culture,
to distill Algerian national identity into a manageable entity. It is this
drive towards stultifying cultural homogeneity, the desire for a kind of
cultural purity that corresponds to the religious purity sought after by
the nation, that makes control over national culture in Algeria
nationalist. The same can be said for cultural control in Quebec, the
United States, and Hawai'i. While each case presents specific
differences in the articulations of nationalist control over culture, in
each case nationalists reach for a cultural purity that can work in
tandem with the religious, linguistic, ethnic, or political purity they
desire to be reflected in the national population and thus in the
national identity.
50
CHAPTER II
NATIONALIST CONSCIOUSNESS, IDENTITY, AND NATIONALISM
A. Introduction
In the second chapter I will focus on developing my central
critique of nationalism in preparation for applying that critique to the
Traditionalist position on curricular reform and the manner in which
the arguments in favor of that position and opposed to
multiculturalism all betray the covert impact of nationalism. I will
critique nationalism on the grounds that underlying every nationalist
movement is a universalist project which denies the reality of complex
personal identity formation. That is, the foundation of all nationalist
campaigns (including the campaign to preserve the traditional
university level curriculum in the humanities) is the falsification of
lived identity by indoctrination into the role of a homogeneous
nationalist subject. In support of this claim I will discuss the
problematic identity of Nationals 18
,
the relationship between racism
and nationalism, and the relationship between social liberation and
nationalism. I will argue that the nationalism necessary to the typical
formation of national identity is based on an impoverished politics of
identity that perpetuates the very conditions of social domination and
oppression it purports to transform.
18By nationals 1 mean individuals defined as citizens of a particular nation. I
capitalize Nationals to highlight its status as a name for a specific group of people.
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Similarly, I will argue in Chapter Three that the central difficulty
with what I identify as the nationalist ideology informing the
Traditionalist position on curricular reform is the underlying goal of
universalizing that results in: first, denying the legitimacy of any
intellectual tradition other than the European Intellectual tradition;
and second, making it difficult to nearly impossible for students to
develop authentic critical consciousness, the ability to critique ideology.
Specifically, I will argue that each of these ramifications of nationalist
pedagogy originates in the drive to construct students as Nationals, to
enlist students in the process of nation building in the academy by
cultivating a pure nationalist identity that can work in tandem with
the corresponding pure nationalist version of national culture.
What is important in my comparison is that nationalism is at
times so closely associated with horrific practices (most pointedly,
ethnic cleansing tantamount to full scale genocide) that those involved
in the construction and maintenance of the Traditionalist position do
not typically identify their practices as nationalist. My purpose is to
force this connection. Many nationalist movements have come under
great criticism for their religious fundamentalism (e.g. Algerian Armed
Islamic Group), their militarism (e.g. Hamas), and their acceptance of
violence (e.g. The Black Panthers). Part of my interest in identifying
the curricular Traditionalists in the academy as nationalist and in
identifying the academy as a center of nationalist activity in general, is
to establish that rigorous analysis of the academy yields central
theoretical connections between academic traditionalism and
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nationalist violence. Thus while many nationalist movements have
been criticized for their violence, militancy, and denial of basic
individual rights and freedoms, those nationalisms are nationalisms of
the dominated. Nationalist movements of dominant groups, such as
curricular Traditionalists in the academy, are less often recognized as
nationalist, and are therefore protected from being criticized for the
prejudicial and violent practices endemic to nationalist movements. I
am thinking here of such examples as the English Only Movement in
the United States 19 or the militant Jewish "settlers" occupying the West
Bank of Palestine. So while we are often willing to identify, and thus
to critique, some nationalist movements of the dominated, we are less
willing (perhaps less able) to identify, and thus to critique, the
nationalisms of the dominant. This is precisely where previous
analysis has prematurely stopped short of its full implications.
Too often, once we recognize the disparity in our treatment of
nationalist movements of the dominated versus nationalist
movements of the dominant, we retreat from further critique
altogether. We say, as Balibar and Wallerstein say, "We have no right .
. . to equate the nationalism of the dominant with the nationalism of
the dominated. . "(Race, Nation
,
and Class 45), and we conclude that
we can take no critical perspective towards nationalism of the
dominated. More specifically, we conclude that to condemn
nationalism is to forgo the possibilities for nationalist liberation of any
19The most recent victory for this political faction is the introduction in Congress of
legislation that would make it illegal to speak any language other than English in the
workplace.
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oppressed group, and therefore to forgo any possibility for liberation;
therefore, we conclude, we should not condemn nationalism.
Iri The Colonizer cind the Colonized Albert Memmi refers to this
phenomenon as the typical Left response to nationalism. According to
Memmi, no one in the Left knows how to respond to nationalism. He
states: "they do not dare to condemn or approve"(29). Or alternatively,
I will argue, we generate flawed and incongruous critiques of
nationalisms of the dominated^ as we fail to recognize the
nationalisms of the dominant21 .
So we begin to see the contradictory nature of any full critique of
nationalism. Any critique of nationalism risks being (or being counted
as) a racist, ethnocentric, or prejudicial treatment of a dominated
group. However, failure to critique the prejudicial policies of the
nationalism of the dominant is also indicative of racist, ethnocentric,
or prejudicial practices. Critiques of nationalism are therefore
theoretically tricky for several reasons. First, nationalism of the
dominated is often recognized and demonized before, in spite of, or
instead of, nationalism of the dominant. Second, as Memmi suggests,
individuals on the Left often do not critique nationalism of the
20Consider Reverend Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam. The New York Times and
other mainstream media are constantly reporting on the widespread acceptance of
Farrakhan in African-American communities when, in reality, very few African-
Americans embrace Farrakhan's principles and many openly condemn his anti-Semitic,
homophobic, and misogynist ideology.
21 This is very much the case in the academy. While disciplines such as English and
History are subject to strict scrutiny and critique on the grounds that many of their
courses focus on the writing of DWEMs(dead White European Males), as disciplines,
History and English are never accused of being anti-intellectual, overly political,
ideological, suffering from a lack of academic rigor, etc. These are all accusations
fielded by departments of Women's Studies, African-American Studies, Asian Studies,
Queer Theory, etc.
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dominated because of the belief that to do so is to forgo the possibility
of the liberation, national or other, of oppressed groups of people.
Balibar and Wallerstein give evidence to this claim when they
dutifully assert that of course we have no right to equate the
nationalism of the dominated with the nationalism of the dominant.
Third, there is a tendency on the Left to transpose our impaired critical
capacity regarding the nationalism of the dominated into a failure to
critique nationalism of the dominant.
While I will be arguing in Chapter Three that the nationalism
endemic to the Traditionalist position on curricular reform is
undeniably a nationalism of the dominant, I will however in this
chapter appeal to critiques of nationalisms of the dominant and the
dominated in order to justify my assertion that the subversion of the
diversity and complexity of personal identity is an unavoidable feature
of all nationalist movements. Because this subversion is a
characteristic of both nationalisms of the dominant and nationalisms
of the dominated, critiques of both forms of nationalism are equally
instructive in the development and defense of my critique of the
Traditionalist position on curricular reform.
While it seems clear then that nationalism in general is
internally contradictory, the source of the contradiction is not yet
apparent. I understand this contradiction in terms of the development,
maintenance, and function of national identity. In order to articulate
fully the inherently contradictory nature of academic nationalism, I
argue that it is the function and definition of national identity,
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regardless of the nationalism under study, that makes for the
prejudicial policies endemic to nationalist movements. Theorizing the
problematic construction of national identity generates a topology onto
which the racism of nationalist movements and both the potential and
pitfalls of nationalist liberation can be mapped.
I begin then by discussing the contradiction inherent in
nationalist identity construction. How can one define a nationalist
struggle without first arriving at a firm conception of the identity of the
citizens of the nation, the Nationals? Nationalist struggle relies on
creating and amassing citizens of the nation, thus, there must be some
criteria for citizenship. These criteria can be understood as being
described by national identity. I maintain that the most fundamental
limitations and contradictions in identity politics are continually
manifested in nationalist struggle. Drawing primarily on the work of
Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, I will construct a position that
questions and critiques the foundation of nationalist struggle: the
monolithic construction of national identity.
I therefore contend that the foundation of all nationalist
campaigns is the falsification of personal identity implicit in the
indoctrination of the homogeneous national subject. This falsification
of identity makes for a fundamental contradiction between nationalist
identity politics in particular and social liberation in general. By "social
liberation" I mean to refer to liberation from both broad classes of social
oppressions such as racism and, the corresponding epistemological
deprivation that attends these broad classes of social oppressions.
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B . The Definition and Function of National THpnHty
In Wretched of the Earth Frantz Fanon discusses the difficult
project of defining a national identity. In thinking about the process of
transforming nationalist consciousness into a wider social
consciousness, Fanon argues that political educators must prompt
people to understand that certain fractions of the population have
particular interests and that these do not always coincide with the
national interest"(144). Such a realization makes it possible for the
people to pass from total, indiscriminating nationalism to social and
economic awareness"(144). Moreover, this enables people to realize
that "it sometimes happens that you get Blacks who are whiter than
the Whites and that the fact of having a national flag and the hope of
an independent nation does not always tempt certain strata of the
population to give up their interests or privileges"(144).
What is intriguing here to me is that Fanon is offering an
example of the limitations of identity politics; he claims that the
expectation that anyone Black and colonized will automatically be a
nationalist supporter is naive. However, what begins as an apparent
critique of the identity politics upon which nationalist struggles are
predicated, concludes in an assignment of responsibility for such
betrayals to social and economic treason. Fanon claims that when
these "White Blacks" betray the nation, the opposition calls their action
treason. According to Fanon though, this naming is not accurate since
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[t]he treason is not national, it is social"(145). According to Fanon, it is
not a weakness in the organization of the nation, in the construction of
national identity, that accounts for the existence of such "White
Blacks, but rather, the aberration is due to a weakness in the
organization of the society.
What then could Fanon possibly be saying here? The betrayal of
national goals by White Blacks is not treason since their crime is not
against the nation but is rather against the society? How is this
feasible? This is especially confusing since much of what is implicitly
described in the identity "Black" is based on national identity. Indeed,
the possibility of "White Black" being a coherent concept is itself
conceptually dependent upon nationalist constructions of Black
identity; clearly, "Black" and "White" describe characteristics more
significant (and less tangible) than skin color. When Fanon claims that
there are Blacks who are whiter than the Whites, then we know that
his understanding of Black (or Arab or White) includes characteristics
far more crucial than skin color and national origin. Black identity, as
far as Fanon is concerned, is not consistent with the tendency of
economically advantaged Black Algerians, the native bourgeoisie, to
make alliances with the colonizer or western bourgeoisie. In
discussing the national treason of the Black bourgeois, Fanon asserts
that the national consciousness of the Black bourgeoisie is actually an
allegiance to the Western bourgeoisie. When the Black bourgeoisie call
for an all Black or an all Arab ruling class they are not doing so because
of an "authentic movement of nationalization"(Wretched 157); they do
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so, Fanon says, out of a desire simply to transfer economic power from
the colonizing bourgeoisie to the native bourgeoisie. This is not
nationalism for Fanon, it is chauvinism, racism, territorialism, and
regionalism.
In so arguing, Fanon attempts to distinguish the reductive
analysis of identity endemic to racism, territorialism, or regionalism
from what he calls nationalism and national consciousness. He is
trying to show that certain kinds of pronouncements that are often
deemed nationalist are actually indications of prejudicial systems not
associated with authentic nationalism. So when the bourgeoisie of the
newly liberated Black or Arab nation calls for the forced and violent
repatriation of all foreigners, and the masses of workers respond by
defining "foreigner" in an increasingly narrow fashion, Fanon
attributes these prejudicial reactions as evidence of class privilege on
the part of the economically advantaged and mystification on the part
of the poor. In the case of the native bourgeoisie, the alleged
nationalist sentiment is indicative of class privilege: the desire to
appropriate for themselves the imperialist economic infrastructure
organized by the colonizers. In the case of the "small people" of the
nation, the alleged nationalist sentiment results from the failure of the
native bourgeoisie to respond to liberation with authentic nationalism:
as the native bourgeoisie assumes control of the exploitative economic
infrastructure and conceals their motivation with false nationalism,
the "small people" are again left to struggle with one another over an
inadequate supply of employment and income. Faced again with
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economic desperation, the "small people" direct their resistance against
the workers of other nations, resulting in racism, territorialism, and
regionalism. As Fanon says, "the 'small people' of the nation - taxi
drivers, cake sellers, and bootblacks - will be equally quick to insist that
the Dahomans go home to their own country, or will even go further
and demand that the Foulbis and the Peuhls return to their jungle or
their mountains"(158). What then are the ramifications for the
composition of the nation; that is, what does this mean for the identity
of the Nationals?
In so arguing, Fanon explains away the prevalence of what are
often taken to be vicious nationalist claims and locates their source in
economic disparity and the power inequities resulting from such an
inequality. Fie does not try to downplay the force or the violence of
such claims; he employs a different strategy when he assigns
responsibility for these sentiments to economic interest and inequality.
This is all for the sake of responding to the critique that nationalism is
marked by prejudice and xenophobia. Moreover, it is for the sake of
carving out a nationalist analysis of identity that does not fall prey to
the critiques of, for example, racist analyses of identity. However, what
comes out in Fanon's exploration of these prejudicial claims is that the
concept of national identity essential to his argument is rife with the
very prejudices, false equivalences, and misconceptions for which he
faults racist, tribalist, or territorialist analyses of identity.
Thus, as Fanon presents an argument against the expectation of
a monolithic national identity, he grounds that argument in the
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identification of the social structure as problematic, and not in the
expectation of a pure national identity as problematic. So, rather than
recognizing the limitations of a monolithic structure of national
identity, he foists responsibility for the lack of necessary conditions for
the development of a pure national identity onto the social and
economic structure. One could look at the fact that Fanon is discussing
(that some Blacks are whiter than Whites) and conclude that therefore
the idea of nationalist liberation based on Blackness versus Whiteness
doesn t make sense, or at the very least is not stable or complete.
Fanon however takes this fact and carefully attributes the contradiction
in identity to socioeconomic organization rather than to national
organization. What his analysis misses is that for any understanding
of national identity to be coherent, it is impossible for that conception
to account for the diversity of the national population; thus any
formulation of national identity is a nationalist understanding of
identity. That is, any formulation of national identity that denies the
national existence of a significant portion of the population and instead
imagines national identity as pure and homogeneous, is undeniably
nationalist. When Fanon confronts the reality of the native
bourgeoisie and their attempt to exploit the native workers through an
economic system with no appreciable differences from the colonialist
system, and concludes from this that the native bourgeoisie are acting
out of economic interest and not out of nationalism, he betrays his
nationalist understanding of identity. The native bourgeoisie
represent a central component of Algerian national identity, whether
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Fanon would like to admit it or not. Their attempts to commandeer
the exploitative economic machinery of colonialism and in so doing to
appr°priate coercive power for themselves is as much a feature of
Algerian national identity as are socialist national initiatives to secure
economic equality in the newly liberated nation.
In claiming that such behavior by “White Blacks” is economic
and social treason, and not national treason, Fanon unwittingly reveals
his conception of national identity. For Fanon, Algerian national
identity includes a fundamental belief in the rights of all Algerians to
economic power, freedom from extreme economic hardship, and
freedom from marked disparity in economic status. Algerian national
identity includes the notion that an Algerian would never exploit
another Algerian. A rich man may exploit a poor man, but an
Algerian would never exploit another Algerian; if he did so, it would
be because of economic treason and not national treason. Now while
we may find Fanon's construction of national identity quite admirable,
enviable, and desirable, we can see immediately that it requires
denying the realities of complex identity formation. To presume that
all Algerians are going to have the same class interests and necessarily,
in virtue of their nationality, are going to understand the primacy of
national claims over all other features of personal identity, is to carve
out a version of national identity that denies the reality of individual
complexity. The attempts of bourgeois Algerians to presume coercive
economic power over poor Algerians is a cardinal feature of Algerian
national identity. This 'ugly' truth revealing the bitter conflicts among
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Algerians is as much a characteristic of Algerian national identity as is
the near universal Algerian resistance to French colonization.
It is my position then, that rather than providing an explanation
for the failure of identity politics rightfully to take hold, instead this
example works as a strong argument against the very kind of separatist
and identity politics upon which nationalist struggles/liberation
movements are based. Fanon laments the non-existence of a
materialized monolithic national identity but grounds the explanation
for that non-existence in a problematic social structure. The
problematic social structure he refers to is actually the class conflict
among Algerians and what Fanon sees as the tendency of the Arab
bourgeoisie to make easy alliances with the Western colonizer
bourgeoisie. What actually is the case is that Fanon has run up against
one of the major contradictions in the definition of national identity:
class conflict. Fie attempts to preserve the possibility of a nationally
defined identity by relegating this contradiction to the realm of
economics, as if economic issues were somehow entirely separable
from questions regarding the definition of national identity. What I
conclude from this example however is something quite different from
Fanon. Fanon's analysis is actually instructive in terms of exposing the
limitations and falsifications intrinsic to definitions of national
identity. In order to define national identity in a way any more specific
than "the identities of the occupants of a given nation," one must
undertake to reject, conceal, and homogenize the actual characteristics
of identity. This is so since any attempt to define national identity
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requires the articulation of a diverse reality in a unified conception.
The articulation of national identity is therefore invariably the result of
falsifying any divergent features of personal identity and generates a
version of nationalist national identity that is inconsistent with
liberation
- personal, social, or national. Such a subversion of diversity
in identity is thereby an unavoidable and destructive feature of
nationalism.
C. Racism and Nationalism
Having argued that the foundation of nationalist campaigns
invariably results in the falsification of personal identity, I now wish to
turn to a discussion of Albert Memmi's The Colonizer and the
Colonized, Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, and Balibar and
Wallerstein's Race, Nation, and Class, in order to defend my assertion
that there is a fundamental incommensurability between nationalist
identity politics and the project of social liberation. My aim is, now
that I have provisionally shown the falsification of personal identity
endemic to nationalism, to show why such a falsification of identity
has such a negative impact on the ability of individuals to practice
freedom and autonomy.
As an example of the failure of monolithic nationalist identity
constructions to provide a secure foundation for the transformation of
reality, I will discuss a particular ramification of nationalist identity
politics: racism. In support of my assertion that the very idea of
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nationalist liberation is inherently contradictory, I will argue that the
overlaying monological structure of the nation, particularly
demonstrated in monolithic national identity, reproduces the very
conditions it is designed to contest.
In support of my claims I will first discuss and critique in detail
what I take to be the central theoretical difficulty with Albert Memmi's
The Colonizer and the Colonized. In this very important book
Memmi clearly illuminates the benefits of nationalist separatist
politics; however, his analysis is weakened by his flat, essentialist
conceptions of the colonizer and the colonized. Memmi draws
compelling portraits of the colonizer and the colonized in the process
of defending his thesis that the colonial relationship, which invariably
results from the colonial situation, is bound to result in the ultimate
and violent destruction of both the colonizer and the colonized, and
thus also the destruction of the colonial situation.
Memmi argues convincingly that there are no distinctions to be
made within the identity of the colonizer. While some would
maintain that there are not simply colonizers, there are colonials,
colonizers, and colonialists, Memmi rejects all of these subtle
distinctions of identity. If the term colonial is meant to describe a
European living in a colony but without any more privileges than the
colonized, then the colonial does not exist. Even the small or
subjugated colonizer, he argues, defends the colonial system because he
benefits from it in some way. Likewise, the colonizer who believes he
is able to avoid becoming a colonialist is also engaging in psychological
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denial. The colonizer who continues to reside in the colony for the
sake of changing the colonial conditions for the benefit of the colonized
is doing no more than continuing to benefit from the colonial system
of exploitation. Memmi describes this condition when he states that "it
is certainly admitted today that one can be, while awaiting the
revolution, both a revolutionary and an exploiter ... He vaguely
forsees the day of their liberation and the reconquest of their rights, but
does not seriously plan to share their existence, even if they are
freed (23). That is, the Leftist colonizer may tell himself that he is
engaging constructively with the colonial system for the sake of
eliminating the injustices of that system; however, the colonizer does
not really intend to transform the colonial system since to do so would
include the elimination of any role for the colonizer within the colony.
Transformation of the colonial system would mean the elimination of
the colony and thus the elimination of the colonizer.
Similarly, the colonized comes to the conclusion that "the
colonial situation cannot be changed except by doing away with the
colonial relationship"(126). Realizing that assimilation to the
standards and identity of the colonized is impossible, and that the
elimination of the colonized by the colonizer is the only other
alternative, the colonized concludes that the only solution is total
revolution of the colonial system. And it is up to this point that
Memmi's analysis seems compelling to me. The presentation of the
portraits of the colonizer and the colonized appear at some times to be
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overgeneralized or overemphasized, however, the overall analysis
presented by Memmi is illuminating in its uncompromising strength.
Now, however, Memmi argues that once the colonized realizes
the inevitability of total revolution, "it is in this context that the
colonized s xenophobia and even a certain racism, must make their
return (130). And it is at this point that the limitations of Memmi r s
essentialized conceptions of colonized and colonizer identity become
apparent. Thus, while I agree with Memmi that there is a stark
division between the experience of the colonizer and the colonized, so
stark that it is absurd to assume that the colonizer can comprehend the
lives of the colonized, at the same time I assert that Memmi's
monolithic conceptions of these identities are decidedly nationalist.
That is, Memmi's understanding of the identity of the colonizer and
the colonized is indicative of a failure to acknowledge the complexity
and diversity of identity within the national community. Moreover,
the absence of an accurate description of identity makes it impossible to
describe the complexities of domination and resistance, and thereby to
provide an adequate theory for liberation from such domination22 .
In contextualizing the racism and xenophobia of the colonized
Memmi argues that the racism of the colonized is a racism of defense:
it has a social and historical (as opposed to a biological or metaphysical)
basis. And thus, the racism and xenophobia of the colonized can be
positive in terms of galvanizing resistance to colonial domination(132).
22For example, Memmi's reproduction of misogynist generalizations about the wives of
colonizers (22) is indicative of his positionality in a complex web of domination and
subordination. His failure to recognize the multi-dimensionality of oppression
translates into a limited theoretical and practical response to oppression.
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Moreover, Memmi argues,
. .he [the colonized] will be nationalistic
but not, of course, internationalistic. Naturally, by so doing, he runs
the risk of falling into exclusionism and chauvinism, of sticking to the
most narrow principles, and of setting national solidarity against
human solidarity - and even ethnic solidarity against national
solidarity. But to expect the colonized to open his mind to the world
and be a humanist would seem to be ludicrous thoughtlessness. He is
still regaining possession of himself, still examining himself with
astonishment, passionately demanding the return of his
language"(135).
I want to focus on this passage and the description here of the
development of national consciousness in the colonized. Memmi's
position appears to be that the colonized, on the cusp of liberation from
colonialism, will necessarily adopt a racist, xenophobic nationalism.
What is curious however, is Memmi's insistence first, that this kind of
sentiment is advantageous in that it provides a rallying point for the
unification of the colonized; and second, that to expect anything
different from the colonized is to deny completely the realities of the
colonized's psychological state. Each of these assertions follows directly
from Memmi's monolithic understanding of both the colonizer and
the colonized, but more importantly in this case, the identity of the
colonized. Moreover, both of these assertions are indicative of the
nationalist understanding of identity Memmi is appealing to in his
analysis of the colonial situation. As I have argued, subversion of the
diversity of identity of the national citizenry, in the name of
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constructing a unified and universal national identity is emblematic of
nationalism.
To assert that the colonized can not do other than to become a
racist, xenophobic, nationalist one must believe that the colonized has
become completely deformed in the colonial system. One must believe
that all individuals living under colonialism have been deformed in
essentially the same way. That is, one must believe, as Memmi asserts
over and again, that the colonized cannot understand himself except as
the negation of the colonizer, that the identity of the colonized is so
completely intertwined with the identity of the colonizer that
destruction of the colonial system leaves the colonized entirely unable
to relate to anyone falling outside the bounds of his race, nationality, or
ethnicity23 . It is as if, according to Memmi, the identity of the
colonized is not merely monolithic and homogeneous; it is, in its
homogeneity, the absence of any appreciable identity. If we were to
believe in Memmi's description of the identity of the colonized we
would maintain that given the gaping absence of identity in the
colonized, it is perfectly understandable that the colonized is unable to
relate to anyone not totally like the colonized: that is, to anyone of a
different race, ethnicity, or nationality. The colonized is allegedly so
completely annihilated by the colonial experience that he is incapable
23This description of the colonized is strikingly similar to Aristotle's account of the
natural slave. The natural slave, without the master, has no agency, no intellect, no
logic, no telos. Only through the master can the slave act. And it is precisely this
extreme account of the natural slave's subjugation that gives one pause: is it possible
that such a state can be cultivated in an entire population? Aristotle himself
recognized the potential of slaves to revolt and in so doing calls into question the notion
that the slave exists in total subjugation to the master. See especially the account of
revolution (Politics Books IV - VI, in Barnes).
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of relating to anyone who differs from him without endangering the
process of developing a substantial and autonomous identity of his
own.
Now, if this is all actually the case, of course we must accept the
ensuing racist, xenophobic nationalism that germinates in the
colonized after the destruction of the colonial system. For the
colonized has no choice. Given that the colonized is essentially
without any identity, the colonized has no other alternative than to
isolate himself from everyone who differs from him. Memmi would
have us believe that the onset of racist xenophobic nationalism in the
colonizer is not merely the result of the collapse of the colonial system,
but that the development of this prejudicial nationalism is a necessary
step in the reconstruction of the colonized, in the colonized's process of
shedding the alienated identity of negation and constructing an
identity grounded outside of the colonial framework. That is, for
Memmi, it is impossible for the colonized to transform his
metaphysical condition of alienation without forming his identity in
the context of racist xenophobic nationalism.
I contest this analysis though and suggest that the inevitability of
it all, the portrait of inescapable development of nationalism painted
by Memmi, is largely the result of his monolithic conceptions of the
colonizer and the colonized, under the colonial system. That is,
Memmi's failure to describe accurately the identity of the colonized
makes it impossible to describe the complexities of domination and
resistance, and thus makes it impossible on this theory to develop an
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adequate theory for liberation from this domination. Xenophobic racist
nationalism is not a substantially improved alternative to the violence
of colonial occupation. But Memmi's campaign of nationalist
liberation from colonialism, based upon his flattened, purified, and
simple identity classes, is leading back to the reconstruction of
prejudicial systems analogous to the colonial systems of separatism and
exploitation. On the national consciousness of the colonized Memmi
states that It is not a coincidence that the colonial peoples are the last
to awaken to national consciousness.
. . As a result of colonization, the
colonized almost never experiences nationality and citizenship, except
privately. Nationally and civically he is only what the colonizer is
not"(96).
So let's first examine the veracity of such claims before
attempting to understand their function in Memmi's analysis. These
statements on the national and civic identity of the colonized
demonstrate the degree to which Memmi's constructions of personal
identity under colonialism are essentialized and falsely homogeneous.
As far as the colonized's experience of nationality is concerned,
Memmi would have us believe that the colonized does not have any
understanding of what it would be to have a nationality and a national
identity. Any understanding of nationality is, for the colonized, only
in terms of a negation. Importantly however, this negation of national
identity, on Memmi's analysis, generates nothing serviceable for the
colonized's conception of nationality.
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While it seems reasonable to assert that the colonized
experiences nationality as a negation, to infer from that fact that the
colonized knows nothing of nationality, experiences no positive
national identity, and must therefore isolate himself from all other
nationalities at the moment of the collapse of the colonial situation, is
a drastic reduction and simplification of the epistemological experience
of the colonized. Surely, while the experience of nationality as
negation is not equal to the positive experience of nationality, the
colonized's lack of a recognized national status and his experience of
living under a hostile occupation teaches him much about the
conditions of nationhood. What the colonized comes to understand
about nationhood certainly varies from individual to individual, but
Memmi's assertion that the colonized has no experience whatsoever of
nationality and his conclusion from this that all colonized individuals
are therefore epistemologically bereft, and consequently, the same in
their epistemological deprivation, informs his portrait of the colonized
as essentially and falsely homogeneous in personal identity.
The Palestinians living under Israeli occupation make for an
instructive example of this assertion. While the Israelis have occupied
Palestine for nearly fifty years, restricting the movement of Palestinians
in Israel, preventing Palestinians from seeking education, government
and military posts, decent employment, etc., the Palestinians have
arguably experienced a negation of nationality. After having been
demonized by the world community and prevented from participating
in world diplomacy, it is only since the first peace accords signed
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between Palestinians and Israelis in 1993 that Yasir Arafat and the
Palestine Liberation Organization have emerged, albeit partially, into
the international political arena. In 1996, under the newly elected
conservative Likud leadership in Israel, it is now questionable whether
Israel will honor even signed agreements providing for Palestinian
self-rule. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have so far been
summarily ignored by the new Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu,
generating considerable fear that the Israeli government intends to
revert to policies that resulted in the Intifada. Palestinians living
under occupation experience extreme poverty, violence (both physical
and ideological), and assaults on their human dignity. These abhorrent
conditions, however, have done anything but prevent the Palestinians
from awakening to national consciousness. Indeed, the Palestinians
have waged an ongoing resistance to the occupation based on their
claims to national sovereignty. Similar examples could be constructed
for the national resistance to colonial occupation in Hawai'i, South
Africa, Mexico, etc. Thus, it seems inaccurate to assert that individuals
living under colonial occupation are fundamentally and wholly
incapable of having a developed sense of national identity.
I wish to turn now to an examination of the function of
Memmi's claims regarding the inevitability of post-colonial racist
xenophobic nationalism. Memmi's subversion of the diversity of
identity in the colonizer and the colonized is a simplified and
reductive analysis that conclusively carves out the future of the
colonized as racist, xenophobic nationalists. On Memmi's nationalist
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conception of the identity of the colonized, it is impossible for the
colonized in the post-colonial era to do anything but become
nationalist. The former colonized must retreat to a defensive stance
against anyone who is foreign to him. As Fanon's analysis suggests,
the definition of foreign in this case becomes increasingly narrow. A
foreigner becomes anyone who does not perfectly match the racial,
ethnic, national, and religious identity of the colonized.
Thus Memmi provides a theoretical justification for the
continued impoverishment and subversion of the identity of the
colonized, for the perpetuation of reductive nationalist identity politics
in the post-colonial era. And it is this perpetuation of nationalist
identity politics that makes real social liberation exceptionally difficult
to achieve under nationalism. In the post-colonial process of
burgeoning nationalism the identity of the colonized undergoes an
increasingly restrictive definition as the colonized resists contact with
everyone deemed different. In determining all of the aspects of
personal identity that the colonized is not
,
the options for what the
colonized is are few. While clarity is one obvious advantage in this
situation, it is clarity at the expense of the subversion of diversity. This
subversion of diversity is then perpetuated within the fledgling nation,
recreating the very structures of domination and oppression
nationalist liberation was intended to destroy. Now the threat to
personal freedom is not from a hostile foreign occupation but is instead
institutionalized in the restrictive nationalist identity politics of the
post-colonial era.
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The current condition of women in Algeria illustrates this
process. Algerian women are increasingly the targets of Islamic
fundamentalist violence. Citing infractions of Koranic law, both real
and fabricated, religious and secular Algerian women are kidnapped,
raped, and murdered by fundamentalist Algerian men. Conservatives
estimate the number of women assassinated since 1992 at
approximately five hundred (Camhi 34). Feminists, teachers,
hairdressers, and women who wear make-up or eschew the veil are all
labeled as blasphemous and thus as legitimate targets for
fundamentalist retribution. This Koranic retribution may include
abduction, imprisonment, and rape according to a Shiite interpretation
of the Koran permitting "temporary marriages of pleasure." One
hundred young Algerian women were liberated from such a
fundamentalist military rape camp in January 1995 (Camhi 34).
The real threat to the personal safety and freedom of Algerian
women is a direct result of the institutionalized nationalist identity
politics of post-colonial Algeria. The nationalist construction of
Algerian national identity cannot permit the diversity and complexity
of the identity of Algerian women. Algerian women span the political
spectrum on questions of feminism, Islam, the veil, arranged marriage
and confinement, education, and occupational options for women.
But the nationalist construction of national identity does not consent
to the expression of any diversity in identity. The secular government
locked in civil war with the Islamic fundamentalists is also accused of
pandering to nationalist identity constructions for its "propagandist^
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use of fundamentalist violence against women in order to demonize
religious sectors of the population and to improve its own standing in
the eyes of the West"(Camhi 36).
The situation for women in Algeria thereby illustrates the
mechanism whereby the nationalist subversion of personal identity
and the consequent attempt to institute a pure and homogeneous
national identity creates social and political conditions that mimic the
social and political conditions under colonialism. These are conditions
under which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve some
measure of social liberation. Ironically, Memmi appears to recognize
the violation of individual autonomy under colonialism but fails to
detect the analogous violation under xenophobic nationalism. He
states that [ajnother sign of the colonized's depersonalization is what
one might call the mark of the plural. The colonized is never
characterized in an individual manner; he is entitled only to drown in
an anonymous collectivity"(85). The anonymous collectivity of the
post-colonial situation enforced by nationalist constructions of
personal identity is equally damaging and depersonalizing.
The institution of national identity is supposed to create strength
and unity; Memmi asserts this when he claims that the resurgence of
racism and xenophobia among the colonized is effective in galvanizing
resistance to the colonial situation. When individuals are
systematically forced to adhere to tightly measured and defined notions
of national identity, and when any deviation from the ideal of purity is
punished by the threat of violence or actual violence, it is impossible to
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characterize these individuals as free, liberated, or even in the process
of achieving liberation. The enforcement of a national identity thereby
does create strength, in terms of the strength of terror campaigns to
silence opposition to the standard of purity. However, while the
enforcement of national identity is allegedly for the sake of creating a
unified front against external assailants, it results in nothing but an
increase of division and aggression among competing groups in the
national population.
The explication of the relationship between racism and
nationalism makes for an interesting defense of this claim. In Balibar
and Wallerstein's Race
,
Nation
,
and Class
,
Etienne Balibar argues in
the essay Racism and Nationalism" that the connection between
racism and nationalism cannot be understood in simple causal terms
(Race, Nation, and Class 50). Balibar considers alternative theses on the
relationship between racism and nationalism, including the idea that
racism is a component of nationalism, that nationalism is the cause of
racism, that racism underlies nationalism, and that racism is the cause
of nationalism. In somewhat rarefied language, Balibar concludes that
the connection between racism and nationalism cannot be expressed by
"classical schemes of causality" since it is more accurately understood
as "a dialectics of the unity of opposites"(50). He goes on to explain that
there is a reciprocity of determination between racism and nationalism
and that "[r]acism is always constantly emerging out of nationalism,
not only towards the exterior but towards the interior"(53).
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With this in mind I want to turn to consider and critique
Fanon's analysis of the relationship between racism and nationalism in
Wretched of the Earth. Fanon argues here that racist nationalism is
due to the bourgeois "nationalists" who desire simply to transfer
power, and thus the structures of domination, from the foreigners to
themselves (157). Thus, I take it, Fanon is claiming that this kind of
"nationalist expression" isn't really nationalism at all. Fanon's
argument here is very similar to his defense of the assertion that the
Algerian bourgeoisie who appear to be whiter than the White
colonialists are not committing national treason but are instead acting
solely according to their class interests. Thus it appears again that
Fanon is attempting to defend nationalism against yet another
potentially devastating objection: that nationalism and racism are
somehow intimately connected and thus that critiques of racism will
apply with equal force to defenses of natonalisms.
It is my position however that Fanon is again mistaken in this
case when he attributes responsibility for prejudicial behavior to a
social or economic structure allegedly not under the control of the
nationalists. Contra Fanon, I am asserting here that it is not the failure
of the bourgeoisie nationalists to think the nation properly that results
in their racist nationalism (whether it is a racism of contempt or a
racism of defense); indeed, racist nationalism is encoded in the
monological form of the nation itself, and, all critiques of capitalism
aside, the internal contradictions in national identity are exposed in the
racist nationalist directive for (in this case) an all Black or an all Arab
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ruling class. In other words, Fanon sidesteps the critique of
nationalism by asserting that the call for an all Arab ruling class is
evidence of the class privilege of the Arab ruling class, and not
evidence of the covert or overt operation of nationalism. While I
agree with Fanon that the Arab bourgeoisie's attempt to amass coercive
power from the exiting colonial regime is indicative of the class
privilege of the bourgeoisie, I disagree with Fanon that this expression
is due only to economic structures and not also to national identity.
Fanon's claim that the bourgeoisie are acting out of class interest
again betrays his nationalist monolithic understanding of national
identity. The bourgeoisie are expressing what Fanon takes to be a
political position which is squarely at odds with the program for
national liberation of Algeria; thus, the bourgeoisie's betrayal of its
fellow citizens is labeled as class privilege when actually the conflicts in
identity between the bourgeoisie nationalists and the socialist
nationalists should point Fanon to acknowledge the falsification of
identity that is the nationalist understanding of national identity. Any
expression of deviation from the nationalist defined national identity
is attributed to factors other than the subversion of identity implicit in
the definition of national identity.
The analysis of these conflicts between the "bourgeois
nationalists" and the nationalists, between the "White Blacks" and the
Blacks, between the Dahomans and the real Algerians, demonstrates
the multiple ways in which the nationalist definition of national
identity fails to describe accurately the population of the nation. As I
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have argued earlier, the falsification and purification of personal
identity in the definition of national identity is nearly inevitable since
the attempt to construct a national identity requires the articulation of
an ultimately diverse constituency in a unified and uniform
declaration.
Therefore, racism, chauvinism, classism, religious
fundamentalism, sexism, territorialism, etc., are bound to accompany
nationalism. It is simplistic to claim that any of these sociopolitical
phenomena are either the cause of nationalism or that they are caused
by nationalism. What I am interested in here is the construction and
function of national identity. It so happens that the function of
national identity within the framework of nationalism is unceasingly
to define, refine, and narrow the criteria for determining who counts as
a National. After all, how can one conceptualize a nationalist
liberation without definitive criteria for citizenship, namely, national
identity? Eventually, all identity classes will be appealed to in the
perpetual search for the archetypal National, an individual, by the way,
who does not exist. The indoctrination of the homogeneous national
subject is an ongoing process; it does not end because there is no
defined ending point at which one can conclusively say that an
individual has finally emerged as the embodiment of nationalist
imagining.
Therefore, Fanon's attempt to shift responsibility for racist
nationalism away from the construction and function of national
identity and onto the structures of international capitalism is, at best, a
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drastic oversimplification of the situation, and at worst, a covert effort
to conceal the real function of national identity. As Balibar states in his
analysis of the relationship between racism and nationalism, racism
emerges out of nationalism not only to the exterior but also to the
interior. That is, the racism encoded in nationalist identity politics is
not reserved only for those who fall outside of the national boundaries.
Eventually and decisively, the racism in nationalism is directed with
equal force at the citizens of the nation in question. The same is the
case for the xenophobia, the sexism, the religious fundamentalism, the
territorialism, the classism, that are all encoded in the monologic of
national identity. This eventuality is demonstrated in the current
politics of many nations or proto-nations in the midst of nationalist
definition and liberation. The condition of women in Algeria is a
primary example. The recent accusations against "foreigners," "the
ethnic vote," and the rich in Quebec, leveled by Premier Jacques
Parizeau, holding them responsible for the October 1995 failure of the
independence referendum, is another. The increasing incidence of
rape and sexual violence against light skinned women in Hawai'i
(presumed to be non-Hawaiian) by Native Hawaiian men who justify
their crimes by appealing to necessary resistance to colonialism is
another. 24 Haunani Kay-Trask's description of this recent trend in
Hawai'i is disturbingly complicit with the misogyny underlying the
violence. She argued that such violence is just retribution for the
crimes of colonial, military, and economic occupation endured by
24Haunani-Kay Trask, public lecture, 2 April 1995, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY.
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Native Hawaiians. While I grant her assertions regarding the violence
endured by Native Hawaiians, her claim that sexual violence against
women is therefore somehow permissible does not follow. Moreover,
her complicity with this trend points again to the falsification of
identity inherent to nationalist identity constructions. Given the fact
that Native Hawaiians are defined as those with fifty percent or more
Native blood (Trask 71), many Native Hawaiian women are likely to be
light skinned, and thus targets of the "retribution." In each of these
cases, the particular prejudicial and oppressive conditions are justified
and encouraged by appeal to a non-existent, but forever sought after,
pure homogeneous national identity.
This analysis invariably leads to a further question: if we cannot
seek our liberation according to the categories of group identity, then
on what grounds can we seek the transformation of reality? In other
words, if it really is the case that nationalist liberation requires the
definition of national identity, and that the definition of that national
identity invariably results in the destructive subversion of the
complexity of personal identity, and that such a monological and
purified formulation of identity permits and encourages analogous
prejudicial practices, how can individuals organize themselves for
liberation? Especially when it is arguably the case that it is in virtue of
these identity classes (gender, race, nation, class, religion, ethnicity,
sexuality) that individuals are oppressed.
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N
ationalism and Social Liberation
Fanon, Memmi, and many other theorists25 argue that because
individuals are oppressed as members of groups, it is only through
organization of those groups that liberation is possible. For Fanon and
Memmi, the native Algerians and Tunisians have been systematically
denied the right to nationality. While the denial of nationality has
brought with it a collection of ghastly oppressions, it is the prohibition
of national sovereignty and citizenship that is at the root of the
oppression of Algerians and Tunisians. This leads Memmi to state:
Being oppressed as a group, the colonized must necessarily adopt a
national and ethnic form of liberation from which he [the colonizer]
cannot but be excluded"(39). Fanon argues from a similar motivation
when he works to explain away the most severe conflicts among
Algerians, conflicts that appear to be leading directly to the
decomposition of a clear national identity, and thus to the
disintegration of a clear program for liberation.
It is my position that while what Memmi offers here is also a
partial explanation of the origin of nationalist, separatist opposition, it
is his reliance on the unattainable nationalist identity of the colonized
that demonstrates the fundamental contradiction between nationalist
identity politics and social liberation. I am concerned primarily with
his analysis of oppression, and the ways in which his distillation of
identity functions in this analysis. Memmi clearly states that
25See especially Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference and Marilyn Frye,
The Politics of Reality.
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individuals are oppressed in virtue of their membership in some
group and he concludes from this that because one is oppressed in
virtue of group membership, then one can only transform those
oppressive conditions through organization according to group
membership.
But it is my interest to contest this analysis of oppression, again
on the grounds of the inherent contradictions in nationalist identity
formation. Memmi and Fanon are certainly not alone in proposing
that because individuals are oppressed according to identity classes of,
in their case, nationality, it is along the axis of nationalism that the
oppressed can transform their social and political conditions.
Contemporary feminist theorists such as Iris Marion Young (Justice
and the Politics of Difference ) and Marilyn Frye (The Politics of Reality)
also maintain that the categories of group identity (especially social
constructions of race, gender, nation, and class) are compelling
categories since it is in virtue of membership in particular groups that
individuals experience oppression. That is, they hold that it is as
individual members of the category woman that individual women
experience oppression; for example, individual women are the victims
of and oppressed by sexual predators in virtue of their membership in
the category woman.
Marilyn Frye's explanation of the subjects of oppression is again
consistent with her overall analysis of oppression as systematic.
According to Frye, the explanation for the oppression of individuals
lies not in some individual talent, merit, or failure; the explanation
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lies in membership in a category. Frye's analysis of sexism further
develops the idea that this kind of oppression is systematic. On the
incidence of sexism she states that "the locus of sexism is primarily in
the system or framework, not in the particular act"(Politics 19 ).
Therefore, recognition of an individual as oppressed requires
recognition of that individual as being a member of a particular group.
Similarly, Iris Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference
argues that individuals are oppressed in virtue of their membership in
particular groups. However, it is at this point that Young's analysis
diverges from Frye's. While Frye, Fanon, and Memmi latch on to the
idea that because individuals are oppressed in virtue of membership in
various identity classes (whether it is nationality, race, gender, class)
they therefore must seek liberation according to their continued
identification with those categories. Young argues for a heterogeneous
public in which the equality of social groups is achieved by mandatory
group representation of disadvantaged groups. According to Young,
advantaged groups do not need guarantee of representation since
much of what makes these groups advantaged is the fact that their
voices are already heard - they are advantaged precisely because they
are represented in a community where not all are represented (187).
My own position on this question falls somewhere between the
identity politicians (Frye, Fanon, Memmi) and the democratic
pluralists (Young). I will begin with my critique of the identity
politicians. As I have argued throughout the dissertation, the
subversion of the diversity and complexity of national identity is a
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necessary and destructive component of nationalism. It is inevitable
that such a subversion will be part of nationalist struggle since the idea
of launching any nationalist project is untenable without the ability to
distinguish between citizens of the nation and foreigners to it. The
process of constructing a national identity will invariably require the
homogenization of personal identity since a national identity must
encompass an ultimate diversity in a unified articulation.
But why, one may object, is the public subversion of diversity
such an intolerable consequence of nationalism - especially in the case
of liberation struggles when nationalist organization is the most likely
to succeed in transforming oppressive and violent social conditions?
Why is it self-destructive for Algerians, for example, to "lay down their
differences" and present a unified opposition to French occupation as
Algerians ? Isn't it possible for Algerians to maintain their
particularities of identity in private sectors as they wage a nationalist
public battle against foreign occupation? We have seen in the case of
Algeria that public subversion of diversity in identity for the sake of
forming a unified national resistance to colonialist occupation has
failed to permit private expressions of difference. In fact, the
cultivation of a unified public national identity, a public nationalism,
has had the consequence of violating citizens' rights to private
expressions of diversity in identity. Of course, this kind of demarcation
between the public and private spheres is erroneous. For example,
how does a secular Muslim woman subvert her difference from
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Algerian Islamic national identity in public and at the same time enact
that difference in her daily private life?
It is the same logic of essentialism that provided the foundation
for contemporary feminist struggle and now stands to destroy the
possibility of future feminist political action. Currently, the underlying
logic of feminist struggle - the category woman - is being contested,
rejected, and reconstructed. Many theorists have argued that the
category woman is inherently prejudicial since it has been employed
since its inception in feminist action not solely as a category of
unification, but as importantly, as a category of exclusion. Feminist
theorists have argued convincingly that the category woman does not
and has not included lesbians, women of color, poor women, women
without formal education, etc. In practice, the initial (and often
persistent) response of the majority of students in Women's Studies
courses to the presentation of course material on women of color,
lesbians. Third World women, working class women, Jewish women,
etc., is to assert that this is not material appropriate to a Women's
Studies course since this is material about sexuality, race, nationality,
and religion - not about women. At this point, students are often
perplexed at the question: what then is a woman? Student responses
indicate overwhelmingly that their conception of woman, and thus of
Women's Studies, is the evaluation and analysis of the particular
social, political, economic, and historical conditions not of women in
general, but of White, economically privileged, Christian, Western
women.
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As significant however, is the fact that the category woman does
not and can not countenance the existence of multiple identities
within any one individual. That is, the category woman forces
particular women - women who are not White and privileged - to
partition, subdue, and valorize different aspects of their personal
identity. Thus, African-American women for example often critique
this categorization for attempting to force them to choose between their
racial and their gender identities and loyalties. The issue becomes
increasingly complex when women who occupy more than one or two
identity classes not included in the original category woman attempt to
find their place within the category26
. As all kinds of women involved
in feminist struggle have discovered and are discovering, there is no
way comfortably to subvert the ultimate complexity and diversity of
personal identity, publicly or privately. Doing so does not promote
unity or strength.
It is my position that the attempt to defend nationalist
constructions of identity falls prey to an analogous critique. I have
argued that the nationalist subversion of the diversity of identity
results in the replication of the very social and political conditions
nationalist action was meant to transform or prevent. Thus, Memmi
and Fanon move from the fact that since Algerians, or Tunisians, or
other colonized peoples are oppressed in virtue of their membership in
a group that is being systematically denied nationality, to the
conclusion that therefore the route to liberation is along the axis of an
26See especially Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider.
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insurgent nationality. What Fanon and Memmi seem to miss
however is the full significance of the fact that the definition of
Algerians or Tunisians, or Colonized, is one imposed by the occupying
power. Importantly, this imposed categorization is one which
undeniably eradicates the diversity of the individuals marshaled
underneath the category. If this is the case, it is no longer clear why
liberation should necessarily proceed along the axis of a category
imposing collective anonymity on the colonized, or the occupied, or
the oppressed. It is the external imposition of a collective anonymity
that permits violent foreign occupation of sovereign peoples. This is
clearly demonstrated in the history of colonization in many places,
including in Hawai'i, Algeria, Mexico (modern day western United
States), and of Native North Americans. While nationalist resistance
to foreign occupation often is successful in ridding the sovereign
people of the colonizers, and while many have theorized the possibility
and desirability of at the point of liberation transforming that
nationalist consciousness into a worldly consciousness27 untainted by
the prejudicial policies endemic to nationalist politics, nationalist
liberation has not been successfully transformed into a post-liberation,
non-nationalist political system. As feminists have learned that the
category woman has been employed as much as a tool of exclusion as a
tool of inclusion, nationalist action and liberation has shown that post-
liberation, the pernicious process of hyper-definition of national
27See Frantz Fanon's Wretched of the Earth and Edward Said's "The Politics of
Knowledge."
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identity persists and is turned inward on the citizens of the nation28
often resulting in the creation of the very challenges to individual
autonomy against which national liberation or organization was
designed to protect.
Thus it is my position that a continued identification with the
socially constructed sense of nationality and national identity leads
nowhere but to a continuation of the social and political conditions
such an identity is designed to transform. While I agree with Memmi,
Fanon, Frye, and Young that individuals experience oppression in
virtue of socially constructed groups and categories, I do not conclude
from this that the axis of liberation for individuals oppressed in virtue
of group identity is necessarily according to categories of group
identification.
Young's analysis of the liberation from identity-based oppression
is a welcome departure from the traditional stance of the identity
politicians. She develops her analysis from complex assertions
regarding first, the composition of social groups - that social groups or
categories are not made or founded, individuals instead find
themselves in certain groups, and that individuals are not defined
solely by the groups in which they find themselves; and second, the
structure of personal identity - that individuals constituted by their
28
It is arguably the case that this nationalist hyper-definition of national identity
persists today in the United States as a holdover from the war for independence
between the colonists and the British. As the United States has become the world
economic and military superpower with no legitimate fear of foreign occupation,
private and public institutions continue to impose and restrict from within the nation an
increasingly prohibitive national identity. This would seem to suggest that even two
centuries is not a sufficient amount of time to transform nationalist consciousness into
worldly consciousness.
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social groupings and private relations are not ontologically unified
and coherent (43-48). From this Young concludes that it is not
necessary for the end of oppression to end the significance of group
identification. And in so arguing, she exposes the latent prejudicial
policies underlying different versions of assimilationist arguments. To
end oppression it is necessary, on her account, to end the privileging of
particular social groups in governing bodies. Disadvantaged social
groups would be recognized and given mandatory representation in
governing bodies thereby displacing privileged social groups who have
maintained a monopoly on public, political, and social power. The
resulting equality of social groups in virtue of equality in
representation in governing bodies would result in the "mutual
recognition and affirmation of group differences"(191) and thus an end
of oppression.
While I agree with Young on her understanding of the subtleties
and complexities of both the formation of social groups and the
construction of personal identity, as well as her analysis of the
constituents of privilege and oppression for given social groups, I am
not convinced that such an equality of social groups would be the
result of mandating representation for oppressed social groups in
governing bodies. My concern with Young's account of liberation from
oppression stems from her reliance on a continued identification with
the socially constructed categories of identity. While her analysis
avoids the pitfalls of the standard identity politics route by relying on a
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more complex analysis of oppression?? than simple membership in
historically marginaltzed identity classes, the notion that mandatory
representation will be according to membership in those historically
marginalized identity classes actually reintroduces an inaccurately
monolithic sense of personal identity.
As working examples of her program for group representation
Young cites the policies of the National Democratic Party, many non-
profit agencies, and some corporations (189). In each of these examples,
the governing bodies in question have instituted policies mandating
the representation of specific groups on their steering committees,
boards of directors, etc. These specific groups are: women, people of
color. Blacks, Hispanics, gay men and lesbians, disabled people, etc.
Now, while I am certainly not contesting that there are such people as
women, Asians, Latinos, lesbians, workers, etc., I am contesting the fact
that these identity classes are capable of countenancing the actual
identities of many real people. In other words, while I find Young's
program radical and visionary, it still relies on the very categories of
identity that have become the occasion for the dramatic reenactment of
coercive power relations. For this reason, I am skeptical about the
ability of equality of group representation successfully to transform
coercive conditions of oppression.
What actually happens in practice when a governing body goes
about the task of filling a designated position for a woman, a person of
color, a lesbian, a disabled person, etc.? Unfortunately, these "reserved
29See Chapter 2 of Justice and the Politics of Difference, "Five Faces of Oppression."
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positions" often become the site for the reproduction of coercive power
relations. Susan Sanchez-Casal refers to this phenomenon as
"multicultural distress"(Sanchez-Casal "In A Neighborhood of
Another Color"). That is, the board or committee is more often than
not stacked with individuals unwilling to consider the position of the
"multicultural" member and therein give merely lip service to equality
of representation. Moreover, the notion of reserving representative
space for women, for Black people, for gays and lesbians, again raises
the problem of the reductive notion of identity inherent in each of
these categories. What is the Black perspective, the women's
perspective, etc.? And where does this leave individuals who do not
succumb to the privileging of one facet of their identity over any other?
A brief account of the history and function of the category
woman will illustrate my point. What are we to conclude from the fact
that the category woman has developed to exclude lesbians, women of
color, poor and working women, etc.? It is my position that the
excessive exclusion inherent in the category betrays the complexity of
the conditions under which women experience oppression. That is,
the excessive exclusion in the category demonstrates the impact of
racism, nationalism, homophobia, classism, etc., on sexism and
misogyny. The exclusion in the category provides a topology of social
and political power from which we can begin to complicate our
understanding of sexist oppression through the analysis of the different
ways in which both men and women have participated in the
construction of the category woman. With this newly complicated
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analysis, political organization and liberation according to that category
no longer makes sense. This is not to say that organizing according to
femimst principles makes no sense. It is to say, however, that our
received notions of feminism (primarily the legacy of gender as the
fundamental subject of feminism) require reconsideration by diverse
groups of feminists engaged in ideology critique.
The same is true for categories of national identity. While it is
certainly the case that individuals experience power or oppression in
virtue of the nationality into which they fall, it is also the case that
categories of national identity are excessively and increasingly
exclusionary - regardless of whether they are national identities of
powerful or oppressed peoples. As I have argued in Chapter One, there
is a considerable amount of nationalist activity geared towards the
increasingly exclusionary redefinition of national identity here in the
United States, a nation certainly not existing under any serious threat
to its sovereignty. I have presented numerous examples of the rigidity
of national identity in nationally defined communities seeking
sovereignty - religious fundamentalism in Algeria, resistance strategies
in Hawai'i, linguistic control in Quebec and the United States, etc. In
all of these cases, it is the enforcement of national identity - the alleged
category of liberation itself - that becomes yet another occasion for the
dramatic reinforcement of coercive power relations.
Therefore, it is my position that while individuals are oppressed
according to the ways in which both they and their communities define
their membership in discrete social categories, and thus that in the case
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of national identity individuals experience power or oppression
depending upon their nationality, there is a fundamental contradiction
between nationalist identity politics and social liberation which makes
nationalist liberation something of a contradiction in terms. I have
argued that this contradiction is a function of the ways in which the
definition and enforcement of national identity subvert the expression
of the complexity of individual identity, and that it is this suppression
of the complexity of identity that reproduces oppressive conditions of
dominance and subordination. The politics of identity necessary to the
functioning of a nationalist movement thereby perpetuate the very
conditions such a politics purports to transform.
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CHAPTER III
THE NATIONALIST UNDERPINNINGS OF TRADITIONALIST
CURRICULUM
A. Introduction
Having established the parameters of what constitutes
nationalist control over culture, I now wish to turn to a discussion and
analysis of the major arguments of the so-called Traditionalist position
on educational and curricular reform. I will attempt to show that the
Traditionalist position, in its several major incarnations, is attempting
a kind of control over national culture that is decidedly nationalist.
The Traditionalist position, I will argue, seeks to support through
curricular control a particular version of national culture, one that is
identifiably pure and free from foreign invasion. By controlling
national culture in this way, the Traditionalists are actually fortifying
their notion of national identity. And mediating between this ideal of
national identity and this manipulation of national culture is the
sentiment of nationalism, a sentiment completely antithetical to the
mission of the university.
I will discuss three different proponents of the Traditionalist
position, Allan Bloom, Dinesh D'Souza, and John Searle. In each case,
I will attempt to demonstrate the consequences of the argument at
hand for the modification of national culture, and in so doing I will
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show how each argument appeals to a particular definition of
American national identity; moreover, I will contend that the
definition of national identity appealed to in each case is identifiably
nationalist. Thus I contend that the arguments to preserve the
traditional canons in the teaching of the humanities are based in
nationalism. The major arguments of the Traditionalists are aimed at
preserving a specific construction of national culture, one that is
identifiably homogeneous, pure, and free from foreign invasion.
B. Allan Bloom's Curricular Nationalism
According to Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American
Mind, the intellectual machinery of the twentieth century has had the
following two major consequences: first, education based on natural
rights has been supplanted by education based on "openness"; and,
second, a fundamental facet of our political heritage -
majoritarianism" - has been rejected "in favor of a nation of
minorities and groups each following its own beliefs and
inclinations"(31). According to Bloom the new education (of the last 50
years) is the "education of openness"(27); the change from an education
based on "natural rights" that, among other principles, held absolute
truth as primary, to this relativist moralizing education, was caused by
"the presence in the United States of men and women of a great variety
of nations, religions, and races and the fact that many of them were
badly treated because they belonged to these groups"(30). Bloom claims
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that the Founders of the nation believed that minorities were, in
general, a negative national presence. However, rather than working
towards "suppressing factions and educating a united or homogeneous
citizenry (31), the Founders worked to create a system whereby factions
would cancel one another out "and allow for the pursuit of the
common good"(31). Since the Founders' plan called for the subjection
of all citizens to the theory of natural rights, a "national majority"
based on natural rights, and not any particularities of identity, was
allegedly constructed.
According to Bloom, the negative intention of the Founding
Fathers towards minorities has been reversed so that the idea of a
majority is taken now to be based in prejudicial self-interest(31).
Likewise, the celebration of ethnic, religious, national, or gender
particularity (minority status) has become the referent for articulating
the legitimacy of one's claims to social protection. Factions now claim
their rights based not on their individual participation in humanity
and thus their protection under the broad jurisdiction of natural rights,
but rather on their minority or special status as members of particular
ethnic, religious, racial, national, or gender classes. For example, the
Martin Luther King branch of the Civil Rights Movement, Bloom
claims, was based on the fundamental claims of natural rights: Black
people deserved equal protection under the laws as human beings.
The Black Panthers however, "insisted on respect for blacks as blacks,
not as human beings simply"(Closing 33).
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In so arguing, Bloom does his best to implode the arguments of
the Multiculturalists. The anti-traditionalist (the Multiculturalist)
position holds that all cultures are equally good and thus intrinsically
deserving of celebration and respect; it is for this reason that
ethnocentrism (the belief that one's culture is superior to all other
cultures) is necessarily indicative of intellectual and moral turpitude.
This anti-ethnocentric position of multiculturalism. Bloom contends,
is actually internally contradictory. A close study of any non-Western
culture. Bloom asserts, will reveal "that each and every one of these
cultures is ethnocentric"(36); therefore, the Multiculturalist proponents
of openness are actually imposing a value of Western culture - anti-
ethnocentrism - on non-Western cultures. The retreat from the
universalist position of natural rights to the particularist position of
multiculturalism will necessarily lead to conflict since the
Multiculturalists are simultaneously asserting that all cultures are
equally good and must be celebrated in their own rights, as they are
asserting that ethnocentrism, a value of most cultures, is tantamount
to moral depravity.
For Bloom, the obvious way out of this antinomy is to recognize
the wisdom of the Founders of this nation and maintain the basic
principles of natural rights. Individuals do not deserve protection as
members of any particular identity class, they deserve equal protection
under the Constitution as members of the human race. While the
Constitution and natural rights understood as such cannot guarantee
equal respect for women as women, for Jews as Jews, etc., this political
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philosophy can guarantee equal protection for all individual human
beings under the laws.
For Bloom, the impact of adherence to natural rights is no less
significant in regards to university level curriculum than it is in
regards to various minority struggles for basic human rights and
protections under the law. Applying the fundamental principles of
natural rights to the theory of education results in the demand that all
beliefs from the "Old World" (i.e. ethnocentric beliefs about the
superiority of one's mother country) be abandoned in favor of the
natural beliefs. To suppose that, for example, Jane Austen has more to
teach women students of literature than Shakespeare does, or that it is
more important intellectually for Black men students to read Eldridge
Cleaver and Ralph Ellison than for them to read Hemmingway and
Tolstoy, is to reject the fundamental principle of natural rights.
What then is the fundamental principle of natural rights in
regards to intellectual inquiry? That "class, race, religion, national
origin or culture, all disappear or become dim when bathed in the light
of natural rights"(27). Thus, in regards to controversy over
curriculum, any modifications of curriculum in established disciplines
(for example, adding a unit on African philosophy to an Introductory
philosophy course), and any proposed additions of new disciplines
based on class, religion, race, national origin or culture, are all suspect.
They are suspect because rather than determining curriculum or
categories of inquiry according to the standards of intellectual quality
established by natural rights (of course we have no idea what these
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standards of quality are), they represent intellectual inquiry based on
the simple-minded celebration of minority factions.
This multicultural education has, according to Bloom, several
devastating consequences for intellectual training. First, rather than
freeing students from the bounds of their identity, multicultural
education forces students to be forever subjected to the accidents of
their birth (women can be intellectually enriched only be feminism,
African-American students by Black and Africana Studies, etc.).
Second, under the principles of multicultural education the
disinterested pursuit of truth and objective knowledge is supplanted by
the relativized equation of all cultures, ideas, and thus intellectual
production. Third, in more specific terms, the attendant relativism of
multicultural education makes the end of classical intellectual inquiry -
the search for the good life - impossible to achieve. If all cultures are
equally complex, advanced, and accomplished, then there is no need to
search for the cultural account of the good life.
Essentially Bloom is claiming that the new education and its
attendant "multicultural curriculum" are focused on and organized
according to loose, intellectually uninteresting, and indefensible
principles of relativism, diversity, and open-mindedness. This
misdirection in educational policy has serious consequences for
objectivity, truth, and aesthetic beauty, let alone the polis. I however
contend that Bloom's impassioned defense of the Western canon,
objectivity, and cultured judgment, is actually an ideologically infused
defense of a particular version of national culture; that is, a version of
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national culture that works in tandem with an image of national
identity that Bloom (and many others) would like to protect and
cultivate. A close examination of the ramifications, assumptions, and
presumptions of Bloom's argument reveals the nationalist ideology
informing his argument. It is precisely through such nationalist
treatises, as The Closing of the American Mind is, that nationalist
images of national identity and national culture materialize.
Since it is the foundation of his argument, let me begin with
Bloom's account of the relationship between natural rights and
intellectual training. According to Bloom's analysis, the principle of
natural rights, when applied to questions regarding the appropriate
content and direction of a liberal education, will consistently and
decisively determine both disciplinary structure and curricular content.
Now, more importantly, while Bloom doesn't say so explicitly, he
presumes that the light of reason will generate (roughly) the Great
Books curriculum. The determinations of natural rights, the light of
reason, are in a way then self-evident, and thus self-justifying. Who
can dispute the dictums of the light of reason? Who can quarrel with
the notions of quality illuminated by the light of reason? Clearly, this
is the first major weakness in Bloom's argument. The assertion that
the principle of natural rights necessarily sifts through the catalogue of
intellectual production of all time and arrives at the contents of what
has (since the early part of this century) been taken to be the Canon of
Great Books, is merely that, an assertion. Bloom claims that
intellectual quality and aesthetic beauty are readily discernible under
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the light of reason, but he gives no theoretical account of the way in
which the light of reason determines quality. The transparency of this
claim requires that we examine it more closely.
One common defense of this claim comes in the form of
evidence from the "other" that the texts in the Western Canon are
actually the most intellectually compelling, artfully written, timeless,
and aesthetically beautiful books in the world. Irving Howe, another
academic who takes a very similar position to Bloom's, makes this very
defense when he asserts that Richard Wright and other African-
American authors claimed to take their intellectual heritage from the
classics of Western (read: White) literature. In so doing, Howe is
essentially saying that Richard Wright's (a successful Black American
author) claim that his literary roots are in the classics of Western
White literature is somehow prima facie evidence of the unmitigated
quality of the Western intellectual tradition. If even Black authors are
claiming the superiority of the Western intellectual tradition, authors
who allegedly have a vested interest in tracing their success to their
own respective minority communities, then all the White folks can
certainly rest assured in the third party native certification of the
ultimate superiority of this intellectual tradition.
It is a shame however that Howe has not studied any of the
correspondence between Richard Wright and Zora Neale Hurston, or
any of the scholarship on this correspondence, particularly Henry Louis
Gates' The Signifying Monkey. Gates argues convincingly in this book
that Wright's denial of African or African-American literary
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antecedents is emblematic of signifying), a highly complex and
definitively African-American rhetorical device of semantic play
whereby the player focuses on the instability of the relationship
between the signifier and the signified. Deliberate manipulation of the
instability in this relationship leads to a multiplication of meaning and
consequently, indeterminacy of interpretation, principles grounded in
the Fon and Yoruba discursive universes. In fact, Gates' theory
suggests that Wright s (and other's) claims to White and western
literary antecedents are actually evidence of Wright's position in a
decidedly Black signifying chain of literary meaning, stretching back
through some of the first slave narratives to Yoruba traditions of
religion and divination. On Gates' theory, Wright's denial of African-
American literary antecedents is another way of saying to White
intellectuals searching for the ''origin'' of great African-American
literature: Yo Mama! The irony is only heightened by the fact that
Howe is the signified lion in this case, interpreting only the literal
meaning of Wright's statements and completely missing the figurative
dimension of his claims.
Now, while there are certainly many legitimate criticisms to be
made of Gates' position in The Signifying Monkey, the theory
articulated there is complex and powerful; it provides a counterpoint to
the position that any adulation for the Western canon is necessarily
evidence of the canon's intellectual and aesthetic superiority. In
regards to the broader point however. Bloom's assertion that under the
light of reason any thinking person will recognize the inherent and
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superior aesthetic and intellectual quality of the texts traditionally
included in the Western canon is clearly false. This is not to say that
the texts in the Western canon are second-rate, irrelevant, or politically
unsavory and therefore not ideal for undergraduate curriculum. It is
to say that the claim that these texts are necessarily and objectively
superior to all other intellectual production in the world is
preposterous, let alone indefensible.
Perhaps recognizing the unmanageable scope of the claim he is
trying to show. Bloom moves to a more pragmatic discussion of the
consequences for higher education of denying the right of the light of
reason to shine. It is in the articulation of these consequences that the
definition of national identity Bloom is aiming to cultivate and
preserve becomes clear. First he claims that the denial of the ability of
the light of reason to generate the appropriate texts for study causes
students to be forever subjected to the accidents of their birth.
Allegedly, multicultural education teaches students that the
appropriate texts for study are determined by their own particular
identity (especially if they possess some minority status) rather than by
the light of reason. This, according to Bloom, undermines the ability of
education to free students from the accidents of their existence.
But let's pause for a moment and ask: why would anyone want
to be freed from their identity? What kinds of social and political
conditions would make it desirable for one to be liberated from one's
identity? And, once liberated from one's original identity, what kind of
identity would one possess? If one possesses a minority identity of any
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kind then, in Bloom's political community, one would want to be
relieved of this identity since individuals deserve equal protection
under the constitution and the theory of natural rights only as human
beings and not as human beings of any particular kind. While this
equal protection seems to be sufficient, as Bloom admits, natural rights
and the constitution do not guarantee equal respect for individuals,
only equal rights.
Now it is clear why one would seek to be liberated from one's
identity. What Bloom doesn't say here though is that this liberation
from identity is actually for the purpose of achieving another identity.
In Bloom's political community one does not relinquish identity for
the sake of becoming free of all and any identity. One considers
relinquishing only minority and subaltern identities since it is these
identities that prevent one from receiving social respect and concern,
as opposed to contempt and hatred. Under the pure light of reason one
may in fact realize not that all races, classes, religions, genders,
sexualities, nationalities, etc., are of no consequence, but instead that
one must be possessed of a particular race, class, gender, nationality and
sexuality in order for one's identity to be of no consequence. One
would seek liberation from an identity if and only if the identity caused
negative consequences for the individual. And Bloom readily admits
the existence of these negative consequences as he argues that the
recent advent of multicultural education is due largely to "the presence
in the United States of men and women of a great variety of nations.
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religions, and races and the fact that many of them were treated badly
because they belonged to these groups"(30).
Thus, when Bloom claims that one of the central goals of
education is to free students from the accidents of their existence, what
he actually means is that one of the goals of education is to free
students from the accidents of their minority or subaltern status, status
that is well named as accidental given the negative consequences for
those in this nation with minority or subaltern identities.
Multicultural education is therefore a formidable obstacle to his
mission of liberation since intellectually rigorous multicultural
education (as opposed to co-opted versions of diversity celebrations)
teaches students (among many other things) not that the appropriate
and relevant texts for study are determined by their own particular
identities, but rather that there are rich intellectual and aesthetic
traditions that exist alongside of and intermixed with what we
understand to be the canonical western texts.
In so seeking to produce, through education, a massive
relinquishment of minority and subaltern identities Bloom reveals the
nationalist subtext of his argument. As I argued earlier in reference to
nationalist manipulations of culture in Algeria, Quebec, Hawai'i, and
the United States, Bloom seeks a similar purity of national identity
through careful orchestration of national culture.30 His claim that
education serves, ideally, to free students from the accidents of their
30Whether such a purity of national identity could possibly be achieved by such a
manipulation of national culture is not what I am trying here to establish. What I am
trying to show is instead that Bloom aims to achieve such national purity through
educational policy.
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identities is actually a call for students to assimilate to a particular
category of identity: majority or dominant identity. It is not Bloom's
position that education should free White capitalist Christian
heterosexual American identified individuals from the "accidents" of
their birth. These are the identity classes in fact that make all other
identities accidental. Latino is an accidental racial category in virtue of
its relationship to Whiteness; third world origin is an accidental
national category in relation to Americaness; bilingualism or speakers
for whom English is a second language is accidental in relation to
native English monolingualism. No one is ever liberated from their
White racial identity in the United States. Liberation from identity can
only refer to liberation from minority and subaltern identities. The
result of such a broad scale liberation is obvious and horrifying: the
hegemony of a tyrannical majority mad for universal compliance with
its will to purify the complexion of the national population . 31 And it is
this attempt to achieve purity and homogeneity in national identity
through purity of curriculum that makes Bloom's project nationalist.
The second and third consequences of multicultural education
for intellectual training cited by Bloom also reveal the latent
31 There are countless examples of such tyranny. Currently, the Bosnian crisis provides
the most compelling example of the horrific consequences of the attempt to homogenize
national identity by "liberating" geographic regions of individuals with undesirable
identities, in this case, of Muslims. I do not mean at all to suggest that Bloom's position
on the canon is comparable to the Bosnian Serb position on Muslims; I mean only to
assert that Bloom's position on the "accidents" of identity and his attendant argument
in favor of preserving the canonical tradition in tact, are analogous examples of the
nationalist desire for purity, in this case, of national culture. The United States has
participated in similar initiatives to "liberate" individuals of their national origin
and linguistic specificity, especially in regards to Native Americans, Chicana/os, and
Latina/os.
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nationalist project in his attempt to preserve the western canon.
Bloom asserts that multicultural education has the epistemological
consequence of supplanting the objective pursuit of absolute truth with
the relativized equation of all ideas. His specific concern is that under
this epistemological relativism it is impossible to achieve the classical
end of intellectual inquiry: the search for the good life. Now we need
to ask. how on earth does any of this constitute nationalism, or the
attempt to control national culture in a way that purifies national
identity? Finding an answer to this question requires that we return to
Bloom's discussion of the relationship between natural rights and
intellectual activity, for it is from this discussion that I will attempt to
show that Bloom's defense of objectivity is actually an impassioned
plea for bolstering American nationalist identity through national
culture.
Bloom contends that there is no American national literature in
the way that the French, the Germans, the Italians, the English, all
have books that furnish their respective national consciousness.
America, Bloom says, begins with nothing but "uncultivated
nature"(54). However, Bloom says, the United States has "one of the
longest uninterrupted political traditions of any nation in the world. . .
that tradition is unambiguous.
. . America tells one story: the
unbroken, ineluctable progress of freedom and equality"(55). This
glorious political history is documented in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, what Bloom calls the "founding
heritage"(55). Without a national literature, these items form the basis
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of national pride, adding significance and meaning to our humdrum
lives.
But unfortunately, the founding heritage has been desecrated;
for Bloom, there is nothing left to tell the national story. In the face of
what Bloom takes to be a national intellectual vacuum, he proposes
that we base liberal education on the doctrine of natural rights.
Essentially, Bloom wants to ground liberal education in the doctrine of
natural rights (as he understands the application of natural rights to
curriculum and disciplinary structure) since it is the doctrine of natural
rights that forms the cornerstone of the founding heritage. The
founding heritage provides a contact point between education and
national identity. Bloom's pedagogy is thus based on an impoverished
nationalist notion of pure identity, one that drums out our diversity
and, eventually, our ability to think critically.
It is as if Bloom is saying that we, as a national community are
without a national story unless we take up the founding heritage with
seriousness and respect. We are not like the French who can choose
for their intellectual orientation between Descartes and Pascal. We
have one option and that is the founding heritage. Conveniently, it is
in the "founding heritage" that the epistemological position claiming
the existence of objectivity and the possibility of the disinterested
pursuit of truth rests. In regards to intellectual training, therefore, the
founding heritage requires that we apply ourselves to intellectual
activity according to the principle of natural rights. Applying ourselves
to intellectual activity according to the principle of natural rights
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means that we have to forget about identity - we cannot engage with
texts and ideas because of the identity of the authors. We should
engage with them only for the sake of our search for quality, form,
beauty, and truth. Moreover, applying ourselves to intellectual activity
according to the principle of natural rights, and thus the light of reason,
requires that we forsake all intellectual traditions other than the
Western canonical tradition as intellectually inferior and, just as
devastating, as nationally inappropriate to us as Americans.
But I am arguing that in Bloom's case these claims to protecting
the pursuit of objective knowledge are actually nationalist claims in
disguise. He essentially gives no justification for the position that we
should adopt the founding heritage as the foundation for intellectual
inquiry except that the founding heritage is the national "book" for
America. He bemoans the fact that unlike the French, the Germans,
the Italians, and the English, America is without a national literature.
However, says Bloom, while we do not have a national literature, we
have a long (perhaps the longest!) uninterrupted political history in
the world - a political history based on the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution, the two documents that form the founding
heritage. And so, we must fall in with the intellectual heritage that
logically follows from the founding tradition: natural rights. However,
here we need to ask: why is it that we must adopt this intellectual
stance? What is the justification Bloom offers for castigating the
public's refusal to follow this position? Unfortunately for Bloom, the
only justification is a nationalist one; since without a national story we.
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as Americans, would be nothing more than untamed nature, and since
the founding heritage is the national story we are in possession of, we
must adopt the founding heritage as the basis for our intellectual
activity.
But this sounds like nationalist pandering to me. The
theoretical justification is drawn squarely from the national origin of
the texts; the explanation stops there. The tacit assumption is: this is
our national heritage, therefore it is our destiny as American nationals
to carry out our intellectual activity in accordance with our destiny.
Conveniently, the unquestionable grounds of our intellectual heritage
also lead us to an uncritical adoption of the principle of natural rights
and an unexamined acceptance of the ultimate superiority of the
Western canonical tradition. Moreover, such a plan has the feature of
rejecting any diversity of identity among individuals who subject
themselves to an intellectual training that cannot be described as
anything but national and nationalist.
Thus I am concluding that those, like Bloom and Howe, who
resist multiculturalism, do so on the grounds that changing from a
traditional curriculum (in whatever existing humanist discipline) to a
multicultural curriculum (diversifying the curriculum) or adding a
new discipline in the humanities (diversifying the categories of
inquiry) threatens the national culture of this nation with impurity
and diversification. In so doing, this threat to national culture is also
always a threat to the definition of national identity; and nationalism
as the motivated attempt to unify, purify, and homogenize national
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culture and national identity is the only sentiment capable of
stabilizing and preserving Bloom's desired images of national culture
and national identity. Any kind of real multicultural education has
the potential to do exactly what Bloom fears it will do: prepare students
to be citizens respectful of a diverse and complex national community,
a community characterized by the inability to articulate its diversity in
a unified nationalist conception.
Essentially, Bloom and others claim to worry that multicultural
education leads to an inability to think critically. The objection to
multicultural education on the grounds that it prepares students to be
respectful of a diverse and complex world community at the cost of
their forever renouncing the ability to judge, to adjudicate among
competing accounts of the good, is actually then an objection with a
nationalist ideological subtext. On the contrary, I contend that it is
nationalist education itself that leads to this very inability to think
critically, that assimilationist multicultural education also leads to such
toothlessness, and that real multicultural education is precisely what
does lead to the ability to think critically, to be an ideology critic.
C. Dinesh D'Souza's Curricular Nationalism
Dinesh D'Souza in his book Illiberal Education, articulates a
related epistemological objection to recent developments in
multicultural education at the undergraduate level. D'Souza ranges
over a number of issues raised by multiculturalism in the university -
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including affirmative action in hiring and admission, regulations on
inflammatory speech, curricular reform, and academic standards. I
wish however to focus on D'Souza's objections to multicultural
curriculum on the grounds that multicultural invasion of the
traditional curriculum stands to prevent the university from achieving
its mission of pursuing the truth. It is in this class of D'Souza's
objections that I will attempt to locate the nationalist subtext of his
position.
While D'Souza devotes extensive passages to the description and
critique of recent academic theories in deconstruction, Marxism, and
feminism, D Souza s position is not that the theories of deconstruction
or reader-response criticism are at fault or are even inherently
dangerous. D'Souza is arguing instead that these kinds of academic
theories are aiding and abetting what he terms "the victim's
revolution," the real culprit in the conspiracy to change liberal
education into its diametrical opposite: illiberal education. While
D Souza maintains throughout Illiberal Education that it is the victim's
revolution and its attendant pedagogical, political, and epistemological
consequences he is concerned with, I instead maintain that D'Souza's
position, particularly his claims to protecting the mission of the
university, is aimed at preserving a particular construction of national
culture, one that is identifiably nationalist.
In a more pointed criticism than Bloom, D'Souza argues that the
very mission of the university - the pursuit of truth - is under attack
from the Multiculturalists. He states: "It is the pursuit of truth itself
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that the modern critics spurn; more precisely, by reducing all truth to
the level of opinion, they deny the legitimacy of distinctions between
truth and error. Yet what is the goal of liberal education if not the
ongomg search for truth? If education cannot help to separate truth
from falsehood, beauty from vulgarity, right from wrong, then what
can it teach us"(D'Souza "Current Controversies" 74)?
D Souza thereby claims that in denouncing current theoretical
(and attendant political) trends in academia he is protecting the
mission of undergraduate liberal education: the unfettered pursuit of
truth. Actually however, D'Souza's appeals to protect the mission of
liberal education are ill-concealed efforts to discredit falsely the recent
achievements of resistance scholarship and insurgent academic
disciplines, and to celebrate uncritically the so-called western
intellectual tradition. Many of the achievements in insurgent
scholarship appear as formidable challenges to the authenticity, the
plausibility, the completeness, and the truth of received knowledges -
knowledges that reinforce, recreate, or formulate a nationalist image of
American national identity and culture.
The nationalist content of D'Souza's argument is thus glaringly
present when he asserts that he is trying to highlight the assault on
truth and objectivity, as he denounces the achievements of insurgent
scholarship, particularly the contributions of insurgent scholarship to
the pursuit of truth. He denounces contributions of insurgent
scholarship that challenge the nationalist image of the United States -
the image of the United States as peerless among other nations for its
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adherence to and protection of the democratic ideals of justice, equality,
and economic opportunity. Moreover, he denounces as pure
demagoguery scholarship that challenges through radical critique the
unexamined adherence to the presuppositions of capitalism,
patriarchy, and democracy. This is a nationalist project aimed at
maintaining a particularly homogeneous and pure version of
American national culture; homogeneous in the sense that D'Souza
wants to protect the in-tact transmission of books and knowledges that
describe the glorious intellectual history of the United States marching
itself towards increasingly pure formulations of democracy; pure in the
sense that the pedagogical and epistemological consequences of
adhering to the Traditionalist position (the position D'Souza defends)
are such that formulation of radical critique of this glorious history is
exceedingly difficult. D'Souza's core curriculum is a false celebration of
a non-existent national legacy.
It is this version of national culture that exists in a dialectical
relationship with the national identity of the United States D'Souza
aims to protect. The development and preservation of a national
culture in general describe and reflect national identity; national
identity in turn determines the course of national culture. Nationalist
consciousness and nationalist educational policy inform both national
culture and national identity. In this case, D'Souza's version of the
Traditionalist position on curricular reform is decidedly nationalist in
its allegations that diversification of the curriculum and of the
categories of inquiry has the cumulative effect of preventing colleges
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and universities from achieving their mission: the pursuit of truth.
D Souza takes aim at the recent developments in so-called insurgent
disciplines that contribute significantly to the pursuit of truth, as they
complicate seriously the unexamined adherence to the ideals of
American national identity. He alleges that insurgent scholarship is
unsuitable for liberal education since it has no inherent intellectual,
aesthetic, or historic substance that would justify displacing one of the
classic texts. However, nowhere does D'Souza present a coherent or
sustained argument to demonstrate the inherent superior quality of
the so-called classic texts. He commits a naturalistic fallacy when he
asserts that the received canon is necessarily the best intellectual work
in the world; the ideology that defines the received canon contains the
assertion that the books in the canon have withstood the grueling test
of time thereby establishing themselves as of inherent superior
intellectual quality. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy however:
membership in the canon is determined allegedly according to whether
a text has withstood the "test of time," but the "test of time" appears to
be membership in the canon.
Moreover, D'Souza's critique of the inclusion of 7, Rigoberta
Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala in one track of the Stanford
University required course in Cultures, Ideas, Values32 is an
instructive example of D'Souza's tendency to discredit disingenuously
32Cultures, Ideas, Values (CIV) is the result of recent curricular modification of the
former required course in Western Civilization. In Illiberal Education D'Souza
misrepresents the Stanford curriculum; out of eight available tracks of CIV, in only one
is there a multicultural curriculum that sometimes includes the book I, Rigoberta
Menchu.
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the contributions to the pursuit of truth that challenge fundamental
aspects of American national identity. According to D'Souza /
Rigoberta Menchu is the text which "best reveals the premises
underlying the new Stanford curriculum "{Illiberal Education 71). He
goes on to challenge the intellectual merits of the text based on first, the
fact that Menchu's history is oral ("As a representative of an oral
tradition Rigoberta33 does not write: rather her views are transcribed by
the French feminist writer Elisabeth Burgos-Debray"(71)); second, the
assertion that the book details mere mundane details of Menchu's
peasant existence, a claim D'Souza substantiates by referring to the
chapter titles in the text (e.g. "Rigoberta's Tenth Birthday"); and third,
that the book is hard to understand since it is "lavishly sprinkled with
Latino and Indian phrases"(71). From this account of the text it almost
appears as if D'Souza has not even read the book; he neglects to
mention the inclusion in the text of a glossary of Spanish and Indian
phrases, nor does he describe the content of any of the "mundane"
chapters where, for example, Menchu details the Indian customs
surrounding the tenth birthday of a child, the symbolic entrance into
the adult world, and the dynamic tension between the isolationist
politics of the Indian community and Menchu's increasing awareness
of the racial, economic, and political diversity in Guatemala.
D'Souza goes on to ask: since there is no clear intellectual merit
to this text, what purpose could there be for including it in a required
33Why does D'Souza refer to Menchu as 'Rigoberta'? Certainly, it is a violation of
conventional rhetorical practice to refer to authors and subjects of history books by their
first names.
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course at Stanford University? He states: "Rigoberta's claim to
eminence is ... as a consummate victim
. .
. Undergraduates do not
read about her because she has written a great and immortal book, or
performed a great deed, or invented something useful"(72). As the
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, Menchu has certainly
performed a great deed. More important however is the contributions
to the pursuit of truth made by such a text. The fact that Menchu does
not write, that her history is oral, should not on its own make the text
intellectually suspect. In fact, given that the mission of liberal
education is to proceed with the unfettered pursuit of truth, and given
that repositories of the truth are not always proficient in our respective
language (whatever that may be), translation of historical accounts is a
common tool of solid historical scholarship.
Menchu's text advances the pursuit of truth since it offers an
indigenous perspective on the political economy of relations between
Indians and Latinos in Guatemala, and between Guatemala and the
international community. At the same time, Menchu's text challenges
the universality of principles fundamental to American national
identity: the naturalness of patriarchy, the economic justice of
capitalism, the equality of democracy. D'Souza marks out these
elements of the book for criticism when he states: "But integrated into
the story, and impossible to miss, is the development of Rigoberta's
political consciousness . . . She becomes first a feminist, then a socialist,
then a Marxist"(71).
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D'Souza argues that the lack of intellectual merit and the
presence of political theory hostile to the "West and Western
Institutions" are the qualities that make /, Rigoberta Menchu an
inappropriate book for liberal education. The text allegedly lacks
aesthetic merit and simultaneously falsely celebrates the victim status
of Rigoberta Menchu. While I would agree with D'Souza that the book
is not written in a compelling style, it is representative of a historically
important genre: testimonial literature. Moreover, the text relates a
first-hand account of the history, beliefs, religion, and political
economy of an indigenous group of people whose history is not
common knowledge but whose presence is felt in the international
economic and political community primarily as coffee harvesters.
Thus we see that while D'Souza denounces so-called illiberal
education, or the intellectual poverty of multiculturalism, for its
alleged assault on truth and objectivity, many of the texts that D'Souza
decries as obstructers of the pursuit of truth actually present knowledge
bases that do contribute to the pursuit of truth. And, what is more, the
very construction of "truth" protected by D'Souza's core curriculum is a
nationalist truth. It is a truth that doesn't begin to account for the
intellectual richness and diversity of national human experience. Nor
does D'Souza's "truth" embodied in the canons of Western literature
and philosophy admit the possibility of fallibility. Thus, the
perpetuation of the traditional canon relies on the ideological logic of
the canon which does not permit submission of any of the member
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texts to scrutiny as it categorically relegates all non-member texts to sub-
canon status.
D'Souza thus delegitimizes the possibility of teaching any
multicultural (read: non-canonical) texts on the grounds that they are
all allegedly about the victim's revolution, and thus can only represent
the groundwork for the indoctrination of unwitting undergraduates.
However, this seems to be mistaken on two counts. First, it
underestimates the capacity of intelligent college students to adopt
some sort of critical perspective on the books that they study and to
resist wholesale indoctrination. But second, and more insidious, it
seems to suggest that these books (I, Rigoberta, Their Eyes Were
Watching God, The Wretched of the Earth, etc.) cannot but be taught as
treatises of political indoctrination. If this were the case, it would mean
that these texts had no remarkable aesthetic, historical, or intellectual
value. Now, this is a difficult claim to defend. In fact, it seems to be
patently false.
D. Tohn Searle's Curricular Nationalism
Though patently false it may be, another well known
philosopher, John Searle, defends essentially the same claims as
D'Souza, albeit in a much more eloquent and elegant fashion. In a
series of critical essays, Searle defines and develops the notion of the
Western Rationalistic Tradition, what Searle takes to be the foundation
of all modern intellectual inquiry and the set of principles that makes
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possible the existence of the university. In his essay "Rationality and
Realism, What is at Stake?" Searle considers the nature of the
relationships between the Western Rationalistic Tradition and the
ideal of the university, and between the Western Rationalistic
Tradition and the insurgent Multiculturalists. Thus Searle begins by
claiming that while there is an ostensible battle between the
Traditionalists and the Multiculturalists, there is really a more
fundamental battle based on a philosophical dispute. Searle states that
the philosophical dispute at the core of this debate is in response to
postmodernist and multicultural challenges to "certain traditional
assumptions about the nature of truth, objectivity, rationality, reality,
and intellectual quality"("Rationality and Realism" 56).
After a long introductory discussion regarding different
philosophical positions on the nature of truth, Searle concludes that
knowledge is objective, that truth is a feature of statements that
"accurately represent some feature of reality that exists independently
of the statement"(65), and that the objective truth or falsity of any
given knowledge claim is entirely independent of the motives,
political agenda, or identity of the speaker. Thus Searle states: "Because
the content of what is known is always a true proposition, and because
truth is in general a matter of accurate representation of an
independently existing reality, knowledge does not depend on nor
derive from the subjective attitudes and feelings of particular
people"(66).
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First, this position on truth needs to be identified as fairly
uncontroversial. To say that the content of what is known is always a
true proposition is to sidestep the difficult question concerning what
constitutes knowledge. In other words, when I say that what I know is
necessarily true, I am essentially making a tautological statement. If
knowledge is justified true belief then what is known is always true;
however, we can quite easily take ourselves to "know" propositions
that actually turn out not to be true. Thus, we cannot conclude that
truth is definitionally part of knowledge. In this discussion of the
relationship between truth and knowledge, Searle seems to presume
that truth is a definitional quality of knowledge such that what is
known is necessarily true. Now if this were the case, then it would also
be the case that the subjective attitudes, feelings, political positions, and
personal identity of any given speaker would have nothing
whatsoever to do with the fact that what that speaker knew would
necessarily be true. However, Searle's position seems to be that truth is
part of the definitional complex of knowledge and therefore, when he
makes the claim that what is known is necessarily true, regardless of
the political or other accidental qualities of the speaker, he is merely
stating a tautology.
Now, Searle moves from this seemingly uncontroversial
conclusion to the position that all of the varied and often contradictory
attempts at curricular reform (postmodernism, antirealism,
multiculturalism, etc.) are aimed at challenging these notions of truth,
objective knowledge, and an independently existing reality - notions so
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central not merely to the Western Rationalistic Tradition, but to the
possibility of intellectual inquiry itself. Moreover, according to Searle,
the motivating force behind all of these various and varied challenges
to the Western Rationalistic Tradition's most fundamental
philosophical presuppositions is an "explicitly leftist political
agenda"(55) aimed at achieving "explicit political goals"(55). For Searle,
the curricular reformers see the Western Rationalistic Tradition in
general, and its attendant theory of objective truth and knowledge in
particular, as a roadblock to their attempted leftist political
transformation of the university.
This truncated analysis leads Searle to assert that all challenges
to the basic tenets of the Western Rationalistic Tradition are grounded
in the simple-minded attempt to use the University as the site for
radical leftist political and social transformation. In so asserting, Searle
trivializes the positions of various curricular reformers and misses the
opportunity to set his critical sites on the actual positions of the would
be curricular reformers. For example, after a long (and somewhat
tedious) account of the relationship between the correspondence and
disquotational theories of truth and the Western Rationalistic
Tradition, Searle concludes that the Multiculturalists are not involved
in any meaningful critique of the philosophical presuppositions of
these systems of thought. Instead, he claims, "those who want to use
the universities, especially the humanities, for leftist political
transformation correctly perceive that the Western Rationalistic
Tradition is an obstacle in their path"(70). Moreover, he suggests, in
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regard to the motivation of the Multiculturalists, "if you think that the
purpose of teaching the history of the past is to achieve social and
political transformation of the present, then the traditional canons of
historical scholarship - the canons of objectivity, evidence, close
attention to the facts, and above all, truth - can sometimes seem an
unnecessary and oppressive regime that stands in the way of achieving
more important social objectives"(70). In other words, multicultural
challenges to the traditional curriculum have nothing meaningful to
to discussions about the nature of truth and objectivity;
multicultural challenges to the curriculum are merely poorly disguised
attempts at mobilizing the large and conveniently assembled student
population into the rank and file of leftist political action.
Thus Searle concludes that the rejection of the Western
Rationalistic Tradition is enabling radicals in the academy to
implement a large scale pedagogical revolution effectively
transforming the structure of intellectual training. Important to my
critique of this position however is what Searle identifies as the
underlying logic of this transformation. According to Searle, one of the
most deplorable consequences of this transformation is the ascent of
identity politics. In order to launch an assault on the most
fundamental elements of the Western Rationalistic Tradition - truth
and objectivity - the Multiculturalists have made individual identity
and identity politics the organizing structures for intellectual training.
Searle states: "it is now widely accepted that the race, gender, class, and
ethnicity of the student defines his or her identity. On this view it is
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no longer one of the purposes of education, as it previously had been,
to enable the student to develop an identity as a member of a larger
universal human intellectual culture"(72 ).
This is confusing here since on the face of it Searle appears to be
arguing in support of a pluralistic notion of intellectual training:
students should be exposed to an intellectual training that reinforces
their individual participation in human intellectual culture and not
in, for example, African-American intellectual culture or in Queer
Theory. Thus, this would seem to contradict my assertion that Searle's
position is actually fundamentally nationalist since he appears to be
advocating a kind of intellectual pluralism; ideally students will avoid
a narrow kind of intellectual particularism based on race, gender, class,
or national origin and will instead occupy themselves with the
contemplation of the central intellectual problems of humanity. Thus
it seems that the current threat of transformation in the American
academy is for Searle a threat precisely because of its alleged adherence
to the restrictive and anti-intellectual tenets of identity politics.
So to summarize Searle's position, the Multiculturalists are
mounting an assault on the university at the most fundamental level -
the very presuppositions of intellectual inquiry, that knowledge is
objective and truth a relation between knowledge and the externally
existing world. However, the Multiculturalists are not engaging in this
attack from the position of an intellectual challenge to the
philosophical presuppositions of intellectual inquiry. Instead, the
Multiculturalists are proceeding according to the logic of a narrow and
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partisan politics of identity, advocating an educational policy that seeks
merely representation of authors of formerly excluded identities. In
order to achieve their goals of representation, the Multiculturalists
must (and allegedly do) attack the presuppositions of intellectual
inquiry according to the logic of identity politics. For example, a
standard introductory course in Philosophy may be modified to include
readings from feminist philosophy and African philosophy but as far as
Searle is concerned, these curricular modifications are motivated not
by meaningful critique of the presuppositions of the Western
Rationalistic Tradition, but are instead the result of blind adherence to
the logic of identity politics: representativeness for the sake of
representativeness.
Now, I have an entirely different reading of the inner workings
of this kind of curricular transformation. I want to explain here why I
see Searle's position on curricular reform as nationalist and begin to
explain why, in this case, nationalist pedagogy stunts the process of
critical thinking. Searle claims that much of his opposition to the new
recommendations for multicultural curricular modification arises
from the contradictions he sees between the goals of a liberal education
and the results of a multicultural education. Searle claims, as I stated
above, that one of the central goals of a liberal education is to enable
students to find their place within a universal human intellectual
culture. Good enough. However, to understand completely Searle's
position we must consider what, specifically, he takes the basis of this
"universal human intellectual culture" to be. In an earlier essay
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entitled "The Storm Over the University" Searle claims that there is "a
certain Western intellectual tradition that goes from, say, Socrates to
Wittgenstein in philosophy, and from Homer to Joyce in literature.
It is essential to the liberal education of young men and women in the
United States that they should receive some exposure to at least some
of the great works of this intellectual tradition"("Storm" 34).
Moreover, he laments, it used to be the case that no argument was
necessary to justify the educational and intellectual value of such a
position.
What Searle does not justify, though he asserts it, is that while
there are compelling intellectual and educational arguments to be
made in favor of such a curriculum, the groundwork for these
arguments is both national and nationalist. The groundwork is
national since the reason we can formulate compelling arguments on
educational and intellectual grounds is because of the alleged national
import of such a curriculum. Searle states that "knowledge of the
tradition was essential to the self-understanding of educated
Americans since the country, in an important sense
,
is the product of
that tradition. . ."("Storm" 34, emphasis added). It is important to
national survival and coherence that educated Americans understand
the alleged origins of their country; in this manner, preservation of the
traditional canon becomes both educationally and intellectually sound.
What is more, however, is that the groundwork for Searle's
position is nationalist. The nationalism of this position surfaces in the
conclusion to "The Storm Over the University" when he writes "For
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the United States, the dominant tradition is, and for the foreseeable
future, will remain the European tradition. The United States is, after
all, a product of the European Enlightenment"(42). Now, to give Searle
his due, he does make reference throughout that essay to the
importance of seeing one's own way of life in relation to others; thus
he adds that "Works from other cultural traditions need to be studied
as well"(42). However, the important point here is the way in which
Searle understands the intellectual account of the American tradition.
While he allows that women of all ethnic and racial origins and
minority men have been excluded from the canonical tradition, and
while he allows that some of these exclusions have been based on
national origin (for example, the exclusion of Confucius and all
Chinese religion and philosophy from standard introductory course in
philosophy and religion) he does not see these exclusions as exclusions
of select segments of the American national tradition. When Searle
claims that the intellectual tradition of the United States was, is, and
will continue to be, the European tradition he betrays his
understanding of the national composition of the United States; and it
is this understanding of the national composition of the United States
that is unabashedly nationalist.
The human intellectual culture Searle wants students exposed to
is, as far as he is concerned, universally applicable to all students,
regardless of their communities of origin. That is, the European
tradition is the human tradition; the European tradition is the
progenitor of the American tradition, and therefore for Americans to
129
be educated in our tradition, we must be educated in the European
tradition. Leaving aside for the moment the question concerning why
we must be educated in our national tradition, we need to examine
more closely what Searle is defining as the American tradition, and the
ways in which his understanding of the American tradition correspond
to his understanding of the national citizenry. To say that for
Americans to be educated we must be educated in the European
tradition is to presuppose that "our" tradition is one solely, or at least
most decisively, determined by the European tradition. Of course, to
claim that the European tradition had or has nothing pivotal to do
with the United States would be absurd. However, to claim that it is
the European tradition that most significantly determines our national
history is equally absurd as it belies one of the most fundamental facts
of our national history: that this is a nation composed of many
different peoples, some of European origin and others not.
While to say that for Americans to be educated we must be
educated in our national tradition is merely the expression of a
national interest, to say that for Americans to be educated we must all
be educated in the European tradition is decisively nationalist. To
make such a claim is to make serious assumptions and presumptions
regarding national identity and composition. It is to assume, in the
face of overwhelming amounts of scholarship and evidence to the
contrary, that the United States was, is, and will continue to be a
product of the European Enlightenment. It is to presume that all
citizens of the United States see their intellectual heritage stretching
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forth from the European Enlightenment. And it is to assume that all
other intellectual traditions pale in comparison to the European
tradition - not because of the claim that knowledge of our national
tradition is essential, but because the argument includes not merely the
admonition that we must be educated in the European tradition (a
decidedly great history), but that we must be educated in the European
tradition to the exclusion of all other intellectual traditions. This is of
central importance since Searle allows that it is important for students
to be educated in other cultural traditions, but solely for the purpose of
comparing those traditions to “our own.” However, the fundamental
mistake Searle makes is in failing to see that those other cultural
traditions are, to a large extent, also “our own." The notion that we can
point to a unified intellectual tradition and name it as the intellectual
grounding of our country, past, present, and future, belies a nationalist
understanding of our national identity. To be able to point to such a
unified intellectual tradition and actually be able to say with some
degree of certainty that such an intellectual tradition corresponds
accurately to an overwhelming majority of our citizenry, would
require that the citizenry of the United States was overwhelmingly
homogenous and unified in terms of personal identity, in terms of
race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, gender identity, etc.
The result of such a universalizing program of education is both
to reinforce and recreate an imagined nationalist community of
citizens. In other words, there is in fact no such nationalist community
of citizens - an overwhelming majority of individuals who see their
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political, cultural, and intellectual heritage as directly descendant from
the European tradition. Despite this reality, the continued valorization
of the canonical tradition and its assertions of Anglo-European
hegemony in the culture, politics, and intellectual production of the
United States reinforces and reifies the notion that the United States
actually is populated only by individuals who see the European
tradition as their cultural legacy. In like manner, such a universalizing
program of education serves to move the national citizenry towards
the creation of an imagined nationalist community of citizens.
For example, the United States' violent suppression of Native
American language, culture, religion, and philosophy, has effectively
reduced a thriving cultural tradition to a diaspora existence. One of the
primary suppression methods employed by the United States
government was and is to fail to provide public money for the local
education of Native children. Consequently, Native children are
routinely bussed to White communities where they live in
dormitories and attend the local public schools, traveling home
occasionally on weekends. Understandably, these conditions make it
exceptionally difficult for Native Americans to educate their children
in Native American cultural traditions. Native children thereby
become Searle's American children, taught to see their intellectual and
cultural legacy firmly grounded in the European tradition. On a grand
scale, the suppression of education in all cultural traditions other than
the European tradition, and the presentation of the European Tradition
as the unified progenitor of the American tradition, creates a young
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citizenry modeled after the imagined nationalist notion of a unified
and homogenous national citizenry.
My final point in this discussion of Searle is in regards to his
position that in the Multiculturalist critique of the traditional program
for education there is no meaningful critique of the philosophical
presuppositions of what Searle calls the Western Rationalistic
Tradition. As I have discussed above, Searle asserts that multicultural
transformations of curriculum are merely politically motivated leftist
indoctrination techniques. However, it is my position that in the
multicultural critique of Traditionalism there is a philosophical
critique of the Traditionalist conception of the relationship between
truth and knowledge.
Now Searle claims that because knowledge is objective, then it is
absurd to claim that the objective truth or falsehood of any particular
knowledge claim is at all dependent upon the identity, motivation, or
political position of the speaker. As I have discussed above, this is an
uncontroversial claim that Searle seems to think can lay all
multicultural challenges to rest. This claim however is only
uncontroversial if we have an objective procedure for evaluating
knowledge claims. For if knowledge is objective and true, and we want
to know the truth, all we need do is ascertain which claims constitute
knowledge and which claims do not. But to retain objectivity here
then we must have some objective method for evaluating knowledge
claims.
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Searle thus appears to sidestep the question of evaluation
entirely, and it is the evaluation of knowledge claims that is
fundamentally at issue in the recent disputes over the definition of
university level curriculum. As in the case of Dinesh D'Souza's
critique of the Stanford University course in Cultures, Ideas, and
Values, at issue in the educational presentation of texts written by
Rigoberta Menchu, Frantz Fanon, or Rosario Ferre is not the objective
truth or falsity of the analysis in these treatises, but the evaluation of
the knowledges presented by Menchu, Fanon, and Ferre. And what we
do not have to present to students is an objective method for
evaluating the knowledge bases represented by different authors. This
presents a considerable obstacle to what many take to be effective
teaching since, as educators, we are therefore faced with the fact that we
ourselves cannot provide our students with an objective method for
adjudicating among the many and often conflicting accounts of what
the truth is.
One way to solve this pedagogical problem is of course to present
to students a unified intellectual tradition, an intellectual tradition that
is not rife with contradictions and controversies. Now certainly, what
Searle, D'Souza, Bloom, and Howe would define as the European
Intellectual tradition is full of contradictions and controversies. In
Philosophy these come in the form of disputes over the definition of
knowledge, the notion of the good, the structure of political
communities, etc. But for the Traditionalists, there is no controversy
in regards to the objectivity of the knowledges set forth in these
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conflicting accounts of epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and political
philosophy. Searle himself states that it is the postmodernist and
multicultural reformers who are attacking the ideal of the university,
an ideal he defines as "the claim of the universities to impart to their
students a set of objective truths about an independently existing
reality"("Rationality and Realism" 72). And while the European
Intellectual tradition presents a number of conflicts and controversies
at the level of particular content, when taken together - as a tradition -
the tradition presents a seamless truth. It is this seamless truth that
makes it possible for Searle himself to outline the basic tenets of the
Western Rationalistic Tradition. As Searle argues in "Rationality and
Realism, What is at Stake?," the Western Rationalistic Tradition
permits robust criticism and analysis at the level of the particular
contents of the tradition. Thus, under the Western Rationalistic
Tradition it is perfectly possible and permissible to consider the relative
merits and faults of, for example, the political community advocated by
Karl Marx versus the political community articulated by Aristotle. So
it is not the case that there are not widely divergent truths presented by
the texts commonly taken to be part of the Western Rationalistic
Tradition.
However, what is not possible within the Western Rationalistic
Tradition is what could be called meta-critique. It is not possible from
within the Western Rationalistic Tradition to engage in criticism and
analysis of the fundamental presuppositions of the tradition. For
Searle, this is an impossibility not because of the impossibility of radical
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critique from within any system of thought, but because the
presuppositions of the Western Rationalistic Tradition are not merely
the presuppositions of that intellectual tradition. The presuppositions
of the Western Rationalistic Tradition are, for Searle and other
Traditionalists, the presuppositions of intellectual inquiry itself. Thus,
it is not possible from within the bounds of the Western Rationalistic
Tradition to consider why the "objective" standards of intellectual
excellence have yielded such a ubiquitously uniform set of authors in
terms of racial, gender, ethnic, religious, political, and national identity.
To pose such a question is, from within the Western Rationalistic
Tradition, to threaten the possibility of intellectual inquiry itself. For to
pose such a question is to suggest that the "objective" criteria for
determining intellectual excellence may not be as objective as
originally thought; and since the worth of the texts in this tradition is
understood to be a function of their measuring up to the objectively
determined standards of intellectual excellence, then calling into
question the objectivity of the standards calls into question the merits
of the texts. From within the Western Rationalistic Tradition, if there
is no objective method for determining the worth of texts, then there is
no pattern or system for participation in the intellectual process. In
this way, the presentation to students of the Western Rationalistic
Tradition is the presentation of a unified intellectual tradition, one that
does not require educators to confront our inability to provide students
with an objective method for adjudicating among conflicting accounts
of the truth, among conflicting knowledge bases.
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Notice that it is not the presentation to students of the European
Intellectual tradition, as a unified tradition taking its logic from the
Western Rationalistic Tradition, that is a problem. It is the
presentation of the European Intellectual tradition and the Western
Rationalistic Tradition to the exclusion of all other seamless
intellectual traditions, intellectual traditions that are distinguished
perhaps by an underlying logic that differs markedly from the
fundamentals of the Western Rationalistic Tradition, that I am
identifying as both nationalist and ideological. The fundamental logic
of the Western Rationalistic Tradition makes it impossible to do
anything but present it to the exclusion of all other intellectual
traditions: the Western Rationalistic Tradition is the compilation of
the objectively determined intellectual masterpieces of all humanity.
As Searle claims in "Rationality and Realism," "[traditionally, the
humanities thought of themselves as conserving, transmitting, and
interpreting the highest achievements of human civilization in
general and Western civilization in particular"(76). So, where the
Western Rationalistic Tradition claims to be for the sake of
transmitting to students objective truths about an independently
existing external world, training students to engage in the disinterested
pursuit of knowledge with universal application, etc., its
presuppositions require us to forgo prematurely the engaged and
ethical study of other intellectual traditions, intellectual traditions that
are grounded in a fundamentally different logic from the Western
Rationalistic and European Intellectual Traditions. Critiquing the
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nationalist underpinnings of the Traditionalist position on curricular
reform thereby exposes the ideology endemic to the Traditionalist
position. Critique reveals the tight theoretical and practical
connections and between seemingly unrelated practices: between the
Traditionalist curriculum and the perpetuation of nationalism, and
between the perpetuation of nationalism and the failure to teach
students to be critical thinkers. Moreover, this critique of the
underlying nationalist ideology of the Traditionalist position lays bare
the contradictions implicit in Traditionalism. The Traditionalists
claim to be engaged in the preservation of the highest human
intellectual achievement for the sake of transmitting it to future
generations, when in fact Traditionalist education prevents students
from becoming aware of the diversity of human intellectual
endeavors; such an education thereby generates a false appreciation of
only one strand of intellectual history.
In my analysis of Searle I have argued that his Traditionalist
position on curricular reform is decisively nationalist. So to conclude
my discussion of Searle and my analysis of the Traditionalist position
on curricular reform I want to summarize what I have said about
Bloom, D'Souza, and Searle and clarify what I take to be the nationalist
ideology informing the Traditionalist position on curricular reform.
As I see it, there are two interdependent qualities of the Traditionalist
position that make it identifiable as nationalist ideology. These are:
first, the presentation of the Western Rationalistic Tradition and the
European Intellectual Tradition as "our" national intellectual heritage;
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and second, the presentation of the Western Rationalistic Tradition
and the European Intellectual Tradition as the repositories of the
unqualifiedly and objectively best human intellectual achievement.
The presentation of the Western Rationalistic and European
Intellectual traditions as our" national intellectual heritage is
deceptive since such a presentation conceals important historical and
current demographic information regarding the national citizenry of
the United States. As I have argued in this chapter, this presentation of
"our" national culture not simply as glorious and wonderful, but more
importantly the presentation of your" national culture as uniform in
regards to language, religion, ethnicity, ideology, etc., bespeaks of a
subversion of the diversity of our national citizenry. And as I have
argued in Chapter Two, it is this kind of subversion of diversity in
national identity, in the name of constructing a unified and
continuous national culture and national identity, that is emblematic
of nationalism.
So to begin with, the Traditionalist position on curriculum
creates and reinforces a particular version of national culture that
belies the realities of national identity. This constructed nationalist
version of national culture and identity is further cemented in place by
the presentation of the Western Rationalistic Tradition and the
European Intellectual Tradition not simply as the repositories of the
best human intellectual achievement of all time, but with the
justification for this assertion being the alleged objectivity of the
intellectual standards applied to each member of the canon. This
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notion of objectivity creates the Western Rationalistic Tradition and
the European Intellectual Tradition as seamless, unified, and thereby
impervious to critique. And it is this quality of the nationalist
presentation of intellectual history that marks the Traditionalist
curriculum as ideological. Critique of the Traditionalist curriculum
makes it possible to identify such a curriculum as ideological since
critique exposes central theoretical affiliations heretofore unrecognized:
affiliations between nationalism and the failure of the university to
achieve its stated mission. The Traditionalist curriculum is
identifiable as ideology since it attempts to tell a unified and seamless
story of intellectual history and production that is impervious to
critique, when in fact, this seamless story of intellectual history fails to
withstand the scrutiny of its own presuppositions. In fact, rigorous
critique of the Traditionalist curriculum exposes not only its
inconsistency with the stated mission of the university, but
additionally demonstrates the commensality of Traditionalism and
nationalism in the United States. Thus the Traditionalist curriculum
functions as nationalist ideology.
In this manner, those students educated in the European
Intellectual tradition - according to the precepts of the Western
Rationalistic Tradition - are appreciably impaired in terms of their
ability to engage other intellectual traditions with different
presuppositions. The fact of an intellectual tradition having
presuppositions is not the problematic feature at issue here; it would be
impossible for any collection of texts, ideas, or artistic works to be called
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a tradition without there being some organizing logic to explain such a
designation. However, in the case of the Traditionalist position, the
presupposition that the contents of the European Intellectual tradition
have been objectively determined to be of superior intellectual quality,
superior to all other human intellectual production over time and
through space, prejudices individuals trained in this tradition with
respect to all other intellectual traditions.
Working in tandem with the first feature of the Traditionalist
position, namely that the Traditions are disingenuously presented as
our national intellectual heritage, the appeals to objectivity and
intellectual standards further cement the hegemony of "our"
intellectual heritage, this nationalist version of national culture, by
constructing "our" intellectual heritage in such a way that it is
impossible to critique its contents, structure, or logic. Our intellectual
tradition simply is the repository of the finest intellectual achievement.
Merely questioning the presumptions behind that assertion makes it
impossible, according to the Western Rationalistic Tradition, to engage
in any intellectual activity whatsoever. Conveniently therefore, all
other intellectual traditions are predetermined to be inferior to the
European intellectual tradition in virtue of the impossibility of
subjecting the European intellectual tradition and the Western
Rationalistic Tradition to rigorous critique.
In this manner, "our" intellectual tradition is preserved as it
functions to reinforce and recreate nationalist constructions of national
identity and national culture. While I will return to a discussion of the
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pedagogical ramifications of such a nationalist presentation of
intellectual history in Chapter Five, I wish to suggest here that it is the
nationalist ideology ever-present in the Traditionalist position that
makes it exceptionally difficult for students to become critical thinkers,
critics of ideology. My position is that when one undertakes a truly
multicultural education, it becomes clear that there are many
conflicting accounts of what reality is, and of what constitutes
knowledge. While it may be tempting to direct students to what we as
educators take to be the account of knowledge, acting to prevent
students from coming to consciousness about the proliferation of
knowledge bases is coercive. Faced with this proliferation of
knowledge bases, it is my position that it is equally coercive to teach
that all of these accounts are true as it is to fail to teach students how to
adjudicate among these different accounts. Instead, as I will argue in
the next chapter, it is essential to teach students to confront the
proliferation of knowledges that results from the complexity of the
encounter between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. It
is an antinomy to claim that in the face of multiple accounts of the
truth one must either reject the idea that there can be such multiple
accounts or one must become a toothless relativist. This is the
discussion I will continue in Chapters Four and Five.
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CHAPTER IV
IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE
A. Introduction
It has been my aim in the dissertation to develop and defend two
broadly defined and related claims regarding the general relationship
between formal intellectual activity in the academy and nationalism.
These are: first, that the Traditionalist position on curricular reform
and multiculturalism is decidedly nationalist; and second, that this
nationalist ideology is antithetical to the stated mission of the
university.
At this point in the dissertation I have argued that the
preservation and development of national culture stands in a
dialectical relation to the preservation and contestation of national
identity, and that nationalism is the sentiment that mediates this
dialectical relation. I have argued further that underlying every
nationalist movement is a universalist project that denies the realities
of complex personal identity formation and leads to the most vicious
and intellectually impoverished manifestations of identity politics.
Moreover, I have presented a sustained argument to show that
education in the arts and humanities is education in the national
culture and that the major Traditionalist arguments in opposition to
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multicultural curricular reform are aimed at preserving a nationalist
construction of national culture.
At this juncture then, I wish to return my focus to a discussion
of the second general claim I set out to defend: that the nationalist
ideology inherent in the opposition to multicultural curricular reform
is antithetical to the stated mission of the university. I have suggested
throughout the prior three chapters that the fundamental
contradiction between nationalist positions on curricular reform and
the stated mission of the university to serve as a site for free inquiry is
inextricably bound up with nationalist constructions of identity,
specifically with the underlying universalist project of every
nationalist movement that denies the realities of complex personal
identity formation. While I have explained in a preliminary fashion
that one of the ramifications of this denial in the academic arena is to
obstruct the process of teaching students to think critically, I turn now
to define and defend that claim comprehensively.
I have asserted that it is this process of becoming a critical
thinker that I take to be equivalent to the practice of ideology critique.
Moreover, I have argued that it is the evaluation of knowledge claims,
the identification and critique of ideology, that is fundamentally at
issue in recent disputes over university level curriculum. Thus in my
critique of Traditionalist positions on multiculturalism I assert that
Bloom, D'Souza, and Searle sidestep entirely the question of
evaluation. Searle for example presumes that he need not contend
with the issue of evaluation since, in his mind, knowledge is objective.
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But, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the claim that all
knowledge is objective is only uncontroversial if we have an objective
method for determining which claims constitute knowledge and
which do not; without such a method, the notion that knowledge is
objective offers no conclusive determinations in our attempts to
adjudicate among competing knowledge bases.
And so, in this chapter I delve into an in-depth analysis of the
concept of ideology. I am critiquing various metatheories of ideology
and working towards developing a conception of ideology that is
grounded in practical political awareness and struggle. My aim is to
reconsider the problem of ideology raised by Kant in The Critique of
Pure Reason. I want to begin with Kant's declaration that the mind is
the lawgiver to nature since I take it that his subsequent failure to
establish a universal psychology leads to the problem of ideology. I will
argue that Kant raises the notion of ideology by failing to seal shut the
epistemic space between the knowing subject and the object of
knowledge. Following Kant's unintentional introduction of the
concept, I claim that both Marx and Mannheim generate theories of
ideology centrally concerned with ineffective endeavors to transcend
the complexity of the encounter between the knowing subject and the
object of knowledge. Moreover, I will argue that both Marx and
Mannheim define ideology in such a way that it is impossible for
individuals to identify and to critique the ideological. Therefore, I will
conclude that each presents a paradoxical account of ideology since it
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describes, in general, falsified constructions of social reality that no one
can successfully articulate.
My focus on this aspect of the development of the theory of
ideology is central to the argument of the dissertation for the following
reasons. In the forthcoming exposition and critique of Marx and
Mannheim, I argue that each fails to offer a philosophically defensible
account of ideology since it is impossible, on each account, for
individuals to engage in ideology critique. In the case of Marx and
Mannheim, I see this failure largely as a result of their respective
attempts to undertake evaluation through transcending the complexity
of the encounter between the knowing subject and the object of
knowledge. This fact makes both Marx's and Mannheim's theories of
ideology and evaluation indefensible.
Marx and Mannheim thereby seek to devise methods for
identifying and evaluating ideology through epistemic standpoints
removed from the site of the production of ideology. By
demonstrating the shortcomings of Marx's and Mannheim's theories
of ideology, I intend to clear the theoretical space necessary for
reconceptualizing our notions of ideology and ideology critique. It is
my aim to refocus notions of ideology and ideology critique on
engaging the contingency of the encounter between the knowing
subject and the object of knowledge.
And thus I will conclude this chapter by asserting that in order to
be a critic of ideology one must struggle with the obscurity inherent in
the convergence of the knowing subject and object of knowledge. This
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discussion will set the stage for the final chapter where I reconsider the
mechanism I outlined in Chapter Three whereby curricular
Traditionalists seek to train students to undertake intellectual activity
from the standpoint of neutral observer. I will argue that this
Traditionalist neutrality is achieved through the careful cultivation of
a purified nationalist identity aimed at rejecting the relevance of the
epistemic space between the knower and the known. Thus Marx's and
Mannheim s attempts to transcend the complexity of this epistemic
space between the knower and the known share central qualities with
the Traditionalist position on curricular preservation and reform. It is
my intention to focus on this correspondence.
In the final chapter of the dissertation I work to move beyond
the foregoing critique of the theory of ideology. Resisting the tendency
to present yet another theory of ideology I go at the concept from
another direction: the practice of ideology critique. I argue, in direct
opposition to Mannheim, that the only way to become a critic of
ideology is to acknowledge one's situatedness, and perhaps to expand
the scope and number of realms in which one is situated. In this
manner, I hope to make a convincing case for my contention that
curriculum based on nationalist understandings of national culture
(specifically, Traditionalist positions on curriculum) is ideological and
stands in direct opposition to the stated mission of the university to
serve as a site for the pursuit of truth and the sharing of knowledge.
My position that in order to become a critic of ideology one must
acknowledge and embrace one's multiple and complex social identities
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will necessarily oppose the position that knowledge is objective.
However, it is my intention not to advocate a position whereby the
only two possible alternatives are universalism or relativism. And
thus, I am aiming to outline the conditions under which we can
ideology critique with intellectual integrity and
epistemological significance.
B. The Concept of Ideology in Kant's Critique of Purr Rp^mi
I begin with a careful evaluation of the genesis of ideology as a
concept in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. I am focusing on the
relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge,
for I will attempt to show that it is Kant's rearticulation of this
relationship that clears a theoretical space for the concept of ideology.
Moreover, I will argue that the discussion of ideology that follows
Kant, specifically in the work of Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim,
continues to be framed in the terms set out by Kant, and, more
importantly, that this fact results in the failure of both Marx and
Mannheim to develop accounts of ideology whereby individuals can
productively identify and critique what is ideological.
Working toward the conclusion that the mind is the lawgiver to
nature, Kant begins the Critique with the dual assertion that
understanding is necessary for experience and that understanding is
governed by rules that exist prior to exposure to objects (Bxvii). Thus
for Kant, what we perceive in the world is a function not primarily of
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what is in the world (objects), but is instead a function of the structure
of our minds (understanding). In fact, according to Kant, the possibility
of experience itself is subject to the existence of understanding. While
the ostensible aim of Kant s analysis is proof of the possibility and
actuality of synthetic knowledge claims asserted a priori (that is,
philosophically and metaphysically defensible knowledge of the world
that extends beyond analytic truths), fundamental to his argument is
the notion that our experience and thus our knowledge of the world
are not contingent upon an objectively real world that exists
independently of our minds, but rather are a function of the structure
of our understanding.
Thus, when Kant claims that the mind is the lawgiver to nature,
he is essentially claiming that we impute reality to the world. In so
doing Kant has reversed the order of determination between the
knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Rather than the object
determining the knowledge of the subject, it is now the knowing
subject that determines the object of knowledge. Yet, this language is
not precise enough to convey Kant's meaning. To show that synthetic
judgments known a priori are both possible and actual, to show that
these judgments can be known with both universality and necessity,
and then to claim that this is all true since the mind creates reality,
would be epistemologically insignificant. For it would be trivial to
claim that synthetic judgments are known a priori with universality
and necessity if the justification for that assertion was simply that
human minds actually construct reality and therefore, the judgments
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of the creating mind are necessary and universal. Such an argument
would be merely a complicated restatement of a tautology. What I
assert about the world is necessarily and universally true, and known a
Priori
,
since the world is composed of nothing more than what I assert.
Kant, however, does not claim either that the observing subject
creates the world, or that without observing subjects there is no reality.
He sets up the problem by comparing metaphysics with mathematics
and physics in particular, and the sciences in general. The sciences,
Kant claims, have been able to achieve necessity and universality in
their claims since they have worked from the presumption that objects
conform to our knowledge of them. He states: "They [Galileo, etc.]
learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a
plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in
nature's leading-strings, but must itself show the way with principles of
judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to
questions of reason's own determining"(Bxiii). Thus, Kant contends,
reason must bring something to nature (Bxiv). The fundamental
existence of nature is not dependent upon the existence of the
perceiving subject.
However, Kant also states that the insistence upon the assertion
of an independently existing reality will make it impossible ever to
have knowledge of the unconditioned, that is, knowledge not based on
experience. He states: "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our
knowledge must conform to objects"(Bxvi). But, he claims, if we
assumed that objects conform to our knowledge, then it would be
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possible to have knowledge of those objects a priori, as things in
themselves. Only by rejecting the idea that knowledge conforms to
objects, and proceeding with the idea that objects instead conform to
our knowledge of them, to our concepts, can we ever assert synthetic
knowledge claims a priori with necessity and universality.
The problem here is in understanding how Kant can conclude
that we must give up on the idea that there is such a thing as an
independently existing reality, as he maintains the significance of his
method for generating synthetic judgments asserted a priori with
universality and necessity. Granted, if one rejects the existence of an
independent reality, one avoids the inevitable logical contradiction
between holding that claim and attempting to generate knowledge
claims asserted a priori. If one retains the idea that objects determine
concepts or knowledge, then one needs experience to generate
knowledge; therein the possibility of knowledge claims asserted a priori
is impossible. If one asserts instead that objects conform to our
knowledge of them, we can then assert knowledge claims with
universality and necessity without having experience of those objects.
According to Kant, the objective unity of nature is nothing more
than the objective reflection of the subjective unity of consciousness.
So, from the mere fact of the subjective unity of consciousness, we can
deduce the objective causal necessity of all things in nature. Without
the subjective unity of consciousness, the teaching of the Critique is
either epistemologically trivial, or leads us to epistemological
151
skepticism. The objective reflection of the subjective unity of
consciousness gives our knowledge necessity and universality.
However, is there any epistemological significance to these
knowledge claims asserted a priori as a result of the mind being the
lawgiver to nature? This is certainly an important and interesting
question: has Kant done more than to restate a complicated tautology?
While the answer to this question is not central to my project, what is
important to my argument is the theoretical apparatus framing the
question. I am interested in two related problems raised by this
assertion. In claiming that the mind is the lawgiver to nature, Kant
has essentially rearticulated the relationship between the knowing
subject and the object of knowledge. First, I am concerned here with
how, theoretically, this rearticulation clears a space for constructing the
beginning of an account of ideology. And second, I am concerned with
Kant's resolution of the significant theoretical difficulties raised by the
assertion of reason imputing law to nature; specifically, I am referring
here to Kant's assertion (but ominous omission) of a universal theory
of mental activity.
I am going to take up these questions in inverse order since I am
arguing that once Kant changes the order of determination between the
knowing subject and the object of knowledge, it is his failure to
demonstrate the existence of a universal psychology that makes it
possible to begin to construct a theory of ideology.
In the "Preface to the First Edition" of The Critique of Pure
Reason Kant discusses the two parts of the "Deduction of the Pure
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Concepts of the Understanding"(Axvi). The first concerns the objects
themselves of the pure understanding and is designed to explicate the
objective validity of the a priori concepts of the pure understanding;
the second concerns the subjective aspect of the pure understanding
itself, a theory of mental activity. Kant, in distinguishing between the
objective and subjective deductions claims that while the former is
essential to his argument, the latter is important though not essential.
However, the subjective deduction is essential to the argument in the
Critique since the theory of mental activity which explicates the
cognitive faculties of the pure understanding is the cause of the
objective validity of the a priori concepts of the pure understanding.
That is, the only way for Kant to explain the synthetic unity of the
manifold is by relying on a psychological description of what the mind
actually does. Kant realizes that the subjective deduction is central to
his argument, though he attempts to conceal that fact since he knows
that the centrality of such a theory of mental activity detracts from the
significance of the objective deduction.
So, for Kant to assert that the mind is the lawgiver to nature,
without an accompanying universal theory of mental activity, would
be an exceptionally radical and chaotic claim. However, that claim is
nowhere near as radical as it seems to be since in no way does Kant
acknowledge that there is even a possibility that all minds do not work
in the same way. That Kant accounts for the possibility and the
actuality of knowledge claims asserted a priori with universality and
necessity, is fully dependent on the unstated claims to a universal
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psychology, or theory of mental activity. Without the universal
psychology, the claim that the mind is the lawgiver to nature generates
anything but knowledge claims asserted a priori. However, it is this
very claim that I am interested in, for it is this aspect of Kant's
rearticulation of the relationship between the knowing subject and the
object of knowledge that begins to clear a space for conceiving of
ideology.
Refusing to presume either that the subject and object do not
come into contact, or that the object exists only through the perception
of the subject, Kant instead asserts that it is the subject's faculty of
judgment that organizes the world. He is trying to develop an account
of the nature of the contact between the subject and the object. And it
is precisely his framing of the epistemological problem in this way that
makes it possible, in fact necessary, to conceive of ideology. That is,
once we accept Kant's assertion that it is a knowing subject, with its
faculty of judgment, that organizes the material world, then it is no
longer possible to conceive of value-neutral representation of that
world. Now, Kant attempts to circumvent this multiplication of
meaning by asserting not only that the mind is the lawgiver to nature,
but that all minds govern reality in the same way. That is, he claims
that each knowing subject's consciousness is constructed identically to
every other knowing subject's consciousness, so that the objective
reflection of the subjective unity of consciousness truly does generate
the objective necessity of knowledge claims asserted a priori.
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However, it is also Kant's framing of the problem in this way
that leaves subsequent discussions of ideology, based on an exploration
of the encounter between the knowing subject and the object of
knowledge, functionally defective. What I want to argue here is that
the discussion of ideology, specifically in Marx and Mannheim, is
stalled in the terminology set out by Kant in the Critique of Pure
Reason. The problem of ideology begins in its depoliticized form in the
Critique and while both Marx and Mannheim shift the focus away
from the purely epistemological to the politicized epistemology
inherent in any theory of ideology, Marx and Mannheim retain the
terminology of the paradox set out by Kant. In this assertion, Kant has
focused on the knowing subject's encounter with the object of
knowledge in a way that foregrounds the subject's structure of
consciousness in the creation of knowledge claims. Without rejecting
the existence of reality, and without claiming that the perception of the
subject is what makes objects real, Kant has prioritized the knowing
subject over the object of knowledge; rather than the object being the
most real thing against which we measure our various knowledge
claims, the source of knowledge claims (and the objective necessity of
those knowledge claims) now rests in the mind of the knowing subject.
This is central to an understanding of ideology since, in a sense, once
one accepts the implications of the mind imputing law to nature, one
can no longer conceive of value-neutral representation, of knowledge
claims that are not dependent upon the structure of the perceiving
mind.
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However, this formulation of ideology is paradoxical in that it
leaves no room for evaluation, no methodology for determining
which representations, which knowledge claims, are accurate and
which are ideological. Of course, Kant avoids this paradox entirely by
claiming that there is a universal psychology, thereby guaranteeing an
epistemological climate free from competing claims about nature,
about social reality. In this sense, the analysis of ideology in the
Critique is purely epistemological. It describes the way in which
knowledge claims possess universality and necessity and resolves any
potential tension in discriminating among competing knowledge
claims by appealing to the universal structures of human judgment. In
this regard, Kant's account then has nothing to do with ideology. He
does not claim to be discussing the social determination of thought. In
fact, much of Kant's analysis seems designed to resolve the very
epistemological problem I contend it raises. If we accept Kant's
analysis, complete with the assertion of a universal psychology, we no
longer are forced to contend with the problem of ideology. Not only
does the problem of evaluation disappear, on this account there
actually is no such thing as ideology. There is no distinction between
thought which is socially conditioned and thought which is a real
account of reality.
However, Kant's analysis does in fact raise the problem of
ideology, whether he intended it to do so or not. While the Critique is
certainly a tremendously significant and interesting piece of work, it
would be naive to accept the teaching of the Critique without some
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critical response. While the assertion that we can assert knowledge
claims a priori with universality and necessity, and the argument
designed to show this assertion, are both intensely complex and
interesting, there are significant theoretical problems in Kant's analysis.
As I have discussed above, the fact that Kant's analysis relies on a
universal psychology raises serious theoretical difficulties for the
entirety of his argument. The fact that Kant does not begin to discuss a
theory of mental activity34
,
and the fact that the assertion of such a
universal psychology is patently false35
,
leaves the epistemological
problem unresolved.
Kant has at this point, in a sense, proved too much. He begins
with nothing other than the premise 'I am conscious' and shows how,
by appeal to universal categories, we can produce one consistent and
philosophically defensible world-view. However, what he does not
show is that that world-view is the only consistent world-view. Thus
the Kantian conception of knowledge and its justification leads
precisely to the problem I am raising. Kant's analysis is thus central to
the argument here since Kant answers the question: how can I justify
knowledge?, but ignores the fact that the methodology he describes to
produce and justify knowledge can and will lead to logically consistent,
but different and competing world-views. That Kant has attempted to
34See Robert Paul Wolff's Kant's Theory of Mental Activity for a defense of the claim
that there is a theory of universal psychology implicit in the argument of The Critique
of Pure Reason.
35We know simply from an examination of human accounts of reality that there is no
operational universal structure of human judgment. The range of conflicting yet
internally consistent reports emerging from war zones is one of the most compelling
examples of this fact.
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solve the epistemological problem by rearticulating the relationship
between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge, that he has
essentially reversed the order of determination in that relationship,
and then, that he attempts, but fails, to complete the deduction leaves
the relationship between the subject and object up for consideration. It
is here that we can begin to see the possibilities for developing an
account of ideology. In Kant's failure to solve the old epistemological
problem of justification of knowledge claims, he has articulated
another interesting epistemological problem: the problem of ideology.
Moreover, regardless of intention, in his attempts to solve the initial
problem by rearticulating the relationship between the knowing subject
and the object of knowledge, his analysis leaves us with the problem of
ideology understood in terms of this rearticulation.
Thus, the doctrine in the Critique does not include an
evaluative position on ideology; that is, Kant only goes so far as to say
that while what we experience is governed by our understanding, each
individual governs experience according to the same laws - there is a
universal psychology governing the synthesis of the manifold.
However, Kant does reject implicitly the idea that we are objective,
neutral observers describing our experience of the world; he substitutes
for this idea the assertion that our understanding imposes an order
onto the world, that our consciousness determines our experience. In
so doing Kant's analysis makes it impossible to consider any
description of the world value-free, or independent of the mind of the
observer. Once Kant makes this move, we are positioned to consider
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the possibility that there is more than one structure of consciousness,
that there are, in Kant s language, alternative laws given to nature that
vary according to the mind that is ordering nature. Clearly Kant does
not entertain the idea that there are such multiple laws imputed to and
thereby governing nature in competing, or at least different, ways.
So, while Kant s Critique provides the conceptual framework for
the understanding of ideology as an order that we (reason) impute to
the world, it does not provide the conceptual terminology necessary to
judge some ways of ordering as false, fundamentally duplicitous, and
instrumental in oppression (i.e. as ideological) and other ways of
ordering as true, essentially correct, and necessary to the task of
identifying repressive authoritarian structures of domination. That is,
Kant's introduction of the possibility of recognizing thought as socially
determined does not include anything that would allow us to engage
in evaluation of socially determined thought.
C. The Concept of Ideology in Marx's The German Ideology
But the tendency of German Idealism after Kant was to get swept
up into articulating the different systems of ideas. This kind of inquiry
completely sidesteps the problem of evaluation I contend is raised by
Kant's conclusions. Marx's theory of ideology, as critique of the Young
Hegelians, sets out from this point. As there is much scholarly debate
over what exactly is the definitive formulation of Marx's conception of
ideology, I will here discuss what are recognized as two distinctly
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different Marxist conceptions of ideology, the first most clearly
articulated in The German Ideology and the second extracted from the
theory of commodity fetishism in Capital Book One. Again, I am
concerned to show that each of Marx's formulations of ideology is
unsatisfactory since each fails to provide a method for engaging in
ideology critique; furthermore, I will argue that it is largely because
each formulation of ideology is framed in terms of the Kantian
reversal of the relationship between the knowing subject and the object
of knowledge, that each formulation excludes the possibility of
ideology critique.
In The German Ideology Marx states: "Consciousness can never
be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is
their actual life process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises
just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of
objects on the retina does from their physical life process"(Tucker 154).
This is perhaps the most famous passage on ideology in The German
Ideology and in it are contained all of the elements of Marx's early
version of ideology. At the most general level, one can explicate this
text to mean that according to Marx, all consciousness is socially
determined. Marx states: "Consciousness is, therefore, from the very
beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at
all"(Tucker 158). That is, our thought, the contents of our
consciousness, is conditioned by social reality. However, Marx's
articulation of the theory of ideology in The German Ideology is much
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more specifically a critique of idealism and a theory of materialism.
Therefore, to construct the theory of ideology it is necessary to explicate
both the critique of idealism and the premises of the materialist
method.
In constructing his account of dialectical or historical
materialism in opposition to idealism, Marx contends that in the
satisfaction of the first material need is the first historical act. From the
satisfaction of this need follows the production of new needs, the
satisfaction of which is the beginning of history (Tucker 155-58). Thus,
the materialist conception of history traces all forms of consciousness
to the basis of all history: production and its various modes. Marx
states: "Men have history because they must produce their life, and
because they must produce it moreover in a certain way: this is
determined by their physical organisation; their consciousness is
determined in just the same way"(Tucker 158). In this respect, the
materialist conception of history and consciousness is diametrically
opposed to the idealist conception of history and consciousness.
History is the activity of people determined by material production;
consciousness is the result of people actively engaged in the
reproduction of their material life. For the materialist, the foundation
of thought is the activity, the modes of production, of actual people.
The premises of the materialist method are thus clear and, more
importantly, tangible. That the premises of the materialist method are
tangible and identifiable further distinguishes materialism from
idealism, and thus from ideology.
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According to Marx, the Young Hegelian idealists are therefore
the prototypical ideologists since they have failed to grasp the true
relationship between German philosophy and German reality. That is,
the Young Hegelians do not correctly understand the connection
between their thought and their material conditions. Actually, they do
understand what they believe to be the relationship between
consciousness and material existence, though according to Marx, their
understanding is upside-down. For the Young Hegelians, ideas, as
opposed to real men and their activities, are the most real things. Ideas
are the foundation of material reality. The German idealists are
ideologists because their understanding of the world is upside down;
ideology is an upside down understanding of the world. Idealism is
now, on Marx's view, tantamount to ideology.
The idealist conception of history and consciousness is therefore
allegedly ideological since it stands the real (materialist) relationship
between consciousness and material existence on its head. Rather than
philosophy ascending from earth to heaven, the idealist philosophy
descends from heaven to earth. Thus, the idealists have no real
material basis for any of their ideas. There are no clear and tangible
premises from which to proceed with the idealist method. All idealist
concepts are, according to a materialist conception of history, essentially
empty. There is no concrete backing for anything expounded by the
Young Hegelians; their thought is the epitome of vulgar idealism. For
this reason, Marx identifies the Young Hegelians, and other
mainstream German philosophers, as ideologists. Their thought is
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ideological since it is upside down, as in the camera obscura: rather
than recognizing the dependence of consciousness on material
conditions, the German ideologists contend that it is consciousness that
determines material conditions.
However, I am interested in this analysis to explore the ways
that political conditions of choice and agency turn on different theories
of ideology, as epistemological theories. In this sense I am following
Marx's appropriation of the term from Destutt de Tracy. Where Destutt
de Tracy at the close of the eighteenth century used the term ideology
to mean a science of ideas, Marx participated in the transformation of
that meaning to one with pejorative connotations. For Marx, ideology
now described "a collection of representations characteristic of a given
epoch and society"(LeFebvre 60). Thus, Marx identifies idealism with
ideology because of the socially and politically coercive aspects of
idealist thought. Idealism is itself ideological because it represents
empty, meaningless concepts as the most real things. In so
representing empty concepts, idealist philosophy successfully obscures
the real (oppressive) conditions of material existence, and thus conceals
the real basis for liberation (communist revolution) with false
philosophic liberation.
Ideology then is false consciousness which in reversing the real
order of reality presents what is false and unverifiable (the ideal) as the
most real; in so doing, ideology obstructs access to truth. What is
worse, since ideological conceptions of the world are idealist, and by
definition the idealists lack a concrete method for verifying the veracity
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of claims, there is no clear method for recognizing the ideological as
ideological. If idealism is ideological because it stands the real
relationship between consciousness and material conditions on its
head, then materialism is the antithesis of ideology since it correctly
represents the relationship between consciousness and material
conditions. Materialism however is not simply an alternative to
idealism, it is also an antidote to the ideological. Because a materialist
conception of the world takes as its premises the concrete activity of
actual people engaged in production in its various modes, where the
idealist can rely on nothing but idle speculation, the materialist has an
advantage over the idealist since the materialist always can appeal to
the concrete to justify his claims. For Marx, the scientific method of
dialectical materialism is therefore not only not ideological,
materialism is also itself a method for demystification.
However, while Marx asserts that the ideological is the ideal, and
that dialectical materialism is the method for recognizing and
critiquing the ideological, nowhere is there a sustained analysis to
explain why materialism is not simply another kind of ideology. In
representing idealism as a simple inversion of dialectical materialism,
and in equating idealism with ideology, Marx has defined ideology as
an inversion of the Truth articulated by dialectical materialism.
However, Marx has not begun to explain why materialism has the
exclusive reading of Reality. The theory therefore undercuts itself
since on this account no one who holds ideological positions can
recognize the content of their thought as ideological. Marx's theory of
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ideology therefore reproduces the "I'm right, you're wrong" conception
of ideology.
Thus this formulation of ideology fails to leave any theoretical
space for individuals to critique their own ideological positions. We
are mystified and must wait for the vanguard of materialist
intellectuals to deconstruct the ideological content of our thought.
Lukacs' theory of imputed class consciousness is the most clear - and
offensive - articulation of this argument. Certainly Marx did not
intend such a failure. Marx identifies idealism with ideology because
of what he takes to be the socially and politically coercive aspects of
idealist thought. Ideology as idealism, in so representing empty
concepts as the most real things, successfully conceals the real basis for
liberation with false philosophic liberation. For Marx then the ability
to identify and critique ideology is of central import to the concept. For,
what possible sense could it make to maintain on the one hand that
there is a distinction between thought that is ideological and thought
that is not, whereby the ideological is false, perverse, and coercive; and
to state on the other hand that there is no way for individuals to
recognize or articulate the ideological structure of our thought?
But this is what Marx does in his analysis and critique of the
German Idealists. According to Marx, the only way to explain the
idealism of the Young Hegelians is by appeal to their material
conditions. The Young Hegelians are idealists because of their material
conditions; and therefore idealists are unable to avoid being idealists
(and ideologists). Marx has created a theory of ideology whereby the
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production of ideology is automatic, it is as automatic as the physical
reality where images are inverted on the retina of the eye. Clearly, this
presents a major problem for any theory of ideology critique since the
representation of the world as upside down, the production of
consciousness that is ideological, is inherent in the material conditions
of the world. The materialist doctrine tells us that ideology is a false
representation of the real conditions of active men and production.
However, the materialist doctrine also tells us that because of the
material conditions in which we live, we will always produce
consciousness that is ideological. There is no escape unless we adopt
the antidote to the ideological: dialectical materialism.
In so developing his account of ideology, Marx has made it
definitionally impossible for dialectical materialism to be ideological.
Since ideology is anything that denies the assertion that material
conditions determine consciousness or denies the corollaries of that
assertion, then dialectical materialism is automatically protected from
the accusation that it is itself ideological. Essentially, Marx's early
conception of ideology describes the reasons for why idealism is
ideology based on the assertion of yet another real reality - the one
articulated by dialectical materialism. However, Marx does not
generate any adequate explanation of why his materialist account of
reality is more true than idealist accounts. Marx's argument that
ideology is idealist or false consciousness is doomed to fail since it
situates one in the precarious position of standing on the alleged truth
and calling down to the mystified that they will continue to be
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mystified until they recognize the truth generated by dialectical
materialism.
For this reason, this particular definition of ideology is
unsuccessful in providing a method for ideology critique that can be
carried out with epistemological significance and intellectual integrity.
On this understanding of ideology, critique is leveled only at thought
that is idealist. Thus, Marx's early conception of ideology does little to
advance meaningfully the solution to the epistemological problem of
evaluation. While Marx offers an intricate theoretical justification for
the identity of idealism and ideology36
,
there is no complex or
interesting meta-account of the evaluation of thought that would,
apart from the characteristics of idealism, define idealism as ideology
and materialism as an antidote to ideology. Marx, in an exceptionally
complicated manner, begs the question: what is ideology? 37
Furthermore, Marx's assertion that dialectical materialism
generates the truth about social reality reproduces the problem raised
by Kant's analysis. Marx, in showing that dialectical materialism yields
a coherent view of bourgeois capitalist society does not show that the
critique of capitalism is the only coherent world-view articulated by
materialist analysis. Case in point: Patricia Hill-Collins in her essay
36Much of that account is contained in Marx's later works, particularly Capital,
though there is scholarly dispute as to whether the account of ideology in Capital is
sufficiently different from the account in The German Ideology. In what follows below,
I will take up these questions in detail.
37In all fairness to Marx, it is not clear that he was setting out in The German Ideology
to define a complex general theory of ideology. However, since this idea of ideology as
false consciousness informs much contemporary theory of ideology it is essential to
address the early version of ideology as a theory of ideology, whether Marx intended
it to be so or not.
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Toward An Afrocentric Feminist Epistemology" and Nancy Hartsock
in The Feminist Standpoint" both generate coherent world-views by
employing a materialist analysis of social reality. However, these
world-views are inconsistent both with Marxist accounts of social
reality, and with one another. Hartsock and Collins each begin with
the assertion that material conditions determine consciousness
Hartsock claims that all women living in Western class societies have a
common experience that yields a unique perspective on social relations
between men and women, a perspective that, by definition, men do not
have access to. Collins goes one step further than Hartsock and argues
that Black women living in the United States have a unique set of
experiences, and thus an epistemic vantage point, on social relations
between Black women and people of all races that is again not available
to anyone but Black women. Thus while Hartsock's and Collins'
analyses are both decidedly materialist, they yield different accounts of
social reality. We see Marx here shying away from the logical
extension of his own argument: that if experience is fundamental to
knowledge and subjectivity in any way, then different experience must
lead to significant differences in knowledge and subjectivity.
In this account of ideology Marx has taken a clear position on the
relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge:
the object conditions the consciousness of the subject, material
conditions determine consciousness and not the reverse. In this regard
then Marx has reversed the Kantian order of determination between
the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Where Kant argues
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that the mind, the faculty of judgment conditions the object of
knowledge, Marx contends that it is material conditions themselves
that determine the consciousness of individuals. Thus, Marx's theory
of ideology is a response to the shortcomings of the idealist position on
consciousness. Marx reversed principles fundamental to idealists, such
as, that the spirit or consciousness is conceptually, and for some, even
temporally prior to matter"(Parekh, "Marx's Theory of Ideology" 3)38 .
However, even given this reversal of Kant's reversal, Marx's theory of
ideology still fails to provide a successful method for ideology critique.
D. The Concept of Ideology in Marx's Capital
According to many Marxist theorists (among them John
Mepham, Terry Eagleton, Henri LeFebvre, Norman Geras, Nicholas
Abercrombie), there is contained in Capital a later, more
comprehensive, more theoretically sophisticated concept of ideology.
Eagleton states: "Note that whereas in the German Ideology ideology
was a matter of not seeing things as they really were, it is a question in
Capital of reality itself being duplicitous and deceitful"(Ideology 87).
Eagleton continues by contending that this new theory of ideology in
Capital is superior since whereas before (in the German Ideology )
ideology was equivalent to "idealist speculation, it is now given a
secure grounding in the material practices of bourgeois society"(87).
Furthermore, this new theory of ideology avoids the theoretical
38
"They [idealists] deny matter not only ontological primacy, but also any form of
ontological reality or 'being'"(Parekh, "Marx's Theory of Ideology" 3).
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problems encountered in the account of ideology in The German
Ideology since in Capital ideology "is no longer wholly reducible to
false consciousness"(87). According to the account of ideology in
Capital, falsehood is due to the structural effects of capitalism.
While there is some disagreement as to whether there actually is
an account of ideology contained in the critique of commodity
fetishism in Book One of Capital, I will begin by explicating the theory
that allegedly is there. While most scholars agree on the fundamentals
of the theory of commodity fetishism, there is disagreement as to
whether within that theory there is actually a full blown account of
ideology. Commodity fetishism refers to the systematic mystification
of social relations. Marx states: "exchange-value [of a given
commodity], generally, is only the mode of expression, the
phenomenal form, of something contained in it, yet distinguishable
from it"(Tucker 304). Thus, the social nature of the exchange of
commodities (the phenomenal form) obscures the material nature of
the relations between workers (the real relations).
According to John Mepham in his essay "The Theory of Ideology
in Capital," because of socioeconomic realities that make for a
distinction between real relations and phenomenal forms, it is nearly
impossible to recognize the true character of these relations. For
example, the real relation of exchange of labour power is obscured by
the phenomenal form of the wage. In this case, commodity fetishism
is a systemic source of ideological consciousness since what is most
real, the conditions of labour, is obscured by the socioeconomic form of
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capitalism. So now the explanation for the existence of ideology is not
in the intention or design of the bourgeois class, but is in the structure
of bourgeois capitalist society itself.
The immediate question however is whether the theory of
commodity fetishism, worked out from the distinction between
appearance and reality, can give us a theory of ideology. Nicholas
Abercrombie in his Class, Stvuctuve, and Knowledge remarks that if it
were possible to construct a theory of ideology out of the theory of
commodity fetishism then this later theory would be superior since
"[i]nstead of a relatively crude image of a class imposing its beliefs on
another class to suit its class interests, the theory of commodity
fetishism points to a way in which ideological categories arise out of
the capitalist mode of production itself"(89). However, Abercrombie
remains skeptical as to whether there actually is a fully developed
theory of ideology in the theory of commodity fetishism. He states:
"[nonetheless, so far I am arguing only that the theory of reification is
incomplete. Either it is in need of further theoretical elements, or it is
limited in its scope in that it applies most particularly to the social
relations of production of capitalism very strictly conceived"(87).
Unlike Abercrombie who argues that the theory of commodity
fetishism is incomplete as a theory of ideology, I would argue instead
that the theory of commodity fetishism is an instantiation of a theory
of ideology, but is not a theory of ideology in itself. Commodity
fetishism is an example of a systemic force that produces a specific kind
of ideological thought that functions in a specific way; it obscures the
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social character of individual labour and results in alienation of
workers, further preventing the possibility of workers recognizing
themselves as a class, particularly in opposition to the recognition of
the ruling class as a class. However, beyond its most general
application in terms of conceiving of a distinction between appearances
and reality, it is not itself a theory of ideology. Indeed, the formulation
of the theory without the particular context of the commodity, that is,
the formulation of the theory as a distinction between appearance and
reality brings us no closer to a viable theory of ideology than the
German Ideology version of ideology where ideology is simply
idealism.
In order to assert that the Capital version of ideology actually
exists one must answer the question: how does the theory of
commodity fetishism explain ideological thinking that is not
fetishistic? While Abercrombie is more willing to consider the
limitations in application of the theory of commodity fetishism,
Mepham is careful on several occasions to state that the theory of
commodity fetishism is a general theory of ideology, with application
beyond and outside of the socioeconomic categories in which it is
framed.
However, this wider application is not at all apparent to me. For
example, how does this theory of ideology explain the existence and
mystificatory power of a certain bit of racist ideology, such as the
assumption that every Black man in an expensive automobile is a drug
dealer? The real relations and phenomenal forms of capitalism alone
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cannot fully explain why we view some prosperous citizens as
legitimately prosperous and hard working (White men in nice cars),
whereas we presume that other prosperous citizens are criminals
(Black men in nice cars).
There is a very general correspondence here between Mepham's
reading of Marx's theory and the operation of racist capitalist ideology.
There is a distortion of a real relation between individuals of different
races that is expressed in what could be called a phenomenal form
,
the
racist internal representation of Black men as gangster drug dealers.
But if this is the upshot of the theory of ideology derived from the
theory of commodity fetishism, then how is this significantly different
from saying that ideology is a distorted view of what are the real social
conditions? How is this any different from saying that ideology is an
appeal to idealist conceptions that have no basis in material reality?
This later Marxist theory still does not respond to many important
questions. For example, who, on this account, is able to distinguish
between the real and the phenomenal, between the accurate and the
ideological? Moreover, how do we proceed to evaluate some views as
ideological and others as non-ideological? What is the methodology
for doing so?
Furthermore, it is unclear to me how it is, if we take Mepham's
reading of the account of ideology in Capital to be a theory of ideology,
that we are not falling into a kind of Marxist reductionism whereby the
exploitation of capital is the explanation for all other forms of
domination. The position Norman Geras takes in his essay "Marx and
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the Critique of Political Economy" demonstrates this very kind of
economic or materialist reductionism in this theory of ideology. Geras
asserts (contra Althusser) that in a true socialist society there would be
no ideology present since social relations would not be concealed by
ideologies. Thus, the essence/appearance distinction which is
fundamental to the critique of capitalism would, according to Geras,
seem to be unnecessary to the "science of that [socialist] society"(301).
This assertion has got to be the most prototypical example of
vulgar materialism going. To assert that ideology would not exist in a
socialist society since social relations would not be concealed by any
ideologies is to assert that the only social relations that can be concealed
by ideologies are those that are concerned with material relations.
Obviously this is erroneous. That commodity fetishism is a systemic
source of ideological consciousness is true enough; however, there are
all kinds of categories of ideological consciousness whose production
cannot be explained by appealing to the appearance/reality distinction
inherent in capitalist society. Recall the example I outlined above
regarding the two rich men, one White and one Black, in fancy
automobiles. It is impossible to explain the complexity of the
assumption that the White man is a lawyer and the Black man is a
criminal by appealing to the reality obscured by the appearance in the
theory of commodity fetishism. How can the mystificatory power of
the wage form explain the fact that White women walking alone at
night are more likely to presume that a Black male passerby is
dangerous whereas a White male passerby is not? Can the theoretical
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machinery of commodity fetishism alone explain why a Black man in
New York City cannot get a cab and a Chinese man can? All of these
assumptions are characterized by a complex interaction of ideas and
experiences of race, class, gender, and nation.
My point is clear. Commodity fetishism cannot possibly account
for the myriad ways in which ideologies, theories that conceal real
relations, are produced and employed. It seems indefensible to
presume that first, the exploitation of capital is the explanation for all
other forms of domination, and second, that ideology would not exist
in a socialist society. Each of these conclusions relies on the distorted
assumption that the only social relations that can be concealed by
ideology are those that are concerned with labour and economics.
The theory of ideology derived from the account of commodity
fetishism is however an advance from Marx's first formulation of
ideology. Commodity fetishism is an example of a systemic force that
produces ideological thought that functions in a specific way; it
obscures the social character of individual labour and results in the
alienation of workers, further preventing the possibility of workers
recognizing themselves as a class in opposition to the ruling class. The
account of ideology in Capital thereby responds to at least one of the
major objections raised to the first formulation: namely, that it simply
asserts the truth of one world-view by opposing it to an allegedly false
world-view. Consequently, this later theory of ideology also avoids the
ethically offensive and epistemologically indefensible position that
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some people in the world can see ideology while the rest of us need to
be demystified by vanguard intellectuals.
However, Marx has only compounded the problem of
evaluation in this second formulation. While in the first formulation
the production of ideology is automatic given the standpoint of the
individual (all but revolutionary intellectuals), in this second
formulation any knowing subject living under bourgeois capitalism
will produce thought that is ideological. In some ways, Marx has
returned the problem of evaluation to where Kant left it. Everyone in
bourgeois capitalist society will think ideologically. Moreover, no one
from bourgeois capitalist society will be able to recognize the unreality
of this ideological consciousness. The notion of evaluation or ideology
critique is now entirely paradoxical.
Moreover, in both formulations of ideology, Marx has attempted
to disregard the complexity of the encounter between the knowing
subject and the object of knowledge. The epistemic thickness of the
encounter is lost when one accepts Marx's conclusion that the coercive
conditions of capitalism pre-determine the ideological character of the
knowledge claims produced by individuals living under capitalism.
E. The Concept of Ideology in Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia
I now turn to explore the development of the evaluative
conception of ideology. I am particularly interested in the analysis of
this development in Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia. I am
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interested in Mannheim since, in his search for a theoretically sound
evaluative conception of ideology, he appeals to the position of neutral
observation - the ideology free sociologists of knowledge. I am
interested in this move by Mannheim since it is representative of yet
another strategy for responding to the ambiguity of the encounter
between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Rather than
positing that the subject organizes the object, as Kant did, or that the
object organizes the subject, as Marx did, Mannheim contends that
some subjects can retreat to a safe distance from the whole encounter
and observe the contact between the knowing subject and the object of
knowledge. From this position of alleged disengagement, the ideology
free sociologists of knowledge can examine the contact and thereby
evaluate the relative, or rather relational, truth of particular
knowledge claims. After briefly explicating Mannheim's account of the
development of the evaluative conception of ideology I will raise and
respond to the theoretical difficulties in Mannheim's thought.
Mannheim contends that the current evaluative conception of
ideology resulted from a progressively broader understanding of the
concept viewed through several definitive stages and distinctions: the
total versus the particular, the special versus the general, and finally,
the non-evaluative versus the evaluative. Working towards the final
distinction between the non-evaluative total general conception of
ideology versus the evaluative total general conception of ideology,
Mannheim traces the development of the concept.
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The first distinction discussed by Mannheim is that between the
particular and total conception of ideology. To subject only single and
isolated ideas of one s opponent to ideological critique is to employ the
particular conception of ideology, whereas to subject one's opponent's
entire system of concepts to analysis is to employ the total conception
of ideology. While Mannheim stresses throughout Ideology and
Utopia the combative and destructive nature of ideology critique, it is
the merging of the total and particular conceptions of ideology that
makes ideology critique all the more devastating. Thus, while at the
level of the particular, the analyst searches for mistakes in the thought
process of the individual, employing the total conception of ideology
suggests that the enemy's entire structure of consciousness is flawed,
that everything the opponent thinks is infused with ideological
content. Essentially, analysis with the total conception of ideology, is
designed to show that the opponent's theories are invalid since they
are "merely a function of the generally prevailing social
situation"(Mannheim 69).
According to Mannheim, this total conception of ideology was
first adopted by Marxist theory. Whereas Kant's analysis leaves us with
the idea of consciousness in itself, with the subjective unity of
apperception, and Hegel revises this idea by adding the notion of a
historically changing subject (folk spirit or world consciousness), it is
Marx who asserts that "the structure of society and its corresponding
intellectual forms vary with the relations between social
classes"(Mannheim 68).
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Mannheim then makes a second distinction between the special
total conception of ideology and the general total conception of
ideology. In this case, acting in accordance with the special total
conception of ideology requires only subjecting one's opponent's
consciousness to critique. The general formulation on the other hand
necessarily includes the subjection of one's own views to ideological
critique. It is from the general formulation that the sociology of
knowledge develops.
The final distinction Mannheim makes is between the
evaluative general total conception of ideology and the non-evaluative
general total conception of ideology. He contrasts this evaluative
notion of ideology with what he calls non-evaluative models of
ideology whereby "no judgments are pronounced as to the correctness
of the ideas to be treated. This approach confines itself to discovering
the relations between certain mental structures and the life-situations
in which they exist"(80). According to Mannheim, it is only because of
our uncertainty in the truth, and because of a socially disorganized
intellectual situation, that it becomes clear that every point of view is
particular to a given situation (84-85). Such an understanding of
thought as entirely socially determined requires that we give up on the
idea of absolute truth. It is as if the non-evaluative model is both a
response to our inability to assert absolute truth, and an assertion of the
impossibility of that task. The non-evaluative model then is actually
indicative of another failure to respond effectively to what is
fundamentally at issue in ideological conflict: the ability to judge, to
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engage in ideology critique with intellectual integrity and
epistemological significance. The non-evaluative model seems to say:
we cannot find a way to say more than every view point is socially
determined, we cannot find a way to say that one conception of the
world is more or less correct than another; therefore, there is no way to
make such evaluations. According to Mannheim (77-79), in order to
get ourselves loose from this extreme relativism we must both separate
ourselves from any particular social group and acknowledge the
relational character of knowledge; that is, we must recognize that
epistemology itself is enmeshed in a certain historical moment and
that all knowledge is historical knowledge and can only be formulated
with respect to the position of the observer.
Mannheim makes a curious move from here however. He
argues that: "The transition to an evaluative point of view is
necessitated from the very beginning by the fact that history as history
is unintelligible unless certain of its aspects are emphasized in contrast
to others"(94). Thus, there is no way to maintain a non-evaluative
conception of ideology since once one sets out to study ideas, one
realizes that such a study is incoherent unless that study includes
evaluation, or judgment.
But as quickly as Mannheim addresses this transition from the
non-evaluative to the evaluative formulation however, he retreats
from the issue. Following his explanation of the genesis of the
evaluative conception of ideology, he claims to have returned to a
non-evaluative ideological analysis, asserting that "this, of course, is
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due to [his] intention to discover an evaluative solution"(98). This
maneuvering by Mannheim reveals fundamental contradictions in his
argument as it (albeit unintentionally) reinforces the necessity of
constructing a viable evaluative account of ideology.
Given Mannheim's own reasoning that we move, nearly
imperceptibly, from the non-evaluative to the evaluative
formulations, it is unclear how, on his account, once we are situated in
an evaluative position we can revert to a non-evaluative position. If
the move to evaluation is actually automatic because of the
unintelligibility of intellectual practice in the absence of a mechanism
for evaluation, it seems impossible to shift back to the non-evaluative
conception of ideology once the definitive step towards evaluation has
been taken. Again, like Marx, Mannheim has undercut his own theory
of ideology. Indeed, Mannheim's assertion of the possibility of such a
return to neutrality is essential to the possibility of the existence of the
ideology free sociologists of knowledge. Without these neutral
intellectuals, existing outside of any particular world view,
Mannheim's solution to extreme relativism - the relational study of
ideas - is utterly untenable39 . If one rejects the possibility of the
existence of such ideology-free intellectuals, and one accepts the total
conception of ideology, then there would be no way to launch ideology
critique since to do so would only confirm one's ignorance and naivete
regarding the ideological structure of one's own position.
39He claims it is the dialectical process of history that caused the final transition to
the evaluative conception of ideology. Mannheim repeatedly cites his own formulation
of Kant's conclusion that the mind is the lawgiver to nature (cf. Ideology and Utopia
65-67).
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Consequently, rejection of the possibility of ideology free intellectuals is
tantamount to the admission that one cannot meaningfully critique
another's position.
What Mannheim is trying to do is to reject the idea that there is
an absolute truth to measure all assertions against as a test for their
ideological content, and yet, still maintain the theoretical space
necessary to judge some views as ideological and others as not
ideological. In other words, he is aiming to avoid extreme relativism
by undertaking an evaluation of thought based not on absolute truth
but on its relational truth. Where Mannheim goes wrong though is in
asserting that this kind of relational evaluation can be executed by
individuals who have returned to a position of neutrality - a position
that Mannheim himself earlier asserts is impossible to maintain.
Mannheim's argument is made more suspect by his cryptic assertions
that it is possible only for some people (I'll leave aside that this must
include Mannheim himself) - not all people - to achieve the standpoint
of the sociologist of knowledge. Mannheim's analysis is therefore quite
interesting in the question it sets out to answer; but the actual
argument falls far short of offering a satisfactory or even coherent
account of how such a relational evaluation of knowledge is possible.
One useful conclusion we can extract from Mannheim though is
that it does us no good to assert that every viewpoint is ideological.
That is, any non-evaluative conception of ideology is entirely
unhelpful, and perhaps entirely uninteresting, to us. The claim that
every viewpoint is ideological is epistemologically insignificant for it
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leaves us no opportunity to judge any given theory or opinion as more
or less ideological than any other theory or opinion. Mannheim I
think is right to assert the intellectual incoherence of attempting to
study ideas without any method for evaluation. But even
Mannheim's ideology free sociologists of knowledge are unable to
escape from the extreme relativism into which he has led himself.
This raises again what I take to be the central difficulty in
Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia : once one acknowledges the total
conception of ideology - that is, that the intellectual orientation one has
toward the world is not disinterested, it is rather, value laden - then the
concept of ideology loses its critical power. From this standpoint, the
notion of critiquing ideology is epistemologically insignificant since
there is no position from which to stand on one's principles and to call
another set of principles ideological. Essentially, at this point
everything is ideological. Mannheim's attempt to circumvent this
conclusion by claiming that certain intellectuals (himself included) can
set themselves free of any particular group (258-9) and undertake the
activity of new sociologists of knowledge (non-ideological
epistemologists actively engaged in the process of the "continuous
expansion of knowledge"(106)) is incoherent given his own assertion
of the necessity of evaluation to the intellectual process.
Moreover, even given any particular individual's will and
desire to achieve a neutral standpoint, there are social and historical
conditions that make it nearly impossible, even for aspiring ideology-
free intellectuals, to reach non-ideological truth. Surely Mannheim
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himself would have to acknowledge that there are social and historical
conditions (to which truth is bound) that make it nearly impossible,
even for the so called ideology-free intellectuals, to generate any
meaningful, non-ideological truth. For example, Noam Chomsky has
argued extensively, and most recently in his Manufacturing Consent,
that capitalist control of media in the United States makes it nearly
impossible to produce an ideology-free understanding (or any
understanding whatsoever) of the current situation in East Timor. In
his Covering Islam Edward Said similarly concludes that Western
journalism consistently misrepresents everything Islamic resulting in
an American fiction called "Islam" which is differently employed by
Western and Islamic governments, typically to the continued
misrepresentation and exploitation of individual Muslims. Thus we
can see that fundamentally, Mannheim's assertions of the possibility of
neutrality are unreachable, notwithstanding the fact that there is more
at issue in the process of reaching for neutrality than Mannheim
acknowledges.
F. The Possibility of Ideology Critique
In the consideration of these various theories, what I would call
metatheories, of ideology, I am struck by the theoretical impossibility of
ever successfully engaging in ideology critique, especially given that the
ability to recognize what is ideological is central to the coherence of
ideology as a concept. In this concluding section then I want to address
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two questions: first, what is it about these theories of ideology that
makes it impossible ever to engage in ideology critique?; and second,
what is ideology, and how can we understand and employ the concept
in a way that makes ideology critique possible?
In the Critique, the mind of the subject is the lawgiver to nature.
That is, reason imputes an order to nature. Now, while Kant subverts
the problem of ideology by asserting that there is a universal
psychology, a universal theory of human mental activity, governing
the imputation of order to reality, I have argued that the proof of such
a universal psychology relies on an unprovable empirical assumption.
What is more, by empirical verification we can see that there is no such
universal psychology, no universal structure of human judgment.
Because such a universal psychology is unverifiable, we are left only
with Kant's idea that minds are responsible for the structuring of
reality. If minds are responsible for structuring reality and it is not the
case that all minds work alike, then different minds can and will
structure reality in different ways. If different minds structure reality
in different ways then there will be different, and potentially
competing, accounts of what really constitutes reality. Enter the
concept of ideology. To review however, on Kant's theory there is no
methodology for discovering which reality is more real or accurate
than any other. Kant does not even address this difficulty since his
assertion of the universal psychology negates the possibility of there
being in the first place multiple accounts of reality.
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In reflecting on Kant's overall project in the Critique, we can see
how he was trying to close the epistemic space between the knowing
subject and the object of knowledge. It is on the ambiguity of this space
that I wish to focus however since it is here that the possibility of
ideology critique lies. In place of the obscurity in this encounter, Kant
has inserted an explicit claim that the mind organizes matter and an
implicit claim that all minds organize matter in the same fashion. So,
essentially, as soon as Kant raises the problem of ideology he explains it
away by his appeal to a universal psychology.
Now Marx s critique of ideology begins as a critique of idealism
and as such swings fully to the doctrine of dialectical materialism.
Ironically, it is Marx's failure to take into account the complexity of the
dialectical relationship between the knower and the known that results
in his failure to develop a useful theory of ideology. In the end, Marx
fails to give those of us who are mystified, who do not recognize the
false ideological nature of our consciousness, who are unable to
distinguish between the real relations and the phenomenal forms, the
conceptual terminology to identify and critique and revolutionize that
consciousness.
What is worse is that according to both the early and later
Marxist conceptions of ideology, individuals living under capitalism
will automatically produce thought that is ideological. The only people
who can identify that thought as ideological are those who have
sufficiently distanced themselves from bourgeois capitalism through
the study and practice of dialectical materialism. Even the proletariat,
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who stand to gain most from the apprehension of Marx's critique of
capitalism, can develop class consciousness only through the assistance
of a Marxist intellectual. On the later formulation of ideology, it is not
clear that anyone living under the conditions of class society
responsible for the production of ideology is capable of evaluating that
knowledge. The systemic sources of ideological consciousness are built
into the very structures of capitalism, and thus there is no work to be
done in examining the encounter between the knowing subject and the
object of knowledge. That work is finished before it is begun since
according to Marx's theories of ideology, all thought produced under
capitalism is ideological.
Mannheim, after surveying the history of the concept of
ideology concludes that we behave as if we had a viable evaluative
conception of ideology. In fact, Mannheim concludes that it is
impossible for us to study the history of ideas and that it is impossible
for us to consider the multiplicity of ideas around us without
evaluating those ideas. Thus, his so-called retreat from evaluation is,
on his theory, impossible to undertake. This impossibility alone clues
us into the significant theoretical difficulty of the assertion of the
ideology-free intellectuals. Such a position is clearly impossible to
adopt.
However, Mannheim proceeds with his analysis, arguing that
although ideas have a relational quality, that ideas are shaped by the
social and historical conditions in which they are produced, this fact
alone does not have to lead to extreme relativism. Mannheim argues
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that ideology-free sociologists of knowledge can choose to assume a
position of observation outside of a particular social /historical epoch.
And from this vantage point of neutrality, the sociologists of
knowledge can survey the relational specificities of ideas and their
social origins, and then can proceed to evaluate the relative ideological
content of any particular idea or set of ideas. For Mannheim, only the
ideology-free sociologist of knowledge has the capacity to generate
critiques of ideology. The sociologists of knowledge gain this ability by
recognizing the relational character of all knowledge claims and
preventing themselves from becoming enmeshed in any social realm.
We can see however that Mannheim's analysis is still arrested in
the attempt to transcend the disorder of the interaction between the
knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Mannheim, in his
assertion of the existence of ideology-free sociologists of knowledge, is
trying to get a grip on that encounter that both Kant and Marx failed to
achieve. And here we have the beginnings of an answer to the first
question I posed. While Kant opens the discussion of ideology by
challenging the nature of the epistemic space between the knowing
subject and the object of knowledge, both Marx and Mannheim attempt
to resolve the tension and ambiguity inherent in that epistemic space.
And thus it is my conclusion that any understanding of ideology
based in the attempt to surpass the dialectical relationship between the
subject and the object of knowledge is doomed to fail since any
understanding based on controlling the epistemic space here leaves
little or no room for meaningful ideology critique. Marx and
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Mannheim each construct theories of ideology critique whereby the
critique of ideology originates from a remote standpoint; the site of
ideology production has no bearing on the formulation of the critique.
These kinds of metatheories of ideology are inherently paradoxical
then since they all point to a failure to recognize the real, but leave no
theoretical mechanism for distinguishing the real from the ideological;
they thus leave no mechanism for critiquing ideology.
Nevertheless, their failures are instructive. I would hope that
my critique here will direct us to confront the complexity and the
accompanying ambiguity of the epistemic space between any knowing
subject and object of knowledge. It is from this encounter that
curricular Traditionalists attempt to evacuate. The critique of ideology
takes place from within the complexity of that interaction between the
knower and the known. Any attempt to side with one half of the
dialectic or to transcend the dialectic altogether destroys the
contradictory dynamism of what seems to be a much more accurate
description of the nature of our knowledge claims. We are, as knowing
subjects, constantly in a state of affecting and being effected by the
objects of our knowledge. Therefore, it is essential for us to undertake
the evaluation of all knowledge claims (both ideological and non-
ideological) from the position of engaged observer within the
dialectical relation between the knowing subject and the object of
knowledge. As I will argue in the next chapter, if we accept that
experience is fundamental to the production of our knowledge, then
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we must also accept that experience is fundamental to the evaluation
of that knowledge.
Where does this leave us regarding an account of ideology that
makes it possible to engage in ideology critique with intellectual
integrity and epistemological significance? It does no good to develop a
logically coherent concept of ideology whereby ideology critique is
possible but intellectually vacuous. I take it that the critique of
Mannheim's appeal to becoming an ideology-free subject is the only
potential starting point for developing a coherent theory of ideology.
Mannheim reaches for the position of neutrality from the cusp of a
bold assertion: that the fact that ideas seem to be shaped by the social
and historical conditions in which they are produced does not
necessarily have to lead us to a position of extreme relativism. It is
here that Mannheim makes the wrong move though. In order to
remain in dynamic contact with the dialectical relationship between
the objective contingency of knowledge and the construction of our
consciousness, we must remain positioned. In absolute opposition to
Mannheim, I assert then that the full awareness of oneself as
positioned towards a set of ideas as a gendered, classed, raced,
nationalized and highly intellectual being is where the only hope lies
for meaningful ideology critique.
From within that epistemic space between the knowing subject
and the object of knowledge lies the possibility of the meaningful
evaluation of ideas and sets of ideas, of the critique of ideology. For
only from within this epistemic space is it possible to begin to see
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ideology, to see the tight theoretical or practical connections between
seemingly unrelated ideas, claims, or practices. This is a notion of
ideology and ideology critique grounded in practical political awareness
and struggle. Political awareness and struggle give us the occasion to
consider the ways in which we are positioned towards various ideas
and practices; rigorous multicultural education encourages students to
confront the epistemic complexity of intellectual history. In the
following chapter I will argue further that rigorous multicultural
education provides additional opportunities for students to develop, in
opposition to nationalist education, the different aspects of their own
identities. Thus rigorous multicultural education does not seek to help
students to transcend the accidents of their existence, but instead to
delve into that contingency; this process however is expressly not for
the sake of forming students according to stagnant nationalist (or racist,
misogynist, homophobic, etc.) identity classes, but is instead aimed at
cultivating the complexity of individual identity for the sake of
enabling students to share in the ideal of the university, to become
critics of ideology.
My conclusion is thus diametrically opposed to the position of
the curricular Traditionalists, who argue that once firmly situated in
the neutral standpoint achieved by proper instruction, students can
properly study the disciplines in the humanities. From this standpoint
of neutrality it is impossible to engage the complexity or ambiguity of
the epistemic space between the knower and the known; and it is the
apprehension of this complexity that makes it possible to adjudicate
191
among competing accounts of reality by assessing the status of relations
between apparently disparate claims and practices. The Traditionalist
curriculum is thereby responsible for sustaining the perpetuation of
ideology since it teaches students to evacuate their subjectivity and
address the objects of knowledge (be they the history of ideas or events,
creative expression, theories of social or political relations, assessments
of aesthetic quality, etc.) from a neutral or objective standpoint. And it
is because the Traditionalist position on curricular reform is embedded
in nationalist ideology that it seeks to force students out of the
particularities of their subjectivity and to force texts out of the
subjective particularities of their production (in Bloom's language: out
of the accidents of their existence) and into the standpoint of alleged
neutrality.
Contradictions seem to provide the occasion for recognizing that
neither the ideal nor the material can be privileged or escaped in our
analysis of ideology. In this way I hope to reset the conditions for real
debate in the academy. Both universalism and relativism are
unacceptable positions in an institution that is supposed to be the site
for the pursuit of truth and the sharing of knowledge.
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CHAPTER V
BECOMING A CRITIC OF IDEOLOGY
A. Introduction
Having concluded that any theory of ideology according to
which it is impossible to engage in ideology critique is
epistemologically unsatisfactory, I now wish to consider the
possibilities for ideology critique. While it is certainly beyond the scope
of the dissertation to formulate, argue for, and defend yet another
metatheory of ideology, it is nevertheless essential that I invoke the
concept in my analysis of academic nationalism. Moreover, the
critique of Kant, Marx, and Mannheim necessarily points to an
alternative notion of ideology critique, and therefore, to an alternative
notion of ideology. My aim in highlighting a theory of ideology
critique focused on an exploration of the encounter between the
knowing subject and the object of knowledge is to reconfigure our
received notions of both ideology and ideology critique. Thus, I use the
term ideology critique to refer to the process whereby the theoretical or
practical connections between seemingly unrelated claims or practices
are made explicit through rigorous analysis. Furthermore, as I have
explained in Chapter One, essential to my understanding of ideology is
that it is central to the maintenance of coercive power structures. And
therefore I use the term ideology in reference to claims or practices that
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support coercive power structures as they purport to be for the sake of
some neutral or noble cause. This is the notion of ideology I have
invoked in Chapters Three and Four to identify the Traditionalist
curriculum as ideological. This is also the notion of ideology I am
working from as I conclude the argument of the dissertation in this
chapter with my final explanation and defense of the claim that
nationalist education is antithetical to the stated mission of the
university.
I have claimed that teaching students to be sharp critics of
ideology is central to the stated mission of the university to serve as a
site for the pursuit of truth and sharing of knowledge. While
Mannheim is right to conclude that inquiry without evaluation results
in intellectual incoherence, his proposal that evaluation should take
place from a neutral standpoint is fundamentally mistaken. The
following discussion of ideology critique, and the relation between
ideology critique and nationalist education, is an attempt to reject
Mannheim's calls for neutrality and to consider at least one aspect of
the epistemic space between the knowing subject and the object of
knowledge. It is my aim then in this final chapter to defend the claim
that nationalist education in the humanities undermines the process
of teaching students to be critics of ideology. Furthermore, I will argue
that a decidedly non-nationalist multicultural education offers the
possibility of developing heterogeneous group identity without the
deleterious consequences invariably brought forth by nationalism.
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— The Evaluation of Socially Situated KnnwIpHg^
My first task then is to answer the question: under what
conditions is it possible to become a critic of ideology? Mannheim, as I
have discussed, argues that in order to become critics of ideology we
should strive to be ideology free sociologists of knowledge, unsituated
observers. It is my position however that this cannot be the route to
becoming a critic of ideology because of the underlying contradiction
implicit in this notion. To accept that knowledge is dependent upon
the social/historical conditions under which it appears, to accept
essentially that knowledge is dependent upon experience, and to claim
that experience obstructs the evaluation of that knowledge is
contradictory. If it really is the case that knowledge is dependent upon
the social and historical conditions under which it is produced, then it
is impossible to excise from the process of evaluation the impact or
contribution of social and historical conditions. That is, the relevance
of the conditions under which knowledge claims are produced must
also impact the relevance of the conditions under which knowledge is
evaluated. In this sense, once one accepts the role of experience in the
production of knowledge, the notion of objective observation or
evaluation is untenable.
However, the construction of the terms in this analysis of
evaluation is deceptive since objectivity (or neutrality) is imagined as
the only standpoint from which to evaluate ideology. But in this
regard, the very notion of objectivity is incomprehensible since it refers
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to the evaluation of knowledge claims, which are dependent in
important ways upon experience, without any impact of experience.
This is an incoherent notion since the claims of evaluation are also
knowledge claims produced under, and thus somewhat dependent
upon, the prevailing social and historical conditions. Therefore, it is
contradictory to assert, as Mannheim does, both of the following
claims: first, that knowledge claims are dependent upon the prevailing
social and historical conditions; and second, that proper evaluation of
those claims can be undertaken only from an "ideology free"
standpoint, the standpoint of one not influenced by any prevailing
social and historical conditions. One may not consistently hold both
claims.
It seems to me then that Mannheim goes wrong not when he
recognizes and acknowledges the relational quality of knowledge - that
the truth of all knowledge claims is relative to the social and historical
conditions under which they are created. Once we acknowledge this
quality of knowledge claims we are relieved of having to engage in
stale scripted debates about objective reality and who has access to it.
Mannheim thus retains the most useful component of Kant's legacy:
the notion that knowledge is, in an important sense, socially
constructed. Mannheim also preserves the central elements of Marx's
theory of knowledge, not merely that knowledge claims are dependent
upon the prevailing social and historical conditions, but also that
different individuals (depending upon their standpoint) have
differential access to the evaluation of those claims.
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I also think Mannheim is right to assert that the critic of ideology
must be able to examine the relational veracity of knowledge claims
relative to the social and historical conditions under which they are
produced. But, this is where my thought departs from his. Mannheim
aims to accentuate the relational quality of ideas without descending
into relativism; his method for doing so is to posit the existence of the
ideology-free sociologist of knowledge. This person travels freely
among the many different social and historical conditions that produce
knowledge claims and sets of knowledge claims (ideologies); the
sociologist of knowledge, because he is tied to no social and historical
conditions, can evaluate the relational veracity (the best kind of
evaluation possible) of any knowledge claims.
Mannheim is wrong though to claim that to evaluate
successfully one must undertake evaluation from the standpoint of
disinterested observer. It is my contention instead that in order to
examine the relational veracity of knowledge claims one must do so
from within the social/historical conditions under which the
knowledge is created. That is, it is my position that in order to become
a critic of ideology one must become an engaged and situated analyst.
I believe this position is superior to Mannheim's since it
countenances more accurately the relationship between the production
of knowledge and the evaluation of knowledge claims. Once one
accepts the upshot of Kant's and Marx's theories of consciousness and
the production of knowledge, it is no longer possible to assert that
knowledge is produced without significant impact of consciousness
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and of social/historical/economic conditions. Once this claim is
established, then it would be contradictory to assert that the evaluation
of knowledge claims should be (let alone whether it could be)
undertaken from a neutral standpoint, a standpoint untainted by the
influence of human consciousness or prevailing social and historical
conditions. This assertion is tantamount to requiring, for the purposes
of evaluation, the exclusion of the experience central to the production
of knowledge. This is not merely an absurd proposition, it is also
intellectually incoherent to claim both that the production of
knowledge is dependent in important ways on the experience of the
subject and that the claims asserted by that subject must be evaluated by
an individual who has successfully purged himself of all the
particularities of human experience.
In this way then the position that evaluation of knowledge
claims must originate from a situated and engaged observer
successfully avoids the standard criticisms of epistemologies that
require neutral or dispassionate observation. For example, many
feminist theorists, among them Uma Narayan and Patricia Hill
Collins, have taken to task arguments in favor of objective evaluation.
In her essay "The Project of Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives From
a Nonwestern Feminist" Narayan rejects positions favoring neutrality
since these positions often encode arguments that obscure and are
complicit with misogynist ideology. In "Toward An Afrocentric
Feminist Epistemology" Patricia Hill Collins generates a more
sustained critique of positivist epistemologies that result in arrogant
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perception of the experience and ideas of Black women in particular
and Black people in general. Collins argues for an alternative
epistemic position, one that can successfully countenance the
experience of Black women. Setting out from the assertion that all
knowledge claims exist within a knowledge validating process, Collins
claims that positivist methodologies for evaluation are characterized by
the absence of emotions, the assumption that ethics and values are
inappropriate in any evaluation process, and the position that the
evaluator should maintain clear distance between himself and the
object of evaluation (Toward 95). Collins proceeds to explain why such
tenets could not possibly be part of the groundwork of an Afrocentric
Feminist epistemology, primarily because Afrocentric and Feminist
traditions take as fundamental that concrete experience is the criterion
of meaning. Adopting concrete experience as the criterion of meaning
permits subjectivity between the knower and the known, allows for the
use of dialogue (central to both Afrocentric and feminist traditions) in
assessing the veracity of knowledge claims, and is consistent with
ethics of caring and personal responsibility (Toward 96-102).
Collins' and Narayan's critiques of neutrality and objectivity in
evaluation are grounded in intellectual and political histories of
resistance to and liberation from coercive regimes of power and
domination. As such, these critiques are essential to my own attempts
to formulate an analysis that exposes a fundamental contradiction
between the stated mission of the university and prevailing
pedagogical structures within the university. Ultimately, it is my
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position that the nationalist underpinnings of the traditional
curriculum significantly vitiate the effort to teach students to think
critically, to be critics of ideology. In this sense then, my attempt to
expose this contradiction is motivated by my belief that the perpetual
failure to teach students to be critics of ideology is closely associated
with the concomitant experience of many individuals and groups of
social, political, and economic disenfranchisement. Therefore, these
critiques of neutrality and objectivity are relevant to my own attempts
to present an account of evaluation grounded in practical political
awareness and struggle, an account that corresponds to the experience
of individuals and groups resisting oppressive domination and
engaged in active transformation of their social conditions. It is my
aim to distinguish this account of evaluation grounded in practical
political awareness from theories of ideology geared towards
transcending the encounter between the knowing subject and the
object of knowledge; to do so, I will be focusing on the complexity of
that epistemic space rather than attempting to close it altogether.
Central to both Narayan's critique of neutrality and Collins'
Afrocentric Feminist epistemology are a variety of factors relating to
the specificities of the encounter between the knowing subject and the
object of knowledge. Narayan, for example, critiques the notion of
neutrality as she problematizes the concept of epistemic privilege.
Narayan argues that while she is sympathetic to many of the claims
made by standpoint epistemologists, she wants to avoid two correlative
claims. These are first, that those who are differently located socially
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can never attain some understanding of or sympathy with others
unlike them, and second, that just because ontologically plural subjects
are compelled to occupy different contexts does not imply that they can
or will use that potential in a positive or liberatory manner (Narayan
264). In so arguing, Narayan exposes important qualities of the
epistemic space between the knower and the known
- qualities
fundamental to the task of evaluation and critique. Rather than
retreating from the complexity of the encounter, Narayan balances the
necessity of taking experience into consideration in the process of
evaluation against resisting the tendency to think about only the
perspective of individuals who actually share in the specific experience
under consideration.
Collins also situates the theory of an Afrocentric Feminist
epistemology within the encounter between the knower and the
known. Collins argues that an Afrocentric Feminist Standpoint is
suppressed by the twin anomalies of Black and female inequality.
Establishing an Afrocentric Feminist Standpoint requires concrete
knowledge of Black women's realities. But because women of all races
and Black men are faced with social, political, and economic inequality
in comparison to White men, the experiences of Black women are
more often than not obscured by racist sexist ideologies and practices.
The discourse of the "Welfare Queen" is a prime example of such an
ideology and practice that distorts the experience of Black women40 .
Therefore, Collins argues, it is essential to the process of evaluation, of
40See Wahneema Lubiano, "Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels:
Idealogical War by Narrative Means."
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ideology critique, that we adopt the tenets of an Afrocentric Feminist
Standpoint. That is, we must take concrete experience to be the
criterion of meaning. Doing so distinguishes Afrocentric Feminist
epistemology from positivist approaches that are based upon alleged
objectivity. The so-called objectivity of positivism however is illusory,
Collins asserts, since all knowledge claims exist within a knowledge
validating process and thus the claims of positivists are evaluated by
"neutral" experts who occupy the same standpoint of the positivists. In
so arguing, Collins establishes the role of experience in the designation
of knowledge claims as true or false, and she offers a complex method
for beginning to critique with integrity the knowledge claims arising
within communities that are systematically marginalized by dominant
social, political, and economic systems. Collins' theory stands firmly
within the ambiguity of the epistemic space between the knower and
the known.
However, the epistemic position Collins advocates is not
impervious to critique. Collins' work is representative of a significant
theoretical advance over early standpoint epistemology of the type
articulated by Nancy Hartsock in "The Feminist Standpoint." In that
groundbreaking essay Hartsock outlines the contours of feminist
epistemology, based upon the notion that a feminist standpoint is a
theoretical tool for opposing all forms of domination. Hartsock claims
that women have epistemic privilege as a result of being exposed to
male domination, and therefore that women can occupy a feminist
standpoint, a unique epistemic position that provides a correct vision
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of phallocratic domination from a standpoint unavailable to men.
The notion of a feminist standpoint however has been subject to
critique on the grounds that, in general, it leads to the conclusion that
knowledge claims can be evaluated only by those who are similarly
socially situated. More specifically, Hartsock's assertion of a feminist
standpoint has been subject to scrutiny since she lays aside differences
among women (differences in race, class, sexuality, religion, etc.) to
conclude that there are some aspects in common to all women's lives
in Western class societies (Hartsock 163-64). For example, in her essay
"The Theoretical Subjects of This Bridge Called My Back,” Norma
Alarcon argues that feminist standpoint epistemologists "have
substituted, ironically, woman for man" (358) and that this has resulted
in the tendency to deny differences among women if those differences
threaten the "common denominator" category woman{359). In other
words, Alarcon exposes the ways in which feminist standpoint theory
is as exclusive in the construction of the category woman as standard
androcentric epistemologies are in the construction of the category
man. Woman is as unsuccessful in its exclusion of many women as is
man in its exclusion of some men and all women. Thus Collins'
contention that there is an Afrocentric feminist standpoint is a
definitive advance over Hartsock's myopic apprehension of women's
experience; Collins' theory includes as central to the feminist
standpoint that systems of racial domination have produced a
common experience and thus a common epistemic standpoint among
Black people (Collins 95). Thus Collins' theory does more to account
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for differences among women that are relevant to the production and
evaluation of knowledge.
However, the pitfalls of standpoint epistemology are equally
problematic for Collins as they are for Hartsock. Hartsock claims that
there is a central and undeniable experience of women (regardless of
race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, etc.) that places all women in a
standpoint, a unique epistemological and ontological relationship with
the rest of the social world. This standpoint is inherently liberatory
since women (and only women) can see the ways in which standard
accounts of reality are really only descriptions of appearances that
actually function to distort perception of the real nature of reality.
Collins complicates this account by including the impact of
experience specific to Black people, thereby responding to what can be
seen as the White feminist solipsism of Hartsock's theory. However,
the basic theory of standpoint epistemology remains unchanged in
Collins' account. It is still the case according to Collins' epistemology
that a certain group of people, simply on the basis of identity, are
afforded differential, or special, access to social reality. And therefore,
Collins' theory also leaves us in the predicament where only those
who are similarly located socially can evaluate the knowledge claims
we produce. This critique of standpoint epistemology only becomes
more devastating once we accept a complex view of social identity.
Once we recognize that the category woman grossly overgeneralizes the
experiences of females, we are pressed towards increasingly specific
designations of social identity and thus of epistemic similarity. The
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consequence is the increased production of special knowledges
accessible and intelligible only to those who experience the social world
in precisely the same way.
Thus feminist standpoint theory tends either to deny difference
in order to capitalize on the notion of a common women's oppression,
or to elevate the impact of identity on the production of knowledge to
the point where only an individual with identical experience can with
integrity evaluate the knowledge claims produced by any given person.
While standpoint epistemology offers an alternative to Mannheim's
problematic insistence on neutrality and denial of the impact of
experience in the production of knowledge, criticisms of the theory still
stand. I am claiming however that my contention that evaluation
must originate with an engaged and situated observer can as
successfully avoid the pitfalls of arguments for neutrality as it can
avoid these serious criticisms of standpoint epistemology. To avoid
the standpoint epistemologist's descent into impoverished identity
politics and still retain in evaluation the emphasis on the experience
under which knowledge claims are produced, requires that I complicate
the notion that knowledge claims should be evaluated from within the
social and historical conditions under which they are created.
C. Nationalist Definitions of Social Worlds
The idea that social worlds are complex and discontinuous has
enjoyed a certain popularity in contemporary feminist theory.
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However, this notion was expressed prior to the recent advent of
"world" talk in feminist theory by W.E.B. DuBois in his famous work
The Souls of Black Folk. Here DuBois claims that the experience of
Black people in America is one of duality, of being caught between two
different worlds, one Black and one White. The consciousness of the
Negro (sic.), argues DuBois, is characterized by a corresponding split
between being at home or at ease in a Black world and violently
oppressed in a White world. DuBois viewed this phenomenon of
double consciousness as exceptionally painful and destructive for Black
people, as it was indicative of the state of race relations in the United
States at the time of writing.
In recent feminist theory however, particularly in the work of
Gloria Anzaldua and Maria Lugones, the related notions of ontological
plurality, mestiza consciousness, the plural self, and the overlapping
existence of social "worlds," are understood as potentially liberatory
facts of existence for Latinas, Chicanas, Lesbians, and other individuals
confronted with the necessity of traveling among and between
disparate social realities. Lugones begins the development of her
theory of "worlds" in the essay "Hispaneando y Lesbiando: On Sarah
Hoagland's Lesbian Ethics ." Here she argues against simple lesbian
separatism for the sake of rendering meaningless heterosexist reality,
since this act would entail rendering meaningless communities that
are central to her existence as a U.S. Latina lesbian. In so arguing,
Lugones theorizes that she embodies a plural self, a self which cannot
be fully animated in either of the two communities (or "worlds") in
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which she finds herself: la cultura Hispana Nuevomejicana and the
predominantly White realm of lesbian separatists.
Lugones further develops the idea in her
"Structure/Antistructure and Agency Under Oppression" where she
argues that liberatory oppression theory must take into account the fact
that many oppressed people occupy several cultures, worlds, or
realities. Drawing on Victor Turner's distinction between structure
and antistructure, Lugones argues that dominant cultural ideology tries
to tell us that structures of existence are complete and coherent, and
that therefore, our selves should be complete and unitary. But for
Lugones it is not the case that structures of existence are complete and
closed; this is why Lugones chooses the term antistructure to describe
our conditions of existence. For Turner, antistructure is characterized
by liminality, by "the phase between separation and
reaggregation"(Lugones "Structure" 506), and while Lugones retains
some of his terminology she is more interested to conclude that
"liminal states are social states, just as much as structural states
are"(507). Thus, Lugones asserts that the experience of oppressed
people (in this case, victims of ethnocentric racism) is one of moving
between and among social states, structures, antistructures, and limens.
One consequence of this metaphysical multiplicity is a
corresponding plurality of selfhood, an ontological plurality that
permits individuals so situated to travel (sometimes joyfully,
sometimes painfully) between worlds. Thus Lugones claims in her
essay "Playfulness, 'World'-traveling, and Loving Perception" that "[a]
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'world' need not be a construction of a whole society. It may be a
construction of a tiny portion of a particular society. It may be
inhabited by just a few people. . . a 'world' may be an incomplete
visionary non-utopian construction of life or it may be a traditional
conception of life"(395). In so arguing Lugones is attempting to stretch
our received notions of what a culture or a society is composed of. In
place of the idea that the social world is constructed by clearly
distinguishable entities (for example, by geographical designation -
continent, nation, state, city, borough, neighborhood, etc.), Lugones
produces an image of ultimate complexity and multiplicity of social
contexts. It is upon this rubric of ontological plurality and
metaphysical complexity that Lugones builds her accounts of
oppression, resistance, and liberation.
Similarly, as I work to define and defend the claim that only
from the standpoint of engaged and situated observation can an
individual successfully undertake the evaluation of knowledge claims,
the critique of ideology, I also have to complicate the notion I draw
upon - historical and social conditions - to explain my position. I have
argued, like Mannheim, that knowledge claims should be evaluated
from within the social and historical conditions under which they are
produced. I have distinguished my position from Mannheim's
however by asserting that such evaluation must be engaged in by a
situated - not neutral or detached - observer. And thus I am left with
the notion that the critique of ideology is only possible for individuals
somehow situated in the social and historical conditions under which
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the ideology in question is (or was) produced. Thus, I have to
complicate the idea that knowledge claims should be evaluated from
within the social and historical conditions under which they are
created. Drawing on the work of Lugones and Anzaldua, I want to say
that historical and social conditions are continually overlapping.
Therefore it is false to say that there are distinct or purely defined social
and historical conditions. Thus the description of social and historical
conditions I am appealing to is somewhat analogous to Lugones'
notion of "worlds" and the ways in which "worlds" exist both in
isolation from one another and in contact with one another.
The social and historical conditions under which knowledge
claims are produced are ultimately complex and multiplicitous. This is
a fact that nationalism attempts to conceal. Through careful
manipulation of national cultural icons, media, official history, the
political process, and national identity, nationalism tells the story of a
nation's ineluctable progress towards definition, sovereignty, or
dominance. Central to the coherence of these stories is the eradication
of any idea, event, individual, or group inconsistent with the process of
what nationalism takes to be the nation's destiny. And so we see in the
United States, Quebec, Algeria, and Hawai'i the attempts to sanitize and
homogenize various manifestations of culture and identity. Thus
nationalism functions to conceal the ultimate complexity and overlap
of social and historical conditions.
For example, nationalist ideology in Hawai'i rejects the task of
analyzing sexually violent hate crimes perpetrated by Native Hawaiian
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men against light-skinned women. To begin to understand these
crimes requires that one engage both histories of colonial domination
and histories of male violence against women. Nationalist ideology
then, in cases such as these, fails to permit sustained analysis of the
situation. Moreover, nationalist ideology perpetuates the perception of
social and historical reality as falsely divided into discrete social worlds
sharing nothing but borders. That is, nationalist ideology in Hawai'i
and the United States makes it impossible to consider both the
operation of sexist misogyny in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement
and the impact of colonialism on social relations between men and
women in the United States. This is only one example of the
mechanism whereby nationalism constructs the social world as
divided into discrete realms. Linguistic purity initiatives in the United
States and Quebec undertake to erase the complexity of linguistic
identity, and thus of racial or ethnic identity, present within the
national borders. Here again nationalism falsely constructs the social
world. Despite nationalist efforts to suppress the myriad ways in which
different social realms encroach upon one another, the social (and thus
historical) worlds in which people live and create knowledge claims
are ultimately complex and heterogeneous.
If this is the case, then it is fundamental for individuals to be
critics of ideology that they have a sense of overlap in "worlds,” in
social and historical conditions, and thus in intellectual traditions and
ideologies. To evaluate successfully the claims coming from any social
and historical conditions one must comprehend those systems. The
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conception of social reality I am working from therefore has serious
consequences for knowledge, and thus has political consequences for
the theory and practice of education.
D. Multicultural Representations of Intellectual History
How is it possible though to apprehend the complexity of social
and historical conditions under which knowledge claims are produced,
especially when many individuals, because they do not occupy
positions of subordination in the social world, are unaware of the
multiplicity of "worlds"? On Lugones' and Anzaldua's theories, people
who are forced to animate plural selves - people who experience at
least one form of social oppression in their lives - are also forced to
experience the social world as multiple and complex. But what of
individuals so situated as not to be confronted with the complexity of
social contexts? This is an especially relevant question for my thesis
since I am directing my analysis specifically at university level
humanities curriculums in the United States, and the majority of
students in these degree programs possess some sort of social power (be
it drawn from class, race, gender, sexuality, age, religion, etc.).
There are many ways of getting within the social and historical
conditions under which knowledge is created, the most obvious being
to live the social and historical conditions under question. However,
this is not the only way to apprehend social and historical conditions.
If one were to hold this position then one would have to concede that
211
no one could ever judge knowledge claims created in social or
historical conditions that were not one's own. This is obviously an
absurd position that becomes incomprehensible once one recognizes
the complexity of social and historical conditions. The primacy of
apprehending social and historical conditions through lived experience
notwithstanding, I am concerned here to consider the relationship
between the apprehension of social and historical conditions and
intellectual training in the university. While there are obviously other
ways of apprehending these conditions, I am focusing on the ways in
which intellectual training can impede or expedite such apprehension.
If it is the case that study without evaluation generates intellectual
incoherence, and it is also the case that claims must be evaluated
within the social and historical conditions under which they exist and
are created, it is essential to establish which pedagogical conditions
make possible this apprehension.
To apprehend those systems through intellectual training
requires that the intellectual training correspond to the complexities of
social and historical conditions. Thus rigorous multicultural
education is the only kind of institutionalized education - other than
having the experience of social and historical conditions other than
one's own - that makes it possible for individuals to apprehend
unfamiliar social and historical conditions. Moreover, rigorous
multicultural education may be the most effective way for
ontologically unified individuals to become familiar with the
complexity of social reality, and thus intellectual reality. It is this
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apprehension that is fundamental to the evaluation of knowledge
claims produced outside of one s social and historical conditions.
Therefore it is central to the intellectual development of individuals
that, for example, they be given the opportunity to apprehend social
and historical conditions other than their own so that they will be able
to evaluate knowledge claims with intellectual and ethical integrity.
I want to be clear though that this is not simply a call for
students to be exposed to social and historical conditions other than
their own. Of course, this is exactly what I am arguing for. However, I
am arguing not for a simple "taste of the world" attitude whereby
students are exposed to, for example, "African-American cultural
traditions" or "Asian-American literature." These are the very
exercises in "diversity training" that reproduce homogenized (and
often nationalist, racist, homophobic, or anti-Semitic) versions of
cultural and intellectual manifestations. What I am arguing for is a
fundamental transformation in the way that we, as educators,
represent intellectual history to our students. The continued
representation of intellectual history according to nationalist
understandings of intellectual production impedes the process of
students becoming critics of ideology. It forces students to become
situated in one intellectual tradition without a sense of the
relationship between that tradition and others. In so doing, such a
presentation of intellectual history undermines the process whereby
students become conscious of the ultimate complexity of social and
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historical conditions, of the existence of a complex of overlapping
"worlds" that constitute reality.
For example, to teach about the process whereby Hawai i became
first a territory and then a state within the national purview of the
United States, and to expect that students will be able to adjudicate
successfully among the diverse accounts of that period in United States'
history (as well as contested contemporary narratives of Hawai'i's
history of statehood), requires that the curriculum be responsive to the
complexity of social and historical conditions under which ideas were
produced and are produced about those events in history. So, on my
theory, it is not the case that we should not teach the so-called DWEM's
(dead White European males) since theirs is the intellectual
justification of colonization, annexation, and oppression. In fact, on
the theory that I advocate it is essential to teach, for example,
colonialist literature on Cook's adventures and triumphs in the strange
tropical land known as Hawai'i. Alongside of the colonialist literature
it is necessary to teach, for example, Haunani Kay-Trask's From a
Native Daughter, and to include explanations of the 1993
Congressional resolution apologizing to Hawaiians for the United
States' role in overthrowing the Native Hawaiian monarchy in 1893. It
is essential to do so since to evaluate the disparate set of knowledge
claims about Hawai'i one must have an opportunity to apprehend the
social and historical conditions under which those ideas were and are
produced. To most non-Hawaiians or non-Pacific Island specialists,
these social and historical conditions are unknown. Inquiry into
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contemporary Hawaiian politics will certainly yield conflicting
explanations of poverty, development, and tourism. However, it is the
apprehension of the conflict that is essential to evaluation. As I have
argued earlier, preventing students from engaging the complexity of
social and political reality only reinforces falsely purified nationalist
conceptions of personal and group identity, social reality, and national
culture. Again, apprehension of this contradiction is not for the sake of
achieving objectivity. This is for the sake of providing students the
necessary means to becoming situated and engaged analysts, critics of
ideology.
E. Ideology Critique and The Practice of Freedom
I can now return to the question I set out to answer at the outset
of this chapter: why does nationalist education undermine the process
of teaching students to become situated, engaged observers and agents,
critics of ideology? As I have argued in Chapter Three, students
educated in seamless intellectual traditions impervious to critique (for
example, the Western Rationalistic Tradition and the European
Tradition taught to the exclusion of all other intellectual traditions) are
intellectually impaired as concerns the necessary resources to draw
upon in the process of critiquing ideology. Students so educated lack
instruction in the methodology of meta-critique - the critique of the
theory behind the intellectual system in which one is engaged.
Additionally however, students educated in seamless and nationalist
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intellectual traditions lack the necessary material to draw upon to
adopt a critical standpoint. Nationalist education prevents students
from becoming multiply situated and therefore prevents students from
becoming critics of ideology. The failure to push students towards
becoming multiply situated diminishes the possibility of their being
able to recognize the theoretical and practical connections between
seemingly unrelated claims or practices. This is so since the production
and evaluation of knowledge claims is contingent upon engaging the
complexity of the epistemic space between the knower and the known.
Individuals with broader access to these many and diverse epistemic
spaces will therefore be better prepared to bring their knowledge and
experience to bear on the task of ideology critique.
The idea I am defending is that to permit the development of
critical consciousness pedagogy must stand definitively against
nationalism. I mean by this that the epistemology underlying the
pedagogy must correspond to the complexities of social and historical
reality. Thus the pedagogical approach must take into account the
connection between the complexities of identity, the complexities of
social and historical conditions, and the oppressiveness of nationalism
as a political and ideological movement that attempts to subvert the
complexities of identity and of social and political conditions. The
epistemology that follows from nationalist theories of political reality
is necessarily impoverished, thin, and brittle. Nationalist ideology tells
a story about the universal identity of the citizens of the nation, about
invasions or threats of invasion by foreigners, individuals who do not
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meet the imagined criteria for citizenship. In so doing, nationalist
ideology constructs distinct "worlds" of social, historical, and political
reality and history. These "worlds" are the nationally defined
communities, the nations. The politics of nationalism require that all
aspects of social reality correspond to the purity and homogeneity of
the imagined national community. And thus, the "worlds" imagined
by nationalist ideology and policy are distinct, pure, autonomous, etc.
Nationalist "worlds" refuse to admit the reality of ontological plurality,
of mestizaje consciousness, of the border dweller. And therefore, the
kind of intellectual training that treats social and historical conditions
as if they too are distinct, pure, and autonomous is indicative of
nationalist imaginings of the "world."
I am thinking here of Edward Said's term "worldly," of Gloria
Anzaldua's conception of the Borderlands, of Maria Lugones' "worlds,"
W.E.B. DuBois' color line, etc. In this way then the conception of a
social world that I am working from is fundamentally different from
nationalist imaginings of the "world." I have discussed concrete
examples of some of these differences in my explanation of the
dialectical relationship between national identity and national culture.
Nationalism, as the sentiment mediating between identity and culture,
creates as its by-product the nationalist conception of the "world." For
example, the conception of Hawai'i as a tropical paradise filled with
lovely hula hands is fundamentally distinct from, but just as inaccurate
in its description of Hawai'i as is the notion perpetuated by some
Hawaiian nationalists that all White people (the haole) are responsible
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for the destruction of the island and are therefore rightfully subject to
violence from native Hawaiians41
. The case of language use in Quebec
is another instructive example. In this situation, the "world" of
Quebec constructed by the Parti Quebecois (and others) is defined in
stark contrast to the rest of Quebec. Any deviation from this
nationalist imagining is attributed to the work of foreigners or
deviants, illegitimate occupants of the "world" so conceived by
nationalist intention. Nationalist constructions of the linguistic
"world" in Quebec refuse to admit the presence of Vietnamese people,
Sudanese people, etc. and their respective linguistic codes. The
ramifications of these nationalist refusals can be devastating for
individuals who do not possess the proper traits for national
citizenship.
So when I claim to be operating under a different set of
assumptions about the characteristics of social, historical, and political
conditions, about the characteristics of "worlds," I am not appealing to
fanciful metaphysical notions without any corresponding examples in
the observable world. I am referring to concrete realities. I am
referring to the fact that despite all news reports to the contrary, Algeria
is not fully populated by Muslim fundamentalists. There are secular
Muslims in Algeria. Moreover, at the time Fanon wrote The
4 1 This claim stands in the discourse of Hawaiian sovereignty even though Native
Hawaiians are classified as such by the Federal Government as those individuals with
fifty percent or greater blood quantum and by various Native Hawaiian groups as those
who self-identify as Native (Trask 70-71). Thus, individuals with fifty percent or
greater white blood quantum could be both the individuals seeking Native rule and the
individuals responsible for the colonization and destruction of Hawai i s Native
culture.
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Wretched of the Earth there were bourgeois Algerians who operated
according to significant alliances to and allegiances with the retreating
French colonizers.
In asserting an alternative conception of a "world" in opposition
to nationalist fantasies I am responding to the realities of
multilingualism and multiculturalism in the United States. These
facts of diversity in language and culture are not descriptive merely of
the combination of different people and social structures in the United
states; bilingualism and multiculturalism are descriptive also of
individuals themselves. That is, the kind of diversity, pluralism, and
multiplicity that I am referring to is not merely the result of mixing
together a variety of people monolingual, monocultural, and different
from one another. This diversity is also the result of diversity within
individuals: cultural, linguistic, ethnic, racial, religious diversity
within individuals. And it is this specific diversity that nationalist
campaigns such as the English Only Movement attempt to suppress.
I am confident that the alternative conception of social reality I
am arguing for corresponds to the experience many people do have of
social reality. Many have argued however that the experience of
"double-vision" brought forth by ontological plurality is not necessarily
liberatory. For example, Uma Narayan in her essay "The Project of
Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives From a Nonwestern Feminist"
asserts that just because ontologically plural subjects are compelled to
occupy different contexts does not imply that they can or will use that
potential in a positive or liberatory manner; thus, she claims, neither is
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ontological plurality necessarily a positive condition. I do not mean to
discount the claims of Narayan or others like her who find the
characterization of ontological plurality as "playful" (Lugones) or
revolutionary (Anzaldua) to be crude and offensive to the many
individuals who report as painful the experience of being forced to
occupy the social world as border-dwellers and "world"-travelers. It is
not my intention to contribute to further romanticization of the
experience of individuals compelled to negotiate complex identities
and complex arrangements of social worlds, especially when
ontologically plural individuals are subjected to arrogant perception
and a corresponding lack of agency in some of those "worlds." It is
instead my intention to respond to the ontological realities with which
we are confronted and to attempt to understand the epistemological
consequences of those ontological realities. Specifically, I am concerned
with the ways in which the realization of the stated mission of the
university is contingent upon the recognition of and response to the
complexities of identity and social reality. And thus while I am well
aware of the pitfalls of "double-vision," it is clear that in that
experience there is much to be gained as far as insight into the
epistemic space between any knowing subject and object of knowledge.
Finally, while the ability to critique ideology seems to me
necessary for the university to achieve its announced mission of
serving as a site for the pursuit of truth and the sharing of knowledge,
the ability to practice ideology critique has consequences far beyond the
reach of the university. The ability to critique ideology is a necessary
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condition for action which can meaningfully be said to be chosen, a
necessary condition for freedom. This kind of freedom can be
characterized as an ability to act without compulsion, without
ignorance, and without coercion. I am concerned here with what
Aristotle describes as voluntary action. Aristotle states: "the voluntary
would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent
himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the
action"(Barnes, Nicomachean Ethics
,
111:1, lllla24). I am interested in
Aristotle's account of action since he suggests that freedom and self-
determination are not the result of objective detachment from political
community (Mannheim's thesis), nor are they the result of submission
to a predetermined set of political principles (nationalist formulation).
Freedom and self-determination are rather the result of the capacity for
choice, for meaningful decision. This account of voluntary action is
strikingly similar to Marilyn Frye's position on coercion in her Politics
of Reality. She states: "The structure of coercion, then, is this: to coerce
someone into doing something, one has to manipulate the situation so
that the world as perceived by the victim presents the victim with a
range of options the least unattractive of which (or the most attractive
of which) in the judgment of the victim is that act one wants the
victim to do'fPolitics of Reality 56). Therein Frye presents another
description of the conditions necessary for meaningful choice: the
ability to see manipulation. One cannot see either manipulation or
liberation from a nationalist perspective, from a perspective that
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refuses to recognize the complexities of social reality, the multiplicity
and impurity of social worlds.
Moreover, non-nationalist multicultural education opens the
possibility of developing heterogeneous group identity that avoids the
pernicious tendency to purify brought forth by nationalism.
Nationalist versions of culture and identity project themselves
forward in time to precast the contours of the nation. In so doing,
nationalism falsely prefigures the characteristics of national culture
and identity. One consequence of this predetermination is the
cultivation of falsely pure and homogeneous constructions of national
identity and culture. Two examples are the fictitious accounts of
national linguistic history outlined by the English Only Movement and
the spurious national intellectual past valorized by experts such as
Bloom, D'Souza, and Searle.
The advent of perpetual evaluation, persistent critique of
ideology, stands in direct opposition to the nationalist tendency to
predetermine falsely homogeneous constructions of national culture
and identity. Therefore, the implementation of non-nationalist
multicultural education offers more than the opportunity for
individuals to share meaningfully in the ideal of the university.
Tenacious and prevalent ideology critique stands to make possible the
continual contestation and creation of national identity and culture,
offering perhaps the possibility of developing heterogeneous group
identity that does not devolve into nationalist, racist, sexist, etc.,
definitions and proscriptions.
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Such a process appears to be at work in the Native Hawaiian
Plebiscite, a mail-in vote that began on 15 July 1996 and continues
through 15 August 1996. In this case, the ballot asks only one vague
question of the 85,000 Native Hawaiians: "Shall the Hawaiian People
elect delegates to propose a Native Hawaiian government?" The
composition, political platform, and jurisdiction of such a Native
Hawaiian government have intentionally been left undecided and
undefined by the various groups supporting different conceptions of
Native Hawaiian sovereignty42 . If the coalition of organizations
supporting different versions of Native sovereignty is able to maintain
through persistent ideology critique the clash of different values and
conceptions of Native identity, there is a chance that Native Hawaiians
can create a sovereign heterogeneous national community grounded
in the continual struggle over conceptions of national identity and
culture. That is, there is a chance of avoiding the pernicious reification
process put in motion by nationalism through the practice of
widespread ideology critique.
One of my primary intentions has been to explore the ways in
which political conditions of choice and agency turn on different
theories of ideology, as epistemological theories. The ability to engage
in ideology critique is a necessary condition for voluntary action, it is a
necessary condition for action that is not informed by coercion, it is a
necessary condition for choice. It is essential, for individual and
collective liberation, to make possible choice and voluntary action
42See Carey Goldberg, "Native Hawaiians Vote in Referendum on Creating an Ethnic
Government." New York Times 23 July 1996: A10.
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characterized by an absence of compulsion and ignorance; when action
comes from knowledge it can then be said to be voluntary.
Interrupting the process of automatic identification with the socially
constructed categories of identity through multicultural education
presents the possibility of reconstructing historically marginalized
categories of identity. For this reason, the practice of ideology critique is
not only central to the effective fulfillment of the mission of the
university, it is essential to the human practice of freedom.
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